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The unpredictable and the predetermined unfold together to make everything the way 
it is. It's how nature creates itself, on every scale, the snowflake and the snowstorm. 
It makes me so happy... It's the best possible time to be alive, when almost 
everything you thought you knew is wrong. 
Arcadia, Tom Stoppard 
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Abstract 
In this thesis I shall outline various modernist authors' arguments that collectivities 
(such as ethnic groups, nations, states and cultures) and subjectivities employ 
sacrificial violence to establish and assert their identity where identity is inescapably 
(?) understood in terms of the sovereignty of the collective or the post-Oedipal 
autonomy of the individual. To this end, violence has been posited as a historical and 
conceptual inevitability and is set as the default-state of human nature and politics. In 
recent times, protesting voices (from post-feminist, post-colonial, post-modern and 
the emerging human rights discourses) have begun to rigorously contest the notion of 
violence as the default-state. As a result, the legitimacy of sacrifice as the primary 
modus to an autonomous selfhood has been radically problematised. I believe that a 
comprehensive understanding of the nature of this crisis of identity formation , and the 
possibility of transcending it, is to be found in the paradigmatic shift away from 
Newtonian thought toward a post-Newtonian worldview. 
In seeking to challenge the assumption of violence-as-default, I shall translate 
the comprehensive sacrificial nature of collective identity and subjectivity into a 
complexity-based model that allowed me to make three crucial conceptual moves 
toward a comprehensive understanding of post-sacrificial identities that occupy an 
important place in a post-Newtonian world. First, it will allow me to challenge the 
assumptions that supported the Hobbesian myth of autonomy/sovereignty sacrificially 
achieved by charting the ontological shift that compels us to understand "entities" (be 
it a cell , an individual or a state) not in terms of autonomy but interdependence. 
Secondly, it provides the conceptual tools needed to understand the systemic nature of 
sacrificial violence by reading subjectivity violence and collectivity violence in terms 
of their organic self-similarity. This will equip me to comprehensively explore a post-
sacrificial epistemology valid for both collective identities and subjectivity. Thirdly, I 
propose a model of post-sacrificial identities that are created and sustained at the edge 
of chaos through the dynamic interplay of order and disorder that reconciles creative 
and destructive forces in a generative unity. I believe that this post-Newtonian reading 
will clear the conceptual space needed to suggest there might yet be hope for a future 
that does not embrace violence as default-state. 
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Introduction 
In this thesis I hope to provide a novel contribution to the existing discussion 
in social theory around the nexus between violence and identity. To begin speculating 
about the linkages between forms of violence and formations of identity, I pose two 
pertinent questi0n.s . Firstly, to what extent has violence historically acted as a force of 
identity (re) construction? And secondly, what is the precise nature of the connection 
between the violence employed in the formation of individual and collective 
identities? Or in other words, how do we account for the filtration of violence 
between levels of social existence? In tracing the theme of the violence-identity nexus 
to address these questions, in the first chapter I shall discuss Rene Girard's theory of 
the centrality of violence in human culture. In an oeuvre that spans more than thirty 
years, and draws from a wide range of work from ethnological, anthropological and 
socio-political fields, Girard has compiled an extremely convincing and equally 
terrifying account of the tendency of groups to seek out an outsider against whom to 
perpetrate violence as a modus for inventing its identity or sense of self. In Violence 
and the Sacred (1977) Girard contends that at the foundation of any community 
stands an act of collective murder that brings cycles of reciprocal violence between 
humans as mimetic creatures to a close. Rivals defer their aggression onto a scapegoat 
victim who is unanimously sacrificed by the community and such a violent arche-
sacrificial ritual generates a collective solidarity that accounts for the violent origin of 
human culture. Based on his deduction that human culture was formed in violence, 
and that collectivities know only the spilling of blood as a catalyst for social cohesion, 
Girard proposes that culture necessarily sustains itself violently through the re-
enactment of ancient rituals that invoke the expulsion or even eradication of an arche 
or original 'other'. Following this conceptual scheme, we may argue that all collective 
identities (groups, societies, nations, states and empires) are diachronically or 
historically (re) constructed through a re-enactment of this sacrificial logic. 
In the second chapter, I shall argue following Julia Kristeva (whose work is 
rooted in a long psychoanalytic tradition dating back to Sigmund Freud) that this 
sacrificial logic also accounts, synchronicallyi , for the constitution of subjectivity as 
such. In Kristeva's model it is the sacrificial rejection of the mother, or abjection, 
1 The use of the word "synchronic" in this study derives from De Saussure's Course ill Geneml 
Linguistics (1974). 
8 
which is originary (in a constitutive sense) to the subject's emergence into society. 
She posits a "single founding and traumatic moment that inaugurates the eltperience 
of abjection" (Hook 2003 :53). It is traumatic insofar as the initial separation of the 
subject from the unity within the maternal body that constitutes the founding moment 
of subjectivity formation (Anderson 2000) involves violence, or the violent expulsion 
of the mother. Abjection enacted as matricide, then, is a vital sacrificial moment in the 
construction of subjectivity within patriarchal culture because the maternal body 
poses the primary threat to its autonomy (Oliver 1998). By extension, the perpetual 
rejection of abject forces (of all traces the maternal body) is necessary in the securing 
of the stable and cohesive identity. From Kristeva I hope to illustrate that subjectivity 
is constructed sacrificially in a patriarchal context. 
In chapter three, I shall argue that this structural similarity reveals the violent 
nature of Western modernity - concerned as it had been with the violent construction 
and maintenance of subjectivity and collectivities like the state. There is thus 
something modernist2 in both the work of Kristeva and Girard whose understanding 
of identity formation works on the principle of exclusion, or definition at the cost of 
Social solidarity is induced by a scapegoat sacrifice that depends upon the eradication 
of the Other and similarly, the sacrificial violence involved in the emergence of the 
subject in the social order demands the symbolic annihilation of the (m)Other. This 
reveals that the violent expnnging of the scapegoat victim to create community is 
comparable in logic to the violent abjecting of the maternal body in the construction 
of subjectivity. In both instances, sacrifice is the modus whereby the autonomy of the 
individual and collective are constructed and sustained and it is the specific nature of 
this comparison that this thesis intends to scrutinize. 
In seeking to make comprehensive sense of the violence-identity nexus by 
clarifying conceptually the coterminous articulation of a fascination with personal 
autonomy and collective sovereignty as exemplified in the Newtonian paradigm' , I 
will examine the ways in which political theorists like Thomas Hobbes, Benedict de 
Spinoza, Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, articulate the relationship 
between a violent human nature and violent state interaction. From here, it will 
become possible to engage one of the founding mythologies of Western modernity -
2 In terms of the historical narrative employed here, "modernist" is associated with "Newtonian" and 
"post-modern" with "post-Newtonian". 
3 This use of the word "Newtonian" derives from authors like Capra (1982) and Merchant ( 1983). 
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that violence is the default-state of human nature (Hobbes; Girard) and, consequently, 
of political associations (Hobbes, Kant, Spinoza, Waltz, Morgenthau et all. The case 
of the identity articulation of the modern man and the modern state provides an 
excellent, specific example of the violence-identity nexus and whilst I shall explore 
the extent to which both were forged in violent expulsion of the feminine as Other, 
my project is a philosophical one, which seeks to launch a more fundamental critique 
of the possibility of conceiving identity formation beyond a reductionist association 
with violence. 
To do so, I shall argue for a synthetic unity of Girard and Kristeva' s analyses 
of sacrificial violence that will offer two important insights into the violence-identity 
nexus. One, that sacrificial violence has both a diachronic or historical dimension 
(Girard) and a synchronic or constitutive dimension (Kristeva) and two, that 
sacrificial violence accounts not only for the formation and maintenance of large 
collective identities (societies, cultures or civilizations) but also for the formation of 
subjectivity at a personal level. Despite the similarity of sacrificial violence in the 
construction of individual and collective identity, what is lacking is a model that can 
account for the violence-identity nexus as a systemic phenomenon, or an account that 
can accommodate an understanding of violent identity formation that is engaged at all 
levels of social existence (be it the individual, community, state or empire). To put 
forward such a comprehensive theory on the basis of which to postulate some kind of 
"analogical relationship" between human nature (subjectivity) and state formation 
(collective identity) is not a radical departure from conventional political theory. 
Where social contract theorists read the relation between man and state in analogous 
terms, I propose that the birth of the Western ideal of the modern, autonomous 
individual is epistemically coterminous with the emergence of the modern nation-state 
that points us to a more fundamental connection than such Hobbesian analogies may 
suggest. What I am searching for is an interpretative model that tells us how 
methodologically the "below" relates to the "above. I believe that such an integrated, 
comprehensive model that can accommodate both an individual and collective level 
explanation of the violence-identity nexus becomes available when we view society in 
complex dynamical terms. 
The primary goal of the final two chapters is to discuss, in a compret.ensive 
way, what it would mean to disengage from the violence of inventing and reinventing 
the identities of individuals, communities and states sacrificially. Again, I suspect that 
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complexity theory will be extremely useful in this pursuit. Complexity is a nascent 
and vast domain of knowledge that constitutes various branches of study. From 
mathematics the field of fractal geometry has developed. Computer science offers 
another area of study concerned with the development and application of computer 
simulated models that enable us to understand society as network or interdependent 
entities. Advances in physics have allowed for the emergence of chaos theory and 
new approaches in the life sciences have made the reappraisal of an organismic view 
of society possible. Given the limitations of this study I cannot possibly delimit the 
entire domain. Instead I shall draw on a very specific set of contributions from 
physics (chaos theory), mathematics (fractal geometry) and the life sciences (revival 
of the organismic world-view) and explore only those concepts necessary for my re-
reading of Kristeva and Girard; a re-reading that is aimed at conceiving the formation 
of subjectivity (chapter four) and collective identity (chapter five) in non-sacrificial 
terms. This means that concepts like "emergence" and "non-linearity" - central as 
they may be to complexity studies - will not be discussed. This thesis, then, is not 
"about" complexity theory. Rather, I believe concepts central to that emergent domain 
can allow me to make two strategic moves. Firstly, to address the question at both the 
individual and the social level and thus explore the possibility of identity formation 
beyond violence in systemic (i.e. self-similar) terms. Secondly, it allows me to sever 
the modernist connection between identity and autonomy/sovereignty and to prioritise 
the inter-relatedness or interdependence of entities as basic, ontological assumption. 
In my opinion both these points need to be explored in order to chart a way towards a 
post-sacrificial identity formation. The combination of self-similarity and organismic 
functionalism accounts for or explains the specific way in which "complexity" is read 
and used in this thesis4. 
The opportunity to do so testifies to the new space opened by current 
paradigmatic shift from the ModernistlNewtonian to a post-Newtonian worldview that 
may be as significant as the shift from the organismic to Newtonian world that 
occurred several hundred years ago (see Capra 1982). A move of this magnitude 
involves a complete revision of the ideas and values that sustained the previous 
hegemonic order and no aspect of social existence will go unaffected. For example, 
..j In the complexity domain there does not seem to be much consensus on the relationship between 
"complexity" and chaos theory. Some might argue that my reading and use of the domain is more 
closely aligned to "chaos theory" than complexity theory. For a discussion of the complexity of the 
domain itself, see Thriffl (1999). 
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the sacrificial mechanisms that have historically ensured our sense of individual and 
collective selfhood have begun to fail us. This failure of violence in acting as an 
effective catalyst for identity formation stimulates what Girard terms a "sacrificial 
crisis" that leads to an eruption of violence in a community. This is manifest in the 
increased viciousness and prevalence of violence in the contemporary global 
(dis)order. Indeed, this "crisis of degree" has reached global proportions as cycles of 
retaliatory violence have been unleashed by in the international arena and are being 
played out in the streets of Baghdad and the undergrounds of London. We thus find 
ourselves in a perplexing and intimidating moment in human history. An instinctual 
response is pessimistic and reads the nature of the multifaceted crisis of transition in 
destructive terms. But we must remember that after a time of destruction and decay, 
comes a time of rebirth. In drawing my inspiration from Fritjoy Capra who wrote, 
"During the painful process of disintegration the society's creativity - its ability to 
respond to challenges - is not completely lost" (1983: 10), I seek to excavate the 
creative dimension of the subject and society's response to the violence of 
disintegration that has historically been buried, even sacrificed, but certainly not lost. 
In theorising identity formation in the light of this paradigm shift, I hope to 
chart a way forward beyond the systemic fascination of individuals, communities and 
states with "autonomy" and thus offer an optimistic account of the possibility of 
articulating identity beyond its historical nexus with violence. 
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Chapter 1 
The Sacrificial Search for Collective Selfhood 
The women came into view, nearly a thousand of them. Some of them who had 
babies in their arms raised them up and waved them like flags of grief and vengeance. 
Others younger with chests puffed out like warriors, wielding sticks, whilst the 
elderly were an awful sight as they yelled so hard the yeins in their skinny necks 
looked almost ready to snap. The men brought up the rear: two thousand frenzied 
madmen, pit-boys, colliers, and repairers moving in a single block, so closely packed 
together that they could not be distinguished from the uniform earth-coloured mass. 
All that could be seen was their burning eyes and the black holes of their mouths as 
they sang the Marseillaise . . . above their heads an axe was raised . .. a single axe, the 
banner of the mob, and it stood out against the ;-Icy like the blade of a guillotine. 
Germinal, Emile Zola (my translation) 
All Nation-States are born and found themselves in violence 
On Forgiveness, Jacques Denida 
1.1. Introduction 
In her beautifully poetic and poignant work The Algebra of Infinite Justice 
(200 I) Arundhati Roy reveals the presence of scapegoating in the policies and 
planning of the Indian government. In particular she refers to the Prime Minister, Dr. 
Manmohan Singh, who in his addresses to the nation and published propaganda, 
dressed up as poetry, has actively sought to mobilise the peoples ' support of 
continued violent retribution against Pakistan. Roy claims he has done so by fuell ing 
the notion of Indians as long-suffering victims of their neighbour's aggression. She 
writes 
That' s the substance of it. That's our meat and our drink. We need enemies. We have 
so little sense of ourselves as a nation , we cast about for targets to define ourselves 
against. To prevent the state from crumbling, we need a national cause, and other than 
our currency (and of course, poverty, illiteracy and elections) , we have none .. . This is 
the road that has led us to the (nuclear) bomb. This search for selfhood (Roy 
2001:27; emphasis added) 
In India, Roy claims that the search for sclfhood is intrinsically violent. She argues the 
nation 's fragile identity is predictably and perpetually bolstered against collapse by 
mobilising the P.1asses against a series of targeted enemies who are constructed as the 
source of the state's malaise. India is by no means unique in this regard. From the 
Salem Witch Hunts to the French Revolution , to the Holocaust's KIistalnacht and 
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Auschwitz to the Black Death, the Crucifixion of Christ, McCarthyism and Mao's 
Cultural Revolution to the Rwandan genocide, Sarajevo, Kosovo and most recently 
the War on Terror, collective identities are relentlessly defined vis-a-vis a diminished, 
sacrificeable emissary. What these parties - from women to Jews to Communists to 
blacks to Iraqis to homosexuals to ethnic minorities - have in common is that they are 
all the victims of unjust violence or dis~rimination. They are victims upon whom evil, 
fear, wrong-ness and violence pent up in society are projected, precisely because they 
are constructed as the Other which, it is believed, stands diametrical opposed to an 
accepted way of life or system of beliefs. The other (and all that it embodies) needs to 
be held on the outside to assert that which is held dear. Whether They (the oft 
unnameable, unrecognisable, formless enemy who we do not know yet know to fear) 
pose a veritable threat or not, is trivial; the point is that they become real enemies. We 
'cast around for them' and ultimately we find them because our sense of self demands 
it. We believe these enemies embody a threat to that which we are, or that which we 
as a community seek to become. Govier writes: 
Wounded individuals and groups seek their own healing and redemption, the 
restoration of their own power and self-esteem, in their ability to assert themselves 
and impose snffering on others" (2002:34). 
All anguished collectivities seek out the blood of minorities, outsiders and constructed 
others whom the group seeks to brutalise, dehumanise and even murder. This 
collective action seems to possess a therapeutic power through which the community 
may restore a sense of social harmony and redeem its flagging sense of self-identity. 
In simple terms, the construction of strong group identity through the manipulation of 
'us versus them' logic to bolster group spirit and divert attention from group problems 
(Bailie 1995:47) is a well-documented phenomenon. Girard however postulates a 
more fundamental explanation. His hypothesis places violence at both the heart of 
human nature and at the origin of human culture and proposes that all collectivities 
(whether families , tribes, groups, communities or nation-states) construct their 
identities through violent unanimous action perpetrated against a scapegoat. He 
argues that in circumstances where the very identity of the group and the sense of 
solidarity amongst its members are fundamentally challenged, individuals become 
immersed in group or mob violence perpetrated against a more or less arbitrary 
outsider. This points to the thematic concern of this chapter, namely to make sense of 
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the nexus between violence and collective identity, or in other words to understand 
the ways in which violence enacted collectively generates an invigorated sense of 
social unity. To do so is a daunting task, as it requires us to delve into the dark side of 
human nature and confront the reality of the viscous, violent underbelly of our 
cultural order. It also requires us to confront the reality that the more uncertain the 
community is of i!s sense of self and the closer the community comes to crumbling, 
the more frantic the search for scapegoats and the more extreme the violence against 
them becomes. Communities search desperately for a form of violence that promises 
to wield transformative power - a public hanging, a necklacing or even ethnic 
massacre will no longer do in generating the desired social unity. The enemy must not 
merely be attacked; they must be destroyed, annihilated. The terror lies in the 
(retrospective) realisation that the scapegoat 'other' whom we seek to exclude, expel 
or even kill is not as distant, not as foreign, and not as malefic as we like to convince 
ourselves. History reveals that victims of scapegoat violence are, for example, our 
German (Jewish) professor, our Rwandan (Tutsi) neighbour or our American 
(Muslim) doctor. They are one of us, members of the community who in one way or 
another are marked as sufficiently different from "us". It is this difference which is 
emphasised while that which is common is symbolically sacrificed or forgotten, which 
allows communities to generate their identities by devaluing and dehumanizing 
outsiders and ultimately, committing "terrible crimes against them"(Bailie 1995:47). 
The conclusions that Girard arrives at horrify our moral sensibilities as they implicate 
us in violence enacted against a denigrated 'other'. It is not merely a case of our 
complicity that shocks us, but the allegation that our human nature, or more 
specifically our mimetic proclivities, acts as the catalyst for such violence. 
1.2. Mimetic violence 
To begin our inquiry into the nature of sacrificial strategies employed by both 
visible and invisible groups in the generation of collective identities, I look to Girard's 
(1977) hypothesis that historically tbe construction of a community's sense of 
selfbood is intrinsically and inevitably violent. As one of the founding principles of 
(violent) human culture Girard presents the notion of "mimetic rivalry". My 
immediate task then is to uncover the notion of mimetic desire as presented in 
Girard's theory and assess the extent to which it provides an adequate model for the 
formation of social or collective identity (Anderson 2000: 217). 
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Imitation is a defining characteristic of human beings; it is our most primal 
desire. We instinctually copy the behaviour, speech patterns and desires of others, 
whom we model ourselves on. We learn to talk and act through these processes of 
imitation, which serve as the nascent subject's proverbial rite of passage into the 
social order. Imitation is closely linked to the concept of mimesis. Although in 
common usage the two terms are used interchangeably, for the purposes of this paper 
it is necessary to distinguish between them for the former involves a degree of 
"conscious intention that the term 'mimesis' does not necessarily imply" (Bailie 
1995:118). The distinction is best illustrated with reference to a very simple triangular 
model between the subject, the object and the model (in Girard and Williams 1996). 
For example imitation occurs if one person (the model) desires an object and others 
imitate this desire. The interaction is therefore between the subject (the imitator), and 
the model (the imitated) and centres on the desire for the object. Consequently in this 
dynamic the individual (the subject) seeks to appropriate an object not because slbe 
desires it but because another person (the model or imitated) desires it. To this end it 
seems that desire for an object is never desire for the object itself, but rather lies in the 
knowledge that someone else desires it. This implies that any belief in freedom of 
choice is a myth, an illusion of our times. Two examples illustrate this point. 
The first is of two young children who are placed in a nursery full of toys 
(Bailie 1995: 116-118). The first child randomly selects a toy to play with, which will 
invariably be the same toy that the second child wants, and will assume it is the 
plaything he wanted all along. In other words one child is pelfectly happy to ignore 
the toy, until the other child suddenJy wants it, at which point the toy becomes an 
extremely desirable object. The object's meaning as desirable is constructed between 
and as a result of the interaction between the children involved. The first child is 
unwilling to give the toy up and the second child is unwilling to play with any other 
toy. Consequently the toy is at the heart of the two children's squabble, each 
considering the other to be the 'sole cause of the crisis' (ibid: 118). 
A supporting example is the very existence of consumer culture. The way we 
dress, the gadgets we buy, the places we eat, the films we watch, the objects we covet 
and the general dividing line between the consumer goods we like and dislike, are all 
mimetically mediated. In For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign (1981) 
Jean Baudrillard argues precisely this in proposing that whilst the individual in 
consumer society may believe they have a range of choices between the commodities 
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they consume, these options are predetermined and pre-coded (Kellner 1989:81) and 
autonomous choice is therefore an illusion. We want commodities, Baudrillard 
argues, not because of their inherent value but because of their sign value. 
Synthesizing the two points, we can argue that the consumer culture is a function of 
mimetic envy. Within such a society, where the consumption of commodities signifies 
happiness, affluence and prestige (ibid: 13), individuals seek to imitate other 
consumers and emulate trends that they too may achieve the status of the model. As 
Girard writes, "the subject desires an object only once he knows it is desired by 
another person whom he admires" (Girard 1996:37). 
The subject's desire is therefore neither spontaneous nor autonomous, but 
rather an emulation of the models' desire. Desire then is not an internal force of an 
independent subject but is externally mediated; defined according to the Other as 
opposed to being defined by Oneself (Girard 1996:35). Girard goes so far as to say 
that all desires are a product of mimetic mediation. On this view our li ves are 
mimetically structured to such a great degree that it has become 'banal' (Ushedo 
2001:140) and we hardly reflect on it. It would seem we are victims of 'mimetic 
paralysis'. We are crippled by our mimetic desires that abolish our ability to make 
"autonomous" decisions. This claim effectively denies us our individuality and our 
capacity for independent choice that we hold so dear. And indeed Girard is in 
fundamental conflict with Freud on this point. In Freud's earliest descriptions of the 
emergence of the Oedipus complex, he explains a situation in which the young boy 
imitates father, then falls in love with his mother and ends up fighting his father for 
the mother's attention. Girard disputes exactly this "then falls in love with mother". 
For Freud, the desire for the mother is a sign of our autonomous desire, born from the 
self and directed at the mother. Girard disagrees. When the boy falls in love with 
mother he does so because he is still imitating the father (1977: 169). In the following 
chapter I shall look more extensively at the notion of the "Oedipus Complex" with 
reference to the work of Freud, Girard, Lacan and Kristeva in a discussion of the 
sacrificial dimension of subjectivity formation . 
In this chapter, in terms of Girard's mimetic theory based upon the triangular 
model, it is fair to assume that the subject and the model eventually desire the same 
object. This overlap of desire ensures that one is a model for others and has a model 
himself. There is thus a perpetual competition between individuals who want what 
someone has or possesses that which someone else desires. In seeking to appropriate 
17 
the same object and in reaching for the same object, they become rivals for that 
object. This is precisely the conflictive aspect of mimesis that can be observed in the 
nursery in the interplay between the two children and the desired object. Such a clash 
of desires invariably leads the self to see the other as a rival, a nemesis. The challenge 
stirs in the rivals certain aggressive urges which incite a physical response. Anderson 
(2000: 17) writes "it is the miming of another's desire that necessarily leads to 
conflict" precisely because the model will not give up ownership of the object and the 
subject will not give up pursuit of it. On the contrary, as the original subject reaches 
to appropriate the object, the model's desire for the object increases when he finds his 
attempts to obtain the object thwarted by the rival. The result is that "each becomes 
the imitator of his own imitator and the model of his own model [and] violence is 
generated by this process" (Girard 1996:9). Otherwise said, aggression is stirred up by 
this tussle in which rivals attempt to hinder one another in their attempts to 
appropriate the desired object. Up until now we have been looking at imitation, but in 
this model, the object drops off the radar and the relation is centred on the rivalry 
between subjects. When the subject becomes more concerned with the model of 
desire than the desired object, this is mimesis. According to Girard and Anspach, the 
mimetic mechanism operates spontaneously within the individual, quite independent 
from rational thought (in Juergensmeyer 1992); it is thus best defined as unconscious 
imitation. In principle, mimetic desires do not necessarily lead to conflict, however in 
practice they often do. The struggle of the subject is to gain a mastery over the rival, 
or to become the model. As such the self becomes bound to the other through 
violence. For example, as the subject gets closer to the acquisition of the object of 
desire and subsequently the model becomes increasingly hostile to the subject's 
advancement (Hamerton-Kelly 1994:9) and the conflict intensifies to the point of 
violence. Then, imitation leads to mimesis and mimesis leads to violence. 
To control and channel our violent impulses so that social life remams 
possible, societies erect rules and taboos that attempt to create distance between 
individuals to prevent them becoming rivals. However these social mechanisms are 
imperfect and cannot offer a guarantee against the consequences of mimetic rivalry. 
As a result of the intensity of interaction between rivals who become obsessed with 
one another, the differences between them are gradually eroded and they become 
replicas of one another - mimicking one another 's actions, desires and violence. They 
become twins, doubles or what Girard dubs "enemy brothers", that is, "matching 
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images of violence" (1977:79). By this he means that rivals engaged in such a 
mimetic rivalry are levelled in uniform violent behaviour fuelled by equally fervent 
feelings of hate and obsession (ibid). Antagonists are equally terrified by the 
dissolution of difference between themselves and the person that they detest most and 
thus resort to violence to reinstate the difference that is agonisingly eroded by this 
rivalry. Once the violence encapsulated between rivals is released, like the blood _that 
is spilt, it seeps and spreads contagiously throughout the social order as "their 
impurity is contagious and anyone who remains in their presence risks becoming a 
pruty to their quarrel" (Girard 1977:28). Through ever-spiralling circles of imitation 
and can spiral into a crisis of epic proportions, as even those not directly involved in 
the initial rivalry may mimic the violence it produces. "There is something infectious 
about the spectacle of violence" Girard writes, "Indeed at times it is impossible to stay 
immune from its infection" (1977 :30). Mimetic conflicts spiral towards the point of 
destruction when the rivalry is no longer about obtaining the object of desire but 
rather the elimination of the rival (ibid: 121). It is only through the eradication of the 
other that individual identity can be restored. 
1.3. The Surrogate 
The spirit of 'mimetic rivalry' has existed since the origin of human history 
and still today acts as a catalyst of conflict between human beings. In simple 
summation we may say that mimesis breeds rivalry and rivalry breeds violence. The 
originary violence, which as we shall see stands at the origin of the primal social 
order, is rooted in mimetic desire. Girard writes in The Scapegoat: 
The future moon-god is obviously driven to volunteer by the wish to outstrip all the 
other gods, the spirit of mimetic rivalry. He wants to be without rival, the first among 
them, one who acts as a model for others without having a model himself (Girard 
1986:64). 
When mimetic desires mutate into violent mimetic rivalry, mimetic violence 
contagiously saturates the social order that threatens to destroy the entire social fabric. 
It is on the basis of this permeation that Girard asserts that violence is endemic in all 
societies (Hamerton-Kelly 1987:6). By endemic he means that once it exists it will not 
fade away, it cannot dissipate naturally. No element of social life is immune from the 
contaminating force of violence, promulgated by the suspicion and fear that govern 
rivalrous human relationships. One act of violence leads to a retaliatory act, which 
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degenerates into an unending cycle of reciprocal killings and violent sprees of 
vengeance, as murder is the only answer for murder (ibid:8). For each attack the 
counterattack is more brutal as every act of retaliation is driven by the (naIve) belief 
that if the act is violent enough it will put an end to all other revenge killings, thus 
bringing the cycle to a close. The irony is that the escalation of the mimetic rivalry 
culminates, not in the killing of the rival, but in an act of_sacrificial violence that 
imitates or re-enacts the arche solution as a ritualistic expUlsion or killing of a 
relatively arbitrary victim. In other words the 'contaminating force ' of self-
propagating cycles of violence within the social order is finally contained by a violent 
act against a "single polluted enemy" (Girard 1977:81). 
This constitutes the second key principle of Girard's theory - the scapegoat or 
"surrogate victim mechanism", which refers to the one last act of violence, or 'final ' 
killing through which the mimetic crises is terminated. As Girard explains: 
Mimetic desire [as) the catalyst for the crisis, would eventually destroy the entire 
community if the surrogate victim were not at hand to halt the process and the 
ritualised mimesis were not at hand to keep the conflictual mimesis from starting 
afresh (1977:148). 
Where the community is one moment engulfed in a flood of violence from the 
plenitude of unbridled conflicts between 'mirror' rivals, a moment later the 
antagonists (greatly facilitated by the dissolution of difference between 'doubles') 
unite in a collective force directing their violent fury toward one isolated individual. 
The mimetic impulses within society generate a snowball effect and everybody's 
chaotic, random accusations polarize to one individual (or indeed a marginal group), 
culminating in a situation of unanimity-min us-one (Girard 1977:259). The whole 
community is united in a collective anger towards one victim. In other words , rivals 
rapidly unite in a single purpose, or mimic one another's violence against a common 
victim, thus re-directing the violence within the community as unanimity becomes a 
function of our imitation of others in the group. Such unanimity is crucial and it is 
only through our proclivity for imitation (of the thoughts and the behaviour of others) 
that all members of a community will believe that the victim is truly responsible for 
all the internal tensions, disorder and rivalries pent up within the community (Girard 
1986). The moment of unanimous deflection or transference from rivals to the 
substitute, with a view to rehabilitating society, corresponds with the emergence of 
the sacrificial victim, or scapegoat. 
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For Girard, the term scapegoat has two references. The first is a biblical 
reference drawn from the Mosaic ritual of the Day of Atonement in Leviticus 16. In 
th is verse the scapegoat is "one of the two goats that was chosen by Lot to be sent 
alive into the wilderness, the sins of the people having been symbolically laid upon it, 
while the other was appointed to be sacrificed" (Girard 1977:73). This denotes a 
scapegoat ritual that must be distingui~hed from a scapegoat effect. The former is 
enacted as a rite whereby a victim is traditionally offered as a sacrifice, most often to 
appease the gods of a primitive community. Girard defines the latter as, "The strange 
process through which two or more people are reconciled at tht: expense of a third 
party, who appears guilty or responsible for whatever ails, disturbs or frightens the 
scapegoaters . .. by expelling and destroying him" (Girard 1996: 12). The effect then is 
an intimate connection that emerges between individuals who collectively partake in 
the act of sacrifice. The second, anthropological reference draws an analogy between 
the Leviticus ritual and other rituals that were underpinned by the belief that feelings 
of suffering, discontent or guilt within a community were transferable onto (an animal 
or human) ritually selected victim (Girard 1977:74). In Girard's understanding of 
scapegoating, the community, which feels that it is under attack by some dangerous 
almighty force that has brought a plague, an endemic, a natural disaster or another 
form of panic, dissolves into a crazed mob. Prohibitions, rituals and social institutions 
were established with a view to containing exactly this sort of descent into disorder, 
by delineating the pure from the impure in two senses. The first is to isolate those 
individuals (lepers, criminals etc.) that embody impurity from the broader community 
in a bid to contain the infectious spread of disorder throughout the social order. 
The second related precautionary measure was to guard against the de-
differentiating chaos that emerges in times when mimetic rivalries turn violent and 
spread like plague that threatens to annihilate a community (Girard 1986). In the case 
of the latter, instead of trying to suppress mimetic violence, the community 
encourages it, seeking to return to a state of social stability with recourse to the ritual 
sacrifice of the surrogate victim. In such instances, where all inclividuals are 
mimetically manipulated, the collectivity is transformed into a mob (Girard 1996: 12). 
Not unlike the fictional scene described in the opening of this chapter, in which the 
coal miners of Montsou have spontaneously risen up in revolt, the mob actively seeks 
out a victim upon whom to project all the pent up fury, desperation, grief and 
vengeance of the group. Girard gives us insight into the mentality of such a mob: 
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Then, like all mobs, this one turned to violence: the people picked the first available 
victim, the likeliest scapegoat, the visiting stranger, but they never found out what 
really caused their violence; they believed in their story too much (in Hamerton-Kelly 
1987:98; emphasis added) 
From this quotation it is clear Girard believes that the escalation of mimetic rivalries 
culminates in an act of collective violence against an outsider, performed by the mob. 
The victim is scapegoated for the 'sins' of others as well as for a whole gamut of 
tensions within society (Hamerton-Kelly 1987:86) and is therefore sacrificed in a bid 
to generate a sense of solidarity. Girard's theory of collective violence is positioned 
vis-ii-vis the genealogy of mob violence as developed by Sigmund Freud, yet at the 
same time goes beyond it in positing such unanimity violence as the generative 
junction of all human culture. In his analysis of Group Psychology (1922), Freud 
argues that the behaviour of the mob is socially constructed. It is not instinctual but 
the product of a dynamic between people that generates a "herd instinct". In a group 
individuals subscribe to a "collective mind" (ibid:7) which makes them feel, think and 
act in ways which they never would if in isolation. As Freud says with reference to Le 
Bon' s work: 
The individual forming part of a group acquires, solely from numerical 
considerations, a sentiment of invincible power which allows him to yield to instincts 
which, had he been alone, he would have perforce kept under restraint (ibid:9). 
In forming the group, all individuals succumb to the logic of the group and 
differences between individuals are obliterated in the group. As Zola describes, all 
differences between women and men, the young and the elderly are effaced as they 
merge into a "uniform earth-coloured mass" united in a common search for blood. 
As Girard says, they pick the same victim. This is not a 'choice' as much as a 
function of mimetic mediation. It is our mimetic inclinations that constitute a 
fundamental part of our human condition, which cause us to imitate the actions of 
others who in turn respond mimetically. The mob is thus a product of the rampant 
indiscriminate spread of imitative violent behaviour and testifies to the susceptibility 
of individuals to mimetic contagion. LeBon states that, "In a group every sentiment 
and act is contagious, and contagious to such a degree that an individual readily 
sacrifices his personal interest to the collective interest" (in Freud 1922: 10). He goes 
on to say that thi s behaviour is contrary to his nature and individuals who are 
immersed in a group fall under the magnetic influence of that group. Le Bon however 
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fails to offer us a psychological explanation for the mechanism that operates at the 
level of the individual who succumbs to mob violence - which explains why his work 
has fallen into disfavour with crowd psychologists. Gobodo-Madikizela (2000: 111-
113) for example, testifies to the way in which participants in necklace murders 
gradually stopped thinking independently, and in imitating the fury and frustration of 
each other, surrendered themselves to the group. 
The supplement to this is the mimetic predilection of the human condition. 
Mimesis is the mechanism within the individual that operates on the basis of the 
imitation of others. The mimetic mechanism therefore saves the concept of de-
personalisation without which we are left with modernist rational-choice theories of 
crowd behaviour (Gobodo-Madikizela 2000). Violent mimetic rivalry has a 
contagious effect; it breeds a mob mentality in which the moral autonomy of the 
individual succumbs to the mass hysteria. As Kristeva (1987 :24) elegantly describes, 
"The object in hypnosis devours or absorbs the ego, the voice of consciousness 
becomes blurred, in loving blindness one becomes a criminal without remorse 
(ibid:24). The ego, the conscience of the individual is devoured by the group and any 
empathy that may arise for the victim is eclipsed by their participation in mob 
violence and the pressures to conform that are implicit in this immersion (Bailie 
1995:51). 
In surrendering themselves to their passions, individuals become lost in the 
mob and subsequently forego their individuality. This culminates in an intensification 
of violence perpetrated by the group against the scapegoat. In the midst of a frenzied 
mob, violence reproduces itself at an exponential rate and rationality diminishes at a 
similar rate. The violence gets more extreme by reciprocity; participants egg each 
other on and become devoured by their appetite for violence. As illustrated in the 
description of Zola's mob who will settle for nothing less than "the blade of the 
guillotine", a violent and bloody public execution in which the three thousand odd can 
all participate, if not directly then by their presence at least. Only under the chop of a 
single axe, which is at one and the same time a symbol of violence and symbol of 
unity, will the mob find fulfilment of its quest and with that a rejuvenation of its sense 
of identity. 
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1.4. Violent culture 
In Girard's conceptual scheme, such a violent arche-sacrificial ritual enacted 
against a first scapegoat accounts for the violent origin of human culture. Girard 
incorporates both historical and constitutive aspects into this meta-narrative. He 
logically deduces from the operation of the sacrificial mechanism in contemporary 
societies that some violence must have occurred. Unsure of the nature of this violence 
he deduces that a primal sacrificial act of violence must have occurred at the 
beginning of social history. This involved a random collection of human beings; the 
primal horde that spontaneously and unanimously excluded one individual by blaming 
him or her for some disaster that had befallen them. Girard's historical account then is 
that the first community is formed through a collective sacrificial act, which is quite 
close to Freud, who can be attributed with the original concept of collective murder 
(Girard 1977: 194). Whilst acknowledging that Freud's account of the origin of society 
and guilt are very problematic and circular (Davis 2000), there is one point worth 
noting. Freud (1913) postulates that at the beginning of totemism we find a violent 
and jealous father who takes all the women for himself and drives away all his sons as 
they grow up. But then, he writes, "[olne day the brothers who had been driven out 
came together, killed and devoured their father and so made an end to the patriarchal 
horde. United they had the courage to do and succeeded in doing what would have 
been impossible for them individually" (ibid:203). The horde transforms into the 
primary fraternal clan and the commemoration of the act of parricide in a totem meal 
(ibid.) becomes the originary act of culture. What then matters according to Davis is 
"not that the father is murdered, but that the father is murdered, that the crime is more 
important than the victim" (Davis 2000: 196). Girard's point is that whilst Freud notes 
the connection between violence and religious totemism from the act of collective 
murder, he fails to posit a generative principle or mechanism that can develop a 
general theory beyond a single act of murder (Girard 1977:197). Girard remedies this 
by unearthing the "unanimity-minus-one" principle as formal mechanism that 
accounts for the formation of human culture. In addition, from a constitutive point of 
view, it is possible to isolate a segment of society, analyse it and arrive at a sacrificial 
mechanism. Both historical and constitutive accounts re-enforce each other and fortify 
Girard's thesis that society is constituted sacrificially. 
Hobbes offers a third mutation of this interplay of the historical and the 
constitutive. His question is rational , conceptual and very much driven by a 
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Newtonian reductionist methodology. He looked to articulate a rational explanation of 
the modus whereby society is constituted by first understanding the facts of man. He 
offers the social contract narrative as such an explanation, which will be more fully 
explored in chapter 3. Crucial here is that for Hobbes the state of nature is quite 
literally a methodological fiction, it is a useful heuristic device to explain how society 
originates, but he is unperturbed by whether the state of nature is historically true or 
not. In The Leviathan (1914), Hobbes states that the solution to the war of 'everyman' 
against 'everyman' in the state of nature is the power of one, the Sovereign who 
remains outside the social contract, thus in the state of nature. The sovereign has 
unlimited force which he may wield to secure the security and prosperity of civil 
society. In mimetic theory, mimesis transforms a war of all against all, into a war of 
all against one. As Bailie (1995: 121) summarises, "Mimesis ... brought the first culture 
together like a magnet". The primary difference for Girard and Anspach (in 
Juergensmeyer 1992:147) is that social contract theory assumes rationality whereas 
mimetic theory draws upon a spontaneous (unconscious) mechanism operating within 
the individual. 
By all three accounts, the birthing of a new sociality requires the participation 
of all members of a collective, united vis-a-vis a unique identified 'other' . Whilst 
Freud acknowledges the importance of the connection of violence with religious 
totemism and Hobbes postulates rational, voluntaristic unanimity, Girard offers a 
spontaneous, generative principle. He contends that the violence in question is not 
merely "collective" violence, but an act of spontaneous unanimity violence against the 
scapegoat who is unanimously declared responsible for the violent divisions in 
society. Such exertions of violence, collectively enacted against the victim, stimulate 
strong emotional ties amongst its constituent members thus leading to unprecedented 
social solidarity. To this end, the violence that threatens to tear society apart is 
redirected onto the victim and as a result harmony is restored to the community, as 
Richard Kearney (in Anderson 2000:217) elucidates: 
[AJ sacrificial mechanism ... provides most communities with their sense of collective 
identity. But the price to be paid is the destruction of all innocent outsider: the 
immolation of the 'other' on the altar of the 'same'. 
But how do we make sense of what Girard terms "a scapegoat-induced return to 
serenity" (Hamerton-Kelly 1987:91). How exactly are we to conceive of the nature of 
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the connection between sacrificial violence and the emergence of the sacred? For 
Girard, human societies are founded on myths of sacrifice (Kearney 1999:251) - the 
creation and rejuvenation of collective identity is only possible provided that the 
ritual sacrifice of the scapegoat is successfully mythologized. The mytho10gising of 
violence as sacrifice and not as murder not just any victim, but the peifect victim to 
distinguish this act of violence from the countless other acts that preceded it. ~he 
notion of 'perfect' is hazy given that the victim can be anyone whose sacrifice 
engenders a sense of collective identity. The 'selection' of the scapegoat is by all 
intents and purposes a groundless accusation; however there are a number of 
conditions that can be stipulated for the perfect victim whose death best serves the 
purposes of the sacrificial economy. Girard (1986) explains these criteria in his 
discussion of Sophocles Oedipus Rex, or the myth of Oedipus who in killing his father 
and marrying his mother was guilty of two crimes, parricide and incest. The closeness 
of these crimes, the one collective and the other individual, had an undifferentiating 
effect which Girard contends marked Oedipus as guilty of a third crime, the 
contamination of the entire collective, thus marking him for scapegoating. Girard 
writes that Oedipus bears 
[T]he sign or stigmata of victimisation. First there is infirmity, Oedipus limps. The 
hero moreover has arrived in Thebes unknown to all, an outsider in fact if nOl in 
essence ... Oedipus manages to accumulate both the marginality of both the outside 
and the inside ... he is sometimes a mendicant stranger, sometimes an omnipotent 
monarch ... the infirmity of Oedipus, his wounded childhood, his status as outsider, 
of stranger, of king, make him a veritable conglomeration of victim-signs (Girard 
1986:38-39). 
To camouflage the truth of such narratives of violent persecution and thus reconcile 
the acute crises within society, Girard stipulates that the victim must firstly have some 
mark or trait of difference around which the accusatory gestures of guilt may 
mimetically polarise. Against a backdrop of mimetic uniformity only the most notable 
differences stand out and most often the notable distinguishing features are physical 
ones (Girard 1991:208). Those with deformity or infirmity will more easily attract the 
anger of the group as they physically represent the diseased and disordered state of 
their society as a whole. As a second condition Girard (1977: 12) stipulates that the 
victim must come from the fringes of society, usually these are the dregs of society 
(prisoners of war, slaves, child urchins , the handicapped or deformed and so forth). At 
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the same time, there is no reason why a figure from the apex of the social hierarchy 
cannot be targeted, as with the myth of Oedipus the King, for it is precisely his 
isolated position at the heart of the community that separates him sufficiently from the 
group (ibid). The common denominator is the victim has an established status as an 
outsider (as this greatly reduces the likelihood of the development of a social bond 
between any the victim and any member of the persecuting ~ommunity). Herein lies 
the logic of the fourth criteria that warns against the integration (ibid: 13) of an 
individual in a community. The aim of seeking out a sacrificeable victim is to restore 
harmony to a distressed social order. This requires that the victim be vulnerable, 
unable to retaliate and most importantly, without champions that would seek to 
avenge the killing (the victim must be without voice, without face and thus without 
means of mobilising sympathy). The sacrifice must be an act of violence without any 
risk of retribution that would plunge society back into cycles of vengeance and 
counter-vengeance. Following from this is the fifth stipulation that the victim must be 
de-humanised, reduced to an abstraction or an object (a dog, a cockroach, vermin 
etc.), as it is the objectification of the victim that makes their mutilation and murder 
possible. In other words, if the victim is placed outside the cultural realm then the 
usual 'rules' of human engagement do not apply. It is virtually impossible to do so if 
the victim has social ties that by their nature would testify to the humanity of the 
scapegoat. The final requisite is ambiguous, as it requires that the victim must be 
neither glaringly guilty nor obviously innocent. Girard argues that the surrogate 
victim mechanism must be delicately poised between 'too much' slippage and 'too 
little' slippage or contact between the victim and those that the victim represents 
(1979:39) - at one and the same time a stranger and a king. Associated with the 
community yet sufficiently removed from it. Why? The answer lies in the third 
criteria. It is clear that the mechanism will only heal society by transfiguring 
animosity and fear if the victim is notably separate from those for whom the victim is 
a substitute (to reinstate a degree of difference). At the same time the victim must be 
recognizable as a surrogate for the guilty party as there must be unanimity in the 
group that the victim is the one at fault if scapegoating is to harmonise the community 
(in Hamerton-Kelly 1987: 100). 
The collective violence of all-against-one hinges on the existence of a perfect 
victim, for a victim that is imperfect in any regard would not be capable of attracting 
violence to itself and will therefore plunge society back into vengeance, murder and 
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mayhem. This is closely related to a third stipulated condition for the perfect victim: 
namely, that the victim has no voice, which ensures that the community feels no 
sympathy and thus poses no possibility of revenge. In such an instance where the 
scapegoat mechanism is rendered completely ineffective, the connections or ties 
between members of the group dissolve. As a result, each individual is set back upon 
him or herself and, Freud argues a pa,!ic arises (1922:45). The libidinal ties that 
constitute the fabric of society disintegrate and sacrificial rites are unable to quell the 
flood of violence pent up in society, hereby threatening to tear society apa.rt. In 
traditional communities the position of the individual is delineated through an 
ontological connection to other people, the dissolution of a social bond is distressing. 
Attempts to master this panic and reclaim a sense of ownership of the place in the 
social order that is no longer under our control involve violence. 
In the study on the connection between various forms of crowd violence, 
Gobodo-Madikizela (2000) argues that rumour consistently acts as a catalyst for 
violence. In a community gripped in fear, confusion and suspicion, embodied by 
South African township communities in the 1980s, the role of rumour is critical as it 
functions to create or "settle on" the perfect as described above. It plants the seeds of 
guilt as witnessed in the necklace murder of Nosipho Zamela in Gobodo-Madikizela's 
study. Nosipho was accused of being an impimpi (a branded traitor) that informed on 
her community and slept with the police. Once such a link was established in the mind 
of the persecuting community, the assumed becomes "the guilty". This perceived 
betrayal becomes the cause of social disharmony, or at least this is the community's 
truth, their mythology. There is thus no way to doubt the legitimacy of the punishment 
that is enacted by the community against her (ibid: 124). Rumour is 
The source of survival and solidarity for the community: survival through the 
unquestioning acceptance of he rumour and solidarity through the creation of a 
common enemy in the person accused i.e. misdirected revenge (ibid:118; emphasis 
added). 
Feelings of individual anger, anxiety and confusion are augmented within a group. 
Rumours generate a feeling of collective outrage as the community unanimously and 
uncritically accepts the allegations. In this way, rumour becomes an event (Gobodo-
Madikizela 2000: 119), a way of pre-emptively mythologising as justice what will 
occur as unjustly murderous. In times of crisis members of a community feel angry, 
frustrated or impotent; they have limited control over their own lives (they cannot act 
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against the regime so they seek out a surrogate). At such times participation m 
rumour, as a predecessor to participation in ritual opens up a space in which 
participants reclaim a sense of diminished autonomy (ibid: 121). If rumour serves as 
the catalyst for scapegoat violence, myth as retrospective narration or meaning 
making adds closure in defining this violence as a legitimate and necessary sacrificial 
ritual thereby confil1lling the original truth of the rumour. And so the circle closes. 
Together they ensure the effective functioning of the sun'ogate victim mechanism. 
The cumulative effect of rumour and myth is that individuals who are 
submerged in violent collective behaviour unanimously direct their violence toward 
the 'accused' . These accusations are invariably of such a nature that they can never be 
confirmed, there is no means of verifying their truth or exposing their untruth. Who is 
to tell if Nosipho was, in fact, a spy? The impossibility of verification is locked in the 
accusation itself. However this confirmation or denial is not the point, as Le Bon 
understood, "Groups have never thirsted after truth. They demand illusions and 
cannot do without them. They constantly give what is unreal precedence over what is 
real" (in Freud 1922:21). The belief in the victim's guilt is not founded in fact or truth 
but rather in necessity and the allegations of guilt are 'proved' when the unanimous 
violent action of the group against the 'guilty' regenerates the social bond. This is 
captured in a telling remark made by one of the marshals involved in the necklace 
murder of Nosipho: 
Once you are called an impimpi, everyone knows what will happen .. . All of us knew 
that she wasn't, but then she got herself into a police truck, and the label stuck on her. 
That's why that morning everyone followed us (in Gobodo-Madikizela 2000: 130). 
Despite the acknowledgement of innocence, the community's need for a scapegoat is 
so great that it collectively convinces itself of the victim' s guilt. The actual guilt of the 
scapegoat is not of concern in the functioning of the scapegoat mechanism - the pivot 
is that which the persecuting community believes. The scapegoat is not innately 
guilty, but is constructed as such and thus only "appears to incarnate the supreme 
violence" (ibid:257). The associative image of Nosipho and the police truck, 
'confirmed' the rumours, and thus provided the 'evidence' to pronounce the victim 
mythically guil ty (Hamerton-Kelly 1987:79). If the victim appears to be the source of 
all tension and violence within the community, the victim's annihilation is believed to 
be the only way to liberate the community. The restoration of order and tranquillity 
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seems to affirm this choice and thus legitimate the violence enacted against the 
scapegoat. This is the mythic lie, that individuals at the margins of society are guilty 
for crisis in society and it is this myth that blinds the group to the scapegoating nature 
of their violence. 
Crucial to this whole process then is the myth that the perpetrators of violence 
are innocent and victims of the violence are guilty. The very order of society requires 
that the innocence of the victim is concealed so that this violence can be cast as 
sacrifice and not as murder. The survival of human communities thus requires the 
ignorance of its members to the mechanism's workings. Girard claims that if such 
sacrificial acts of violent unanimity or the "expulsion of the surrogate victim" creates 
and restores the social order then we are dealing with something more fundamental 
than myth. We "find ourselves dealing not only with myths but also with rituals and 
the whole question of religion" (Girard 1977:87). We find ourselves in the realm of 
religion, the very task of which is to give a structure to the sacred and at the same 
time conceal the acts of sacrifice that structures culture. The origin then is not the 
foundational act of murder as such but the mythologising of this act (to say that this 
murder is a symbolic act) that generates a sense of the sacred. This delicate meshing 
of myth and murder stands at the foundation of cultural order and accounts for the 
nexus of "violence" and the "sacred". 
1.5. The violent sacred? 
In Girard 's in Girard's magnum opus, Violence and the Sacred (1977), the 
Sacred is perceived as a transcendental force that dictates the prohibitions and rituals 
that must be obeyed to keep violence (as disorder) outside the social order. Members 
of the community must heed prohibitions for culture can only be sustained if members 
are cognisant of the things that they must and must not do (Hamerton-Kelly 1987:93) 
where this understanding is intimately related to the task or function of sacrificial rites 
and rituals to prevent, channel and contain the destructive violent forces born from 
mimetic rivalry. In particular it is the surrogate victim mechanism, which if 
masterfully deployed, can negotiate and achieve a renewed sense of social solidarity. 
In this way, sacrificial violence invents a new form of the sacred - if by "sacred" we 
understand the cathartic collective experience of calm and awe, which results from 
this ritualistic expUlsion. However failure to translate chaotic violence into social 
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order, invokes the rain of 'transcendent violence', which can push society to 'the 
point of total annihilation ' (Girard 1977:259). 
To achieve the delicate balance needed to preserve the illusion of 'scapegoat 
guilt,' the god is removed from the community to avoid resurgences of 'bad' violence 
yet not too far away that it may cease to inspire both awe and dread. The illusion 
requires that there is an optimum distance (Girard 1977:268) between the community 
and sacred. Girard argues that if the sacred is to close to the community it loses its 
transcendental character and the result is the blurring of the distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate violence. The result is the flood of both 'bad' violence and 
'bad' blood throughout the social order (ibid). Constructed as the source of all social 
malign (plague, illness, flood), the community may be cured by riding this party from 
their midst. Theoretically then, the collective banishment of the scapegoat from the 
communi ty also banishes all traces of violence and the cathartic effects are attributed 
to the scapegoat who is divinized. This is a matter of violence and the sacred. One 
may object by noting that Girard reads the relation between violence and the sacred in 
modernist binary terms. The sacred or the feeling of collective awe, from which the 
primal community is born, is a function of the violent expUlsion of disorder, manifest 
as violence against the scapegoat. In writing that "the operations of violence and the 
sacred are ultimately the same process" (ibid:258), it is clear that Girard reads the 
sacred in purely destructive terms and in so doing constructs violence qua destruction 
as a cultural, political, but also natural, default state. 
Because the community has no way of conceiving or understanding the 
surrogate victim mechanism, they are ignorant to the workings of violent unanimity. 
Therefore the community "naturally turns toward the victim and seeks to determine 
whether he is not somehow responsible for miraculous consequences of his own death 
or exile" (Girard 1977:85). The scapegoat's death does not, miraculously, invoke a 
violent reprisal from any individual or party because he/she would have been pre-
selected as not being able to take revenge but also because, through their death, they 
miraculously become the source of reconciliation and societal unity. The victim's 
spilled blood becomes the lifeblood of the community. If the originary act of 
collective murder restores peace and stability to the community, then it is a controlled 
ritual re-enactment of this originary sacrifice that constantly and in future will 
regenerate society. Girard's reading of religion is limited to its task of instructing 
men as to what they must do prevent such destructive violence, or the reign of fury 
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from the transcendental 'demonic temptor' (ibid:258). He therefore responds solely to 
the destructive aspect of the sacred. In instances when unanimous violence 
harmonizes society, Girard says (1977:258) the community is offered the 'gratuitous 
gift of non-violence', or a cathartic moment of peace and social harmony. In saying 
that violence breeds non-violence, it becomes clear that violence sets the frame and 
the alternative is conceived of in violent terms. Through the employ of the sacrificial 
mechanism, violence gives birth to a new form of the sacred. The originary sacrificial 
act therefore engenders the view of the violent sacred. 
While Girard conceives of the sacred in violent terms, there is the second 
sense in which violence is linked to the sacred that will be explored extensively in the 
final chapter as a means to problematise the hegemonic place that the economy of 
sacrifice occupies in culture - namely, violence as the sacred. To begin to interrogate 
the implications of the conceptual nuance in defining the nexus between the two in 
terms of 'as' , let us take Girard's claim that all primitive divinities (the Sacred) have a 
double nature as they display both beneficent and maleficent behaviour (Girard 1977). 
Prometheus, Osiris, Romulus and Christ are all examples offered by Girard of such 
sacrificial figures that have been retrospectively transfigured into saviour gods who 
miraculously transform chaos and conflict into order and peace. In this way the 
divinity stands as a supernatural being which is believed capable of absorbing both 
'good' and ' bad' violence. This ambiguity is captured in the sacred or of the Latin, 
sacer, which can be translated as both "sacred" and the "accursed" (ibid:257) and 
equally in that of the pharmakos which in classical Greek is a word that denotes both 
poison and the antidote for the poison. The surrogate victim is "a supernatural being 
who sows violence to reap peace; a mysterious saviour who visits affliction on 
mankind in order subsequently to return it to good health" (ibid:86). In bestowing the 
good effects of violence, namely the return to serenity, onto the victim the persecutory 
community construct the illusion that the victim is both the cancer and the cure. 
At height of the mimetic crisis the (destructive) reciprocal violence of all 
against all is metamorphosed into (creative) unanimity violence through the 
intermediary of the surrogate victim. The violence that threatens to tear society apart 
is redirected onto the victim and in restoring harmony to the community and thus the 
victim qua central figure of the myth becomes "a transcenC:ental symbol not only of 
violence and disorder, but of peace and order as well" (Girard 1987:92). Whilst 
Girard reads order as a function of the violent expulsion of disorder, and social 
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formation as a function of sacrificial exclusion of the scapegoat, in this citation we 
see that scapegoat violence has both a generative and a destructive role. The "Sacred" 
which is born out of such violence becomes a metaphor for that which is both 
generative and destructive and therefore any processes of social reconstruction must 
surely demand the collective's engagement with the creative, as much as the 
destructive, aspect of the sacred. 
Whilst Girard acknowledges the conceptualisation of violence as the sacred, in 
writing that the sacred involves "peace as well as war, creation as well as 
destruction" (1977:258), he is very disparaging toward such a "metaphysical attitude 
to violence" (ibid:258-259). He argues that the metaphysical approach that conceives 
of violence in transcendental terms is dangerous as it separates violence from man. It 
speaks the 'language of pure sacredness' and thus "detaches violence from man to 
make it a separate impersonal entity" (ibid:258). By portraying the victim as 
superhuman, we infer that the victim is not one of us and therefore it is not our 
violence, it 's the work of a metaphysical entity that is notably separate from us and 
over which we have no control. We thus deculpabilise ourselves projecting the source 
- as well the resolution - of violence to a metaphysical level. In denying our 
complicity in the violent origins of culture, we generate the illusion that the scapegoat 
is guilty and the mimetic rivalry is not ours. We are not the guilty party. Quite the 
contrary, we are the victims. However if myth fails in transfiguring human violence 
into divine violence, then the sacred effectively fails in its task of detaching violence 
from man, which has lethal consequence for society. Violence is no longer a separate, 
impersonal entity - on the contrary, within a community it becomes personalised 
(Girard 1977). It becomes our violence. We cannot blame it on the ancestors, the 
gods or any transcendental force. At the moment of this devastating revelation, we 
find ourselves alone with our own violence and the truth of our "violence is unveiled" 
(Bailie 1995). 
1.6. The crisis of sacrifice 
In Dunstan Wai's description of violence that consumes African post-colonial 
states, he writes, "everywhere, violent eruptions, vengeful massacres, and frenzied 
power struggles have punctuated the CGurse of political violence since independence" 
(in Pollis & Schwab 1979:155; emphasis added). Wai describes a violence that has 
become endemic and like a contagion erupts, seeps and overflows throughout the 
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social order. Violence is, quite literally, everywhere and anyone and everyone may 
become its target. Wai succinctly captures the essence of the pervasiveness of 
violence that has the potential to become pandemic, as theorised by Girard. In his 
work, Girard speaks of precisely such a deluge of violence, which when unleashed in 
all its fury permeate all levels of social existence and all human relations. 
For Girard, the fabric of human culture is a tapestry _weaved of murder and 
myth, and it is precisely the role of myth to veil the truth of our violence from us. It 
seeks to "incorporate the point of view of the community that has been reconciled to 
itself by collective murder and is unanimously convinced that this myth was a 
legitimate and sacred action" (Williams 1996: 150). In other words, myth seeks to 
legitimise acts of sacrificial violence as good violence (by no means murder) enacted 
unanimously against the scapegoat for the Good of the Community. This 'Ultimate 
Good' is invoked to legitimate all manner of evil perpetrated against all manner of 
Other. Roy (2001) recognises this tendency in India's history. She argues the 
foundational act of Indian nation was born from the oppression, displacement and 
exclusion of Adivasi people, the original inhabitants of the land. She writes, "their 
histories, customs and deities were dispensable, and ultimately sacrificeable, for the 
'Good of the Nation'" (2001:35) . Similarly Roy claims that India's sworn enemy, 
Pakistan, is equally sacrificeable and she fears her governments willing and able-ness 
to detonate a nuclear bomb on its neighbour, for the "Good of the Nation". This is 
Girard's point, that scapegoats are constructed as the source of all violence and 
disharmony within the community, who become sacrificeable for the good of the 
community. However through the contemporary moral lens, with help from critical 
minds such as Roy, we may retrospectively reinterpret the acts of violent persecution 
perpetrated against the scapegoat as bad or illegitimate violence. In other words with 
the benefit of hindsight we may begin to label scapegoats as such and allow victims 
their claim to victimhood. The exposure to the truth of the mechanism is tantamount 
to the failure of myth and results in the "unveiling of violence" (Bailie 1995). As a 
result communities are alerted to the truth of the role that the scapegoat plays in 
regenerating social harmony and this is matched by an increased tendency of the 
plight of the victim to be brought to light. The success of scapegoating requires that 
parties defend their own status as victim and the Other as guilty, however for Girard, 
this inversion of traditional sacrificial logic - namely that the perpetrators are guilty 
and the victim is innocent - accounts for a sacrificial crisis. 
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As violence is unveiled, it is unleashed. Scapegoating is no longer effective in 
channelling and expelling violence away from the community, which is thus 
incapable of regenerating itself with recourse to ancient rituals that rely on surrogate 
victim's sacrifice to bring violence to an end. In failing to unite the entire community 
against the identified scapegoat, acts of vengeance occur. These revenge killings fail 
to bring the violence to a close, but _ rather fuel further violent reprisals that 
di sintegrate into violent mayhem and vengeful massacres. Where sacrificial 
mechanisms should turn "murder and madness into a sacralized bulwark against 
madness and murder" (Bailie 1995:17), the failure to do so breeds more murder and 
greater madness. Each person in society falls prey to their mimetic impulses, 
'reciprocating violence they experience and duplicating violence they witness' 
(ibid:121). The combination of mimetic impulses inherent in human nature and the 
augmentation of violence in human affairs generate a series of violent ri valries that 
quickly galvanise into a frenzied mob. In such a group, governed by passion and 
panic, the moral autonomy of the individual succumbs to the mass hysteria. Any 
empathy that may arise for the victim is thwarted by their participation in mob 
violence and repressed by the pressures to conform that are bound up in this group 
action (ibid:51). 
Crises always emerge when the legitimising myth - on the basis of which 
good violence is distinguished from bad violence - is revealed. In the absence of a 
clear distinction between pure (good) and impure (bad) violence, indiscriminate 
violence spreads rampantly throughout the community. In sum, the loss of the 
Transcendental Signifier, which is basically any Ultimate Good in the name of which 
violence can be considered good or necessary, leads to the disintegration of entire 
system of signification. In this post-colonial moment the failure to redirect violence 
onto a scapegoat hereby containing it, places a devastating ontological strain on 
communities whose attempts to assert and sustain themselves following sacrificial 
means are predisposed to failure. 
Such is the crisis of the African community's engagement with their post-
coloniality - the generative scapegoat mechanism is no longer capable of 
emancipating society from its own violence. It is also marked by a failure of the 
community to conceive of its liberation in anything other than violent terms. Our 
contemporary crisis is therefore marked by a specific kind of violence, not as Wai 
contends, specifically political violence, and equally the failure to realise an imagined 
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post-colonial communality is not a purely political failure . It is a more fundamental, 
foundational failure to translate the employ of sacrificial ritualised violence into the 
articulation of a sovereign sense of selfhood. The failure of myth met with the failure 
of imagination has unleashed devastating orgies of violence in these fragile 
communities. In his paper Warfare, Endemic Violence and State Collapse in Africa 
(1999) Chris Allen observes that extensive violence and warfare have become 
commonplace in Africa from the late 1980s. His research on the nature and 
prevalence of violence in countries including Ethiopia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, 
Algeria, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Liberia, Sudan and Angola provides 
empirical support for Girard's claims. Indeed the (frustrated, failed) attempt of many 
African communities to make sense of their post-coloniality reads as a Girardian 
blueprint of the sacrificial crisis. 
In the last twenty years violence has become increasingly ubiquitous, 
demanding vast numbers of victims as the attempts to make ritual sacrifices work 
become increasingly desperate. Vulnerable groups such as children, women, the 
elderly and refugees (Allen 1999:369) who in an ordered stable polity would be safely 
removed from the terrain of war instead become inextricably embroiled in it. They 
have become not only targets of violence and are attacked, mutilated or killed but also 
act as the agents of violence as attackers, mutilators and murderers. Naturally all 
warfare involves brutality; however such violence takes an excessively sacrificial 
tum, as Allen (ibid:370) observes in the prevalence of violent rites involving the use 
of body parts in murders, mutilations and torture, ritually enacted. Previously 
unthinkable acts of horror, acts of brutal mass slaughter are committed by young 
children against the elderly; by the elderly against their neighbours; and even between 
members of kin. Indeed such grotesquely violent acts become commonplace. Such 
general frenetic erosion of family and community institutions, for Girard (1979) 
testifies to the crisis of degree. By this Girard means that the obliteration of pure -
impure distinction led to an obliteration of all other differences through which the 
social defines itself, differences such as elders, children and the relation between 
them. Panic saturates the society as existing hierarchies, which denote the place of 
each individual in the community, are toppled. Consequently, the sacrificial crisis can 
be defined as the crisis of distinction that permeates the entire cultural order (Girard 
1979:49). Girard says the following about Degree qua social system of differences: 
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"[itl is the underlying principle of all order, natural and cultural. It permits individuals 
to find a place for themselves in society; it lends a meaning to things, arranging them 
in proper sequence within a hierarchy" (ibid:50). 
The crisis of degree is a testament to the fury of the moment when things fail to differ. 
Individuals loose their distinctiveness, identity and ultimately their ontological place 
in society and as a result, existing social hierarchies are overturned which causes the 
-entire cultural structure to teeter on the brink of collapse. Historically the employ of 
extreme or founding acts of violence enacted against the scapegoat reconstitutes 
difference upon which the social order is erected hierarchically. For example, in 
ancient societies sacrificial rites were delicately and expertly employed by the sages 
of society, whose ability to establish, restore and perpetuate a social bond through 
such ritual exercise clearly demarcated their place in the social hierarchy on a basis of 
seniority. The scapegoat was therefore accorded a central place in religious and 
cultural ceremonies as his or her ritual murder, meticulously performed, held the 
power to purge society of its own destructive violence and affirm the hierarchical 
structures of society. In the current crisis however the art of sacrifice has disappeared 
and with it it's transformative power. Ellis' study of Liberia illustrates my point: 
In the civil war, in a world grown anarchic, acts of violence are performed daily in 
the familiar language of the secret society rituals, but now out of control. Ritual 
murders are no longer carried out by officers of established cults, but by unqualified 
adolescents (in Allen 1999:374; emphasis added) 
The continued failure of sacrificial violence to transform a community's anarchic 
disorder into the order of culture, in no way infers that societies have given up on 
sacrifice. Quite the contrary, it means the members of a community go to greater 
lengths, explore more terrifying extremes, to make the rituals work. In an especially 
provocative bid at myth making, it was reported in the Liberian civil war that 
cannibalism was practised and that "Charles Taylor himself has been reported to have 
drunk the blood of sacrificial victims" (Allen 1999:370). The accuracy of this claim is 
less important than the desperation that this image powerfully suggests. The nation's 
leader is literally immersed in the blood of the scapegoat, feasting on the flesh of the 
victim in a bid to imbue the murder of his rivals , mostly members of his two main 
opposition parties (LURD and MODEL) with a sense of legitimacy. After the 
slaughter of what is estimated around 200 000 Liberians failed in its generative 
capacity, this excessively, overtly, sacrificial act testifies to a desperate last ditch 
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attempt to make the members of his community believe in his myth. The frantic fall 
back onto increasingly ineffective rituals leads to the ' immolation of more and more 
victims' that are meant to be sacrificial but are less and less so (Girard 1987). As 
Girard explains: 
Anything that tends to disengage of reveal violence, represents considerable progress, 
at least potentially in intellectual and ethical respects, but that also, in the short term, 
it will mean a terrible recrudescence of that same violence, often in odious and 
atrocious forms, since sacrificial mechanisms become progressively less efficient and 
less capable ofrenewal (ibid: 127- J 28). 
When national leaders participate directly in acts of ritual violence and these acts are 
not successfully mythologised, civility crumbles and any sense of rule of law is lost. 
The participation of the nation 's father figure in indiscriminate murderous sprees 
represents the fulcrum of the crisis, in which violence becomes the only language that 
members of the ravaged community understand. In the absence of a Transcendental 
Signifier to legitimise the distinction between Good and Bad violence, the system of 
differences disintegrates and individual identities - the differences between rival and 
ally, victim and victimiser, layman and leader - become increasingly indiscernible. 
The violence of de-differentiation becomes a disease to which no one is immune. At 
this point desperate and disillusioned communities turn their backs upon rituals of 
scapegoating; "sacrificial rites are no longer effective and parties, who had previously 
spontaneously united in projecting their violence and hostili ty onto the scapegoat, 
now turn on one another" (Girard 1987:47). At this point society is swamped in 
violence and antagonists become completely blind to the humanity of the rival. The 
power of violence is such that interpersonal rivalries between enemies fall away and 
violence becomes an end in itself, as witnessed in African states where "violence and 
warfare have become self-reproducing with no prospect that they can be brought to 
an end" (Allen 1999:369). In such societies, the carnage in human life is unspeakable. 
But why at this specific moment in a millennia long narrative of cultures 
violently born and sustained is the sacrificial mechanism suddenly no longer 
effective? In other words , why now? Why have violence and the mechanism of 
sacrifice become transparent or, in the words of Bailie, been unveiled at this point in 
time? Allen offers an inadequate response in suggesting that what we are seeing is a 
new form of warfare and violence, what he dubs 'senseless' violence (1999:368). 
There is nothing new about either the scapegoat mechanism or the sacrificial crisis 
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that constitute a recurring theme in all of human history in the way that communities 
are born and attempt to regenerate themselves. The experience of contemporary 
African communalities displays a clear sacrificial logic and bears testament to the 
attempts of post-colonial communities to construct an identity - a sense of social 
solidarity - with recourse to ancient sacrificial rituals that, according to Girard, are 
constitutive of human culture as such. This seemingly senseless violence was 
therefore generative in this sense. The attempts to violently restore the communality 
and recreate the System of Difference (Degree) present us with an example of 
violence as the sacred. This post-colonial moment is exceptional however because of 
our awareness and understanding of scapegoating and the wholesale doubt in the 
possibility of legitimising myth. What is therefore new is that the mechanism no 
longer works. The extremity of violence employed in a bid to make the mechanism 
work is new, as is the length and depth of the crisis. So how do we account for the 
increasing ineffectiveness of the generative scapegoat mechanism that culminates in a 
prolonged sacrificial crisis? Girard offers a convincing account of the crisis, attributed 
to the heightened awareness of humanity to the plight of the victim, which 
undermines the moral legitimacy of sacrificial rituals that archaic religion employed 
to restore social cohesion. 
In responding to this question, Leo Lefebure (1996) criticises Girard for 
missing what he considers to be quite an obvious point: namely, this century has the 
technology necessary for the perpetration of wholesale genocide. Whilst Lefebure 
uses Dresden and Hiroshima to illustrate hi s case, in defence of Girard we need only 
look the Rwanda's genocide of 1994 or the current genocide in the Sudan. These mass 
killings (by stabbing, stoning, impaling, hacking or burning), not to mention the 
Ancient Incan or Aztec slaughter by the thousands, have been enacted using the most 
primitive of weapons (pangas, machetes, sticks, stones, clubs and bear hands). This 
tells us that it is less about the method of violence than the logic that underpins it, or 
in this case, unveils it. 
The ability to step back and criticise or even condemn the violence enacted 
against the scapegoat indicates that sacrificial mechanisms have lost their original 
mystifying power (Bailie 1995:28). The implications are profound as they render 
traditional ways of generating and regenerating society's idelltity and culture not only 
ineffective but also morally reprehensible. It seems to attack the excess of scapegoat 
violence. In short, from the ludaeo-Christian perspective, "the gospel revelation 
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gradually destroys the ability to sacralise violence" (ibid:24) which coincides with the 
disintegration of the sacrificial system. But how are we to make comprehensive sense 
of this revelation? 
1.7. Girard's revelation 
Girard interprets the failure of myth in the light of his commitment to 
Christian theology. He argues that the Judaeo-Christian tradition has "an undeniable 
tendency to take the side of the victim on moral grounds" and that "the condemnation 
of the murder takes precedence over all other considerations," (Girard 1987:149). He 
contends that the prophetic teachings of the Bible, which defend the victim, present 
humanity with a unique revelation of the workings of the sacrificial mechanism. The 
victim is innocent and vindicated by God, as Friedrich Nietzche notes, Christianity 
'sides with victims, not conquerors ' (in Lefebure 1996). He argues that the gospels 
have revealed the role the surrogate victim plays in the founding of all human 
cultures and the role that sacrificial victims play in sustaining them. It is on these 
grounds that Girard makes the bold claim in Things Hidden since the Foundation of 
the World (1978) that it is the Bible, and only the Bible, that has presented us with a 
moral backdrop against which to condemn acts of murderous violence and recognise 
the humanity of the victim upon whom such violence has befallen. The Bible is aware 
of the sacrificial crises, but its scriptures aim to reveal rather than conceal the guilt of 
those who deploy the surrogate victim mechanism and hence, the scriptures provide a 
"complete revelation of the collective victimage as the founding mechanism of human 
culture" (Girard 1996:18). 
Girard argues "It was first in ancient Israel that. .. prophets began to vIew 
history from the standpoint of God's concern for the victims rather than from the 
standpoint of the sacred social order" (Williams 1996: 145). In other words, the 
biblical teachings of the prophets reveal the truth of the sacrificial mechanism by 
inverting the logic that the victim is guilty of the violence encapsulated within the 
community and declaring instead that the community is guilty of projecting such 
violence on to an innocent scapegoat. Girard argues that various examples of this 
revelation are mentioned in the first testament but is never defined as such. In Genesis 
the murder of Abel by his brother Cain stands as the founding moment of the Cainite 
community. In the book of Job, Joseph is identified as an innocent scapegoat who is 
violently expelled from the midst of his brothers as a result of their jealousy and in 
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Exodus Moses and the Chosen people are identified as the scapegoat vis-a.-vis 
Egyptian society. It is only in the New Testament - in the prophetic writings of the 
Gospels - that the workings of sacrificial mechanisms are unambiguously revealed 
most specifically with the crucifixion of Christ. This is clearly articulated in Isaiah 
Chapter 53 verses 8 and 9: 
By oppression and judgement He was taken away; and as for His generation, who 
among them considered that He was cut off out of the land of the li ving for the 
transgression of my people, to whom the stroke was due? (8) And they assigned Him 
a grave with the wicked, and with a rich man in his death, although He had done no 
violence, neither was any deceit in his mouth (9). 
By assigning Christ a 'grave with the wicked' the persecutors attempt to mythologise 
the violence to be enacted against Him as legitimate violence: Christ was wicked, he 
was the omnipotent source of all the violence pent up within the community and thus 
his murder was both necessary and defensible. However the revelation of gospel 
inverts this myth by once again siding with the victim in proclaiming Christ's 
innocence and thus clearly vindicating him of the allegations, 'He had done no 
violence'. By insisting on his innocence this statement blows the one criteria for the 
perfect victim out of the water, namely "somewhat guilty, somewhat not". In addition 
and as argued before, the success of scapegoating violence depends upon the 
community's unanimous support of the action enacted against the victim. It is thus 
imperative that all empathy for the victim be extinguished. The word of the Gospel 
however raises at least one empathetic voice. Its message bears witness to the 
innocence of the victim - who has done no violence - and the truth of the violence 
committed against them, hence shattering the possibility of unanimity. It is this 
revelation which amounts to the failure of the sacrificial mechanism and Girard 
argues that as a result "Humanity is no longer capable of producing idols of violence 
around which it might achieve unanimity" (Girard 1987:l36). 
Girard asserts that the rehabilitation of the victim has a descaralising effect 
(Girard 1987: 152). Bailie enforces this point by stating that "The only kind of 
violence that can end violence effectively is sacred violence, but over time, the gospel 
revelation gradually destroys the ability to sacralize violence" (Bailie 1995:24). This 
means that the violence enacted against the victim can no longer be mythologized as 
sacred, Good or even Legitimate. The nexus between violence and the Sacred is 
severed and consequently the victim is no longer the omnipotent source of all 
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violence and disorder or the supreme source of order and social cohesion. The victim 
is simply human - and an innocent one at that - against whom indiscriminate acts of 
violence have been perpetrated. 
This "humanising" of the scapegoat makes us recoglllse the nature of the 
sacrificial mechanism more clearly. The more aware of the arbitrary victim age we 
become, the less effective the mechanism_is in its powers of reconciliation. Indeed 
the increase in our knowledge of the logic informing acts of sacrificial violence is met 
by an increase in the number of victims that fall prey to the multiplied violence that 
this revelation incites. Communities who come under biblical influence now find 
themselves in a state of proverbial purgatory: unable to find redemption with recourse 
to ancient rituals of sacrificial violence yet equally unable to transcend violence as the 
vehicle in attaining the redemption that they seek. 
In the light of the Gospels there can be no denying that it was the suffering and 
crucifixion of Christ that revealed the workings of the scapegoat mechanism and in so 
doing set a frame against which to denounce other acts of sacrificial violence. Christ 
was intended as a scapegoat and because his innocence was revealed after the 
crucifixion Caiaphas along with the Gospels revealed the victim as innocent and 
consequently revealed the entire mechanism for what it is. Girard is very clear when 
he states that "everything is already revealed" and the Scripture "has no other function 
than to unearth the victims of collective violence and to reveal their innocence" 
(Girard 1987: 138). This revelation equates a monumental shift in perspective insofar 
as it allows us to take the side of the victim and thus declare the culpability of the 
community. With this the ordering and sacrificial benefits of original violence fritter 
away (Williams 1996: 151) and the entire sacrificial system disintegrates. To this end, 
Girard's argument that the Gospels can be accredited with the revelation of the 
workings of the scapegoat mechanism is extremely compelling. 
1.8. Beyond Girard 
Whilst Girard's theological explanation is perhaps a necessary part an 
explanation, it is not sufficient as it fails to account for the emergence of sacrificial 
crises in cultures that do not fall under biblical influence. Whilst Girard proposes a 
universal account of the origin of all human culture, he does not articulate an equally 
universal account of the failure of the mechanisms that generate culture. Girard 
stresses the radical singularity of the Bible and Bailie clearly supports this position . 
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My criticisms are as follows . Firstly, it is precisely this distinctiveness and uniqueness 
of the Bible that denies his theory universal application. It excludes all the other major 
religions including Hindus, Muslims, Confucians, Buddhists, Shintoists, Animists and 
equally secular communities, which collectively populate a vast portion of the globe 
that certainly has not escaped the permeation of sacrificial crises. My second 
contention is that to r~late the current crisis causally to the influence of Christianity is 
reductionist. Bailie (1995:14) asserts that, "the West's historical consciousness is 
inextricably bound up with the historicity of the Judaeo-Christian tradition". Certainly 
the important contributions of Judaeo-Christian scriptures must be acknowledged, 
however even if individuals and groups have never had biblical exposure, they may 
still feel an acute sense of dignitas to others that is derived in terms of a social bond 
between members of a community. Finally, Girard fails to adequately address the 
teleological aspect of this view. He admits that the truth of scapegoating has been 
'hidden since the foundation of the world' (1978) indeed the sacrificial crisis is by no 
means a new phenomenon. However he fails to explain why this crisis at its most 
intense and its most ubiquitous now, given that over the last two millennia the Bible 
has been preaching the same message of the victim's innocence. In other words, what 
allows us now to understand the Bible's message so clearly - after so many thousands 
of years of Church complicity in scapegoating. He fails to offer us an adequate 
explanation as to why we now find ourselves incapable of escaping or transcending 
the crisis and are thus unable of injecting differentiation into an increasingly 
undifferentiated order with appeal to the scapegoat mechanism. 
Given how deeply embedded the sacrificial crisis has become in our global 
contemporary social order, it is impossible to ever return to a time and place in which 
the mechanism works because the truth of it is concealed from us. Girard postulates 
that if societies are to be saved from the cycles of a sacrificial economy, humanity 
must make a stark choice between our complete annihilation and our abandonment of 
violence. He states, "For the first time ever, humanity faces a perfectly 
straightforward choice and even scientifically calculable choice between total 
destruction and the total renunciation of violence" (in Bailie 1996: 16). But how 
reasonable is it to offer us a choice between utter destruction and complete 
renunciation? For, straightforward it certainly is not. 
As it has already been elaborated, for Girard one of the two truths of the 
human condition as a whole is the revelation of the first condition, the mimetic 
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predicament. The second truth - the truth of liberation - is therefore the revelation 
that is born from the Scriptures and exposes the victimary mechanism (Williams 
1996:145). Girard assumes that in revealing the truth of our inherently mimetic 
nature, we can be liberated from it and by extension, be liberated from the violence 
that threatens our eventual annihilation. The prospect of liberation is indeed one that 
~ust be explored for failure to do so would uncritically accept humanity's self-
induced and inevitable march toward Armageddon. The problem with Girard's 
dichotomous postulation is that it rests upon the problematic assumption that man -
and indeed by this I mean every human being - is capable of altering their human 
nature. It requires that humankind expunge from our nature all envious and aggressive 
tendencies that cause our mimetic desires to run their course for rivalry to violence 
and finally to murder. It seems to demand, ironically and of all things, a violently 
sacrificial redefinition of human nature as such. 
Girard's account of the origin of human culture is a theory in which violence is 
set as the default state. Society is born violently and must therefore be nurtured 
violently as human solidarity literally feeds off violence. Whilst conceding that 
violence is an extremely fundamental aspect of cultural formation, it is not the only 
aspect. Violence is not, as Girard's logic dangerously suggests, a conceptual and 
historical inevitability. Despite his previous claim, Girard proposes that humanity can 
only be saved from its own violence by moving toward non-violence. This requires an 
incorporation of human values such as compromise, love and forgiveness as 
expressed in the Scripture' s in such dictums as 'love one's neighbour' ; 'forgive one ' s 
enemies' and 'tum the other cheek' . Following this logic Girard states that, "The 
definitive renunciation of violence ... will become for us the condition sine qua non for 
the survival of humanity itself and for each one of us" (Girard 1987:137). But how 
plausible is it to conceive of a collective future, which in Girard's conceptual scheme 
would be premised upon an understanding of 'human nature', devoid of violent 
mimetic impulse or aggressive urges? This strikes to the heart of this thesis, and the 
question of whether there can be a form of the sacred that incorporates and 
simultaneously transcends violence. In chapter 3 the conceptual space will be cleared 
to engage thoroughly with the nature of the nexus between culture and violence 
scrutinised from an alternative epistemological paradigm with a view to the 
possibility of alternative catalysts for social regeneration, as a means to transcend this 
economy of violence. For now, I look to universalise the logic of Girard in a search of 
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a cultural, historical and moral force that can account for the unveiling of sacrificial 
logic. It is imperative that Girard's narrow - yet intellectually sound - theological 
explanation for the increased consciousness of the sacrificial mechanism is enlarged, 
for only in developing a comprehensive, universally applicable, understanding of the 
emergence of this crisis may we hope to move beyond it. 
1.9. Human rights discourse: the catalyst for consciousness 
Girard contends that in order for the myth to work in regenerating social 
solidarity, it requires that the face of the victim be veiled and the voice of the victim 
be muted. Whilst Girard and Bailie attribute this unveiling to the revelation in Judaeo-
Christian scripture, there is another tradition that predates (and includes) this biblical 
message, that exerts a powerful force in preventing the generative scapegoat 
mechanism from functioning effectively. This frame is the emergent human rights 
culture, whose very raison d 'etre is to protect the minority and ensure the voice of the 
victim is heard. The contemporary notion of human rights emerged from 18'h century 
Western political philosophy and later in the United States and developed through the 
legal and philosophical writings of thinkers such as Grotius, Locke, Montesquieu and 
Jefferson. The Judaeo-Christian tradition has certainly contributed to this culture but 
constitutes one aspect and is thus not a sufficient explanation in and of itself given 
that the discourse is situated in the tradition of natural law that dates back to classic 
antiquity and significantly predates Christianity and is present in the writings of 
Sophocles (496-405 BC), Aristotle (384-322 BC) and Cicero (106-43 BC). The 
proposition then is to situate the sacrificial crisis against the emerging universal 
humanist order and the moral background languages that constitute it. 
According to Charles Taylor (1989:4) "Perhaps the most urgent and powerful 
cluster of demands that we recognise as moral concern the respect for life, integrity, 
and well-being, even flourishing, of others". Vandersluis and Yeros (1999) take up 
this view and argue that the humanist order "exists as a set of background languages 
that. .. constitute the universalist version of [such] moral demands" (ibid: 10). The 
universality of the humanist moral order is critical for my purposes as, "it is this moral 
order from which demands for rights, autonomy and participation spring in every 
comer of the earth" (ibid:7). This humanist order is founded upon a gamut of mural 
languages, as the authors explain "the moral languages of religion, race, ethnicity, 
nation, class and gender have come to be in wide currency, as has most importantly, 
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that of humanity" (ibid: 13). Together - culminating in the latter - they constitute a 
universal background language on the basis of which to ma..lce claims about moral 
worth and 'human' rights and from this develop a universalist ontology of the human 
(Taylor 1989:5). Two points must be made here. Firstly, the human background 
language has attained a global presence (Vandersluis and Yeros 1999:5) and is thus 
inescapable as a basis for moral debate. All our actions, obligations, reactions and so 
fOith are interpreted against this background language and it "provides a common 
moral language on the basis of which to indict the objectification and annihilation of 
human beings" (ibid: 13; emphasis added). Such condemnations are underpinned by 
the belief in the innate human worth of all human beings. Human worth is subject to a 
struggle for recognition for membership in a morally higher human community. 
Following from this, the second point is that the humanist moral discourse provides us 
with a frame against which to condemn exclusionary social practices publicly. To 
voice discord in a public forum is critical as it generates a debate within the 
community in raising differing and/or concurring voices, marks a development toward 
a universal recognition of sacrificially exclusionary practices as morally violent 
(ibid: 10). The public nature of processes of contestation is critical. We know that in 
instances of generative scapegoating, unanimity is the guarantor of success. To 
mobilise the entire community, the act must involve "the blood, sweat and screams of 
the spectacle of the public flogging" (in Govier 2002:39). The visible flow of blood and 
sweat; the anguished screams of the victim and the frenetic jeers of the spectators 
create a spectacle that is indispensable in processes of myth-making, the success of 
which literally makes or breaks the community. Society is fascinated by such 
spectacle, people are morbidly drawn to the vulgarity of violence; they are seduced by 
it. If such fascination manifests itself in a cathartic sacrificial conclusion then the 
violent spectacle will have succeeded in curing society 's internal ills (Bailie 1996:87). 
Logically then, any move to denounce such acts of violence must be an equally public 
spectacle. Only in generating a public fracas, either as a participant in collective 
violence or a protester against it, may we tap into the power of unanimous collective 
action and the capacity it has to restore the social bond. 
The pursuit of a universal ontology of the human that elevates the status of 
victim-hood in public debate, according to a Girardian in ~erpretative stance, will 
perpetuate the sacrificial crisis and make the transcendence to a higher moral 
community less rather than more likely. As we have seen, exclusionary social 
46 
practices (read: scapegoating) are fundamental in the founding and re-founding of 
social unity. The success of the scapegoat mechanism requires that worth of the 
certain subjects are not recognised and that certain subjects are dehumanised -
deprived of their human worth and right to life - in a bid to generate social cohesion. 
The truth of this act of sacrificial violence qua generator of social peace and harmony 
must remain hidden if the scapegoat mechanism is to succeed in its task. A publi~ 
condemnation however equates an exposure of the truth of the sacrifice and it thus 
stimulates the failure of the myth. The ideal of the humanist moral order requires that 
all unite unanimously against such violations of 'human' rights. The crisis is therefore 
born from the clash between one community that needs to silence the voice of the 
victim and the other that feels it has a moral obligation to make the voice heard. 
The exposure to the rights and the plight of the scapegoat, which has 
developed empathy for the victim, ultimately amounts to the failure of the myth. In 
other words, the human rights discourse provides us with a universally applicable 
mode of knowledge. or consciousness (even moral paradigm) of the mechanism and 
the result is that ritual killing cannot be successfully mythologized as an act of 
sacrifice, thus culminating in a prolonged sacrificial crisis. Reading this crisis in terms 
of the human rights discourse is a proposition counter to, but also supplementary to, 
that of Girard. Once the knowledge of the violence has been revealed it can never be 
stifled and all attempts to do so will involve violence. The inability of the scapegoat to 
absolve the community of its violence and restore the sacred frustrates members of 
the community and leads to an increase in the extremity of violence perpetrated 
against the victims as the truth of the mechanism becomes less and less obscured by 
ignorance. The "sacrificial crisis" cannot be resolved using traditional rituals, as by 
giving the victim a voice and a face and a place in the global moral community, the 
universal humanist backdrop will never allow for the invention of a "perfect victim" -
whose existence is a condition for any act of sacrificial violence. In fact, the presence 
of humanist background languages will contest the construction of a collective 
identity with recourse to violence in every corner of the earth. As a result, 
perpetrators will forever be exposed to the humanity of their victims. 
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1.10. Post-colonial Africa and human rights 
From Girard 's claim that every culture is founded upon a collective act of 
ritualised sacrificial violence, we can assume that the emergence of new political 
forms will also necessarily entail violence. In looking at nascent democracies in 
Africa, this logic is problematised however by the emergence of a universalist moral 
order that generates an empathy for the would-be scapegoat, ~d framed by global 
discussion of human rights. condemns any form of violence against them. By way of 
brief illustration of the crisis manifest from this inherent tension, let us take the 
contemporary example of the Sudan. Since February 2003, state-sponsored Arab 
militiamen, the J angaweed (translated as "Devils on Horseback") have slaughtered 
more than 50 000 non-Arab Africans in the south Sudanese region of Darfur 
(Robinson 2004). Despite the reluctance of global powers to define this systematic 
ethnic massacre as genocide for fear that this definition will demand action, the 
statistics speak the truth that UN resolutions avoid. Employing sacrificial strategies of 
ethnic cleansing as a means to a consolidated national identity, the Khartoum-based 
Arab regime has given its militia-allies the financial and military support needed to 
enact a rampage of mass extermination against Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic 
groups. The question then is, Why now? Why over the last few years have we 
witnessed a terrifying descent into ethnic cleansing at this scale when the Arabs and 
non-Arab Africans have co-habitated in the region for millennia? Certain analysts 
have attributed it to persistent drought that has changed migratory patterns of the Arab 
nomads, leading to conflict with the African farmers. Others argue the competition 
over land has turned violent due to a proliferation of arms in the region from 
neighbouring states (ibid.). However these explanations speak to the symptoms rather 
than the cause of the crisis. A true understanding of this ethnicised violence is, I 
would argue, found in the emerging chasm between the sacrificial violence that 
historically made community possible and the universal human rights discourse that 
makes attempts to mythologise that violence impossible. The persistence in 
employing violence despite the crisis accounts for the extremity of violence 
employed. 
The mandate given by Khartoum reflects the actions taken by their 
contemporaries whu are confronted by like pressures of the 'nation-building' project. 
One of the primary obstacles to the creation of a unified national identity is the fact 
that the tribes and communities that comprise the nascent nation-state are severely 
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politically and ethnically divided. As An Na-Irn and Deng explain "a new African 
state has to face the fundamental problem of welding a heterogeneous conglomeration 
of tribes and communities into a united nation" (1990:298). In terms of the Girardian 
model of social formation set up in this chapter, the only way to transcend inter-group 
rivalry and violent conflict to effectively establish a sense of national solidarity is 
through sacrifice. In theory, all rival p~rties would unite spontaneously in the 
expulsion or killing of an identified tribal or ethnic minority other who would 
effectively become the scapegoat onto whom all woes would be projected. As an 
identified enemy other, the scapegoat is violently excluded from the community. 
Although banished as an outsider, this excluded minority ironically becomes the pivot 
- or what McKenna (1992) would term the "supplement" - of the entire community-
building project. 
Sensitive to this logic certain authors such as, Keba M'Baye, asserted in the 
face of strong criticism, that human rights violations are necessities of the nation 
building project. M'Baye explains that after independence the African ruling elite 
wanted to "make up for their economic backwardness [and] protect their fragile 
independence ... they reached a point where they neglected all that did not seem likely 
to consolidate their sovereignty and ensure their economic progress" (in An Na-Im 
and Deng 1990:295). The historical nexus between scapegoat violence and state 
sovereignty suggests this is true. He goes on to say that African governments 
interpreted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "in such a way as to justify the 
infringements required inevitably by the necessities of unity, prosperity and stability" 
(ibid.). This is by no means an exclusively African predicament. Pollis and Schwab 
(1979) use the example of McCarthyism in United States as an instance where the 
perceived threat of communism was invoked as justification for the infringement and 
violation of the civil and political rights of many individuals. Much the same can be 
said of the present War against Terror. This position acknowledges that in such 
instances when it is necessary to establish both the legitimacy and unity of the nation, 
and ensure the imperatives of national security, individual political rights may be 
infringed or "legitimately violated". Framing this view with the logic of generative 
scapegoating, it is unsurprising that 'human rights' violations playa central role in the 
nation-building project. 
To cast human rights violation as necessary seems morally problematic, even 
outrageous. But it is precisely the human rights discourse and corresponding 
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emergence of a universalist moral community that allows for the articulation of these 
feelings of outrage. The ontological dividing line lies between our violent cultural 
heritage that demands human rights violations against the scapegoat and the moral 
frame of reference that renders such violations increasingly problematic. In a bid to 
make sense of this discontinuity that translates extremely poorly in terms of Africa's 
human rights record,. James Silk commentated that "Africa cannot be held to 
standards that are culturally inappropriate and that Africans had no part III 
establishing" (in An Na-Im & Deng 1990:291). The problem with this argument is 
naturally that in denying the universality of human rights, the entire concept of human 
rights may be rendered obsolete. In so doing, the crop of African postcolonial elite are 
free to invoke either state sovereignty or an opposition to Western conceptions of 
human rights to mask or excuse serious violations of human rights, security and 
dignity of their citizens. But this is not the concern here. The point is that human 
rights discourse sets up a frame against which the modernising project of African 
states has to be interpreted. How to do so without recourse to the kind of violence that 
made Western modernity possible pushes the question of non-violent alternatives to 
the fore. While Girard's suggested alternative follows conceptually from his theory, it 
presents us with a binary either/or, which is extreme and, I would argue unhelpful. In 
order to generate more helpful way of thinking non-violence, we need to revisit and 
question the basis assumption of violence as default state. This, I will do in chapter 
three. 
1.11 Conclusion 
Central to the sustenance of a collective identity is the (mimetic structured) 
enactment of the sacrificial violence that occupies the space at the birth of human 
culture. Thus a community's search for selfhood invokes the cOflstruction of a series 
of victims against whom the ancient rituals of sacrificial scapegoating may be re-
enacted. As Roy (2001: 220) explains, 
If it [the community] doesn't find its enemy ... ir will have to manufacture one. Once 
war begins, it will develop a momentum, a logic and a justification of its own, and 
we'll lose sight of why it's being fought in the first place. 
Sacrificial violence gains momentum and in generating a unanimous social purgation, 
the sacred may be restored. To this end, the shared act of persecution of the 
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scapegoat, who is blamed for a gamut of ills and is deemed 'guilty' for a range of 
crimes, rejuvenates social bonds (Kearney 1999:252). This century's notable 
examples of such strategies of persecution include the Holocaust, Apartheid, the War 
on Terror or the Rwandan genocide and all reveal very clearly the nexus between 
violence and collective identity (re)formation . Increasingly however the ritualistic 
v:.orld that humankind has created can no longer be sustained through purely 
sacrificial means - quite simply, the persecution of scapegoats is no longer an 
effective means to social salvation. The act of scapegoating fails to achieve its 
intended effect of uniting the collective unanimously against the victim because it is 
pre-determined to failure, and consequently sacrifice compounds rather than closes 
cycles of violence. This failure of myth testifies to the failure of the scapegoating 
mechanism to stand up to the scrutiny generated by the human rights discourse. The 
root of the Greek word mythos is mu that means 'to close ' or 'to keep secret' (Bailie 
1995:33). Myth can act as a supremely powerful generator of social unity. But, it only 
does so on the proviso that the mouth of the victim is kept closed to avoid them 
speaking the truth of their innocence and the face of the victim is kept hidden so that 
the truth of arbitrary violence committed against them is kept secret. These requisites 
are denied as acts of generative scapegoating are unfolding against a backdrop of 
human rights, the task of which is to protect the minority in making the voice of the 
victim heard and face of the victim visible, thus inverting the traditional function of 
mythos. This exposure to the rights and the plight of the scapegoat ultimately 
amounts to the failure of the myth, and with that the failure of the generative 
mechanism. Girard elucidates the consequences of this, 'The spectacle of violence 
will become a model for similar violence, and those who were its most entranced 
members will reciprocate it" (1977:7). Under the influence of mimesis, the failure to 
generate a ritual catharsis leads to the festering of violent rivalries throughout the 
social order. The gross violations of human rights we see in post-colonial Africa is a 
function of the aforementioned failure. This leads us to the (unnerving) ironic 
conclusion that within the current frame in which violence is set up as the default 
state, human rights violations can be read as a function of the human rights discourse, 
which has served to define rather than deter heinous crimes against humanity. 
So if we accept Girard, and despite our growing awareness of the operation of 
violence, acknowledge the unwillingness of communities to relinquish sacrifice and 
similarly the unwillingness of states to abolish war as an instrument of foreign policy, /'--- - -"" /.' r I :" ,'.. '\ 
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we find ourselves in a terrifying place. At a global level the idea of nuclear powers, 
armed and engaged in a deadly mimetic rivalry, as 'monstrous doubles' poised ready 
to replicate the offensive move of the enemy, even if it culminates in global 
annihilation is deeply distressing. At the level of community, the image of child 
soldiers impaling their own parents or pregnant women hacking each other to death is 
even more haunting. 
In post-colonial African communities, scapegoating has become excessively 
violent. Indeed, examples of brutality are so numerous and instances of hate so 
prevalent that tales of unspeakable horror and the cruelty and carnage of war eclipse 
all notions of good, purity or legitimacy. By and large it seems impossible to even 
imagine an imagined communality that is not haunted by the spectre of violence. 
Whilst we still speak the archaic languages of ritualised sacrifice, the reality is that 
this vocabulary is no longer intelligible in terms of contemporary cultural discourse. 
We thus have no mechanism that can effectively bring violence to a close, other than 
the employ of violence so staggering that it ends all other violence - and life in the 
process. The current challenge laid down to collectivities is how to negotiate the 
ontological obstacles in their search for selfhood that spring from the agonising 
realisation that the originary force of social (re)generation in the form of ritual 
collective sacrifice, has in contemporary culture descended into random collective 
slaughter. While the focus of this chapter has been on the violent formation of 
collective identities, in the following chapter I shall examine the role of sacrifice in 
the construction of subjectivity. 
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Chapter 2 
The Sacrificial Construction of Subjectivity 
There looms with abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of being, directed 
against a threat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside, ejected 
beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. Its lies there quite 
close, but it cannot be assimilated. It beseeches, worries, and fascinates desire, which 
nevertheless, does not let itself be seduced ... Unflaggingly, like an inescapable 
boomerang, a vortex of summons and repulsions places the one haunted by it literally 
beside himself 
Powers of Horror, Julia Kristeva 
2,1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I argued that the construction of social existence is 
sacrificial, mediated by the unanimous collective violence inflicted upon a relatively 
arbitrary chosen scapegoat, whose death restores good health to an ailing social order. 
In this chapter, I look to those authors in psychoanalytic discourse who maintain that, 
historically, the very construction of subjectivity or consciousness has a similar 
sacrificial dimension. By tracing the thread that runs from Freud to Lacan and 
Kristeva, I shall argue that the emergence of subjectivity and the assertion of the 
subject 's sovereignty is fundamentally a function of violence instigated against, what 
Lacan first termed, the 'Other' . From as early as Freud's work, we were offered the 
insight that the 'Other' was problematic as it challenged the omnipotence of the self 
and is thus perceived as a presence that haunts and repulses the subject precisely 
because it threatens the individual's autonomy. The fear of the 'Other', or the fear of 
the threat to existence that the 'Other' incarnates, enlightens us as to our attempts, in 
their various guises, to destroy or annihilate the 'it' with a view to self-assertion and 
more fundamentally, self-preservation. This is akin to the threat to the community that 
we believe the 'scapegoat other' poses and who we accordingly seek to denigrate, 
demonise and eventually destroy to bolster the collective's identity. I shall read 
Kristeva to expose the sacrificial dimension underpinning her theory, which suggests 
that the maternal body is demonised, and abjected, or sacrificed in a bid to assert the 
autonomy of the subject. In tandem with the first chapter the suggestion, here, is that 
at both the social and personal levels there is an immolation of that which threatens 
the identity or autonomy of either the collective or the self and that identity formation 
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is thus intimately connected to what appears to be a necessary violence. To unveil the 
sacrificial logic involved in the immolation of subjectivity the first port-of-call in this 
chapter must be Kristeva's work that exposes an intimate historical nexus between 
language and violence in the formation of subjectivity. In what follows I shall, firstly 
situate her work genealogically vis-a.-vis her psychoanalyst predecessors Sigmund 
Freud and Jacques Lacan. Secondly, I shall examine the way in which she_ 
psychoanalytically maps the development of the subject from its absolute dependence 
on the mother to its location as a speaking subject within the Symbolic order (Fletcher 
and Benjamin 1990:80). Kristeva is particularly concerned with both "the role of the 
body and corporeality in the constitution of the speaking subject" (ibid:80) and the 
role that violence plays in the constitution of subjectivity insofar as the violent 
abjection, or sacrifice, of the maternal body allows the child to cross the threshold into 
the social order. Here it will take up a position as a speaking, autonomous subject as 
a member of a collectivity that similarly has to (re)define its identity violently. 
2.2. The early stages of selfhood 
Kristeva works from Lacan's psychoanalytical model of the three stages of 
subject formation: the Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic. According to Lacan the 
Real, also known as the pre-mirror stage, is the infant's first experience of the world 
during which the child undergoes negligible psychic maturation, causing him to 
largely disregard this phase in his body of work. What we do learn from Lacan is that 
during these first 6 months the "self' experiences its body as fragmented, 
uncoordinated and helpless. At this time, the child's body image is in Lacanian terms, 
"un corps morcelr (in Gallop 1985:79) or literally "a body in bit and pieces". The 
child is unable to distinguish between inside and outside, here and there, and similarly 
cannot discern between self and other. Lacan believes that in this psychic phase the 
child's world is the mother and the child lives in an idyllic state of harmony with her 
(Lechte 1985: 158). Kristeva criticises Lacan for skimming over this period of the 
self's development ego. She takes on and enlarges the notion of the Real, re-terming it 
the semiotic from the Greek semeion, which means trace, mark or distinctive feature 
(Kristeva 1987a:5). Kristeva borrows the concept from Plato's Timaeus in which he 
spoke of "the chora, an ancient, mobile unstable receptacle, prior to the One, to the 
father, and even to the syllable, metaphorically suggesting something nourishing and 
maternal" (ibid:5). The chora is a centre of energies and drives at the heart of the 
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semiotic space, which precedes the unified one-ness of the subject precisely because it 
precedes the first encounter with the 'Other' or 'Third party'. The Real is a similarly 
'prior to syllable'; prior to speech and signification and for Lacan is that which 
"resists symbolisation absolutely" (in Leader and Groves 1995:61). It is thus prior to 
the birth of subjectivity for as shall be argued, speech is the means of access into the 
Symbolic order of signification. Kristeva agrees that the semio!ic is a pre-linguistic 
space and acknowledges the difficulty of articulating this linguistically, precisely 
because the semiotic is a receptacle of traces of existence that is "outside of language" 
(Keltner 2004:97) and symbolic definitions that are, as it cannot be, fully grasped by 
the human mind. The difference is that for Kristeva, this pre-symbolic (pre-
signifying) phase contains important traces that have been suppressed and, as I shall 
support, must be excavated if we are to rethink the origins of subjectivity. These 
traces speak of a nourishing, loving, pre-oedipal identification shared by the mother 
and infans (pre-subject). In Kristeva's understanding of the semiotic (pre-oedipal, 
pre-symbolic) phase, the "mother" is primary and the self and other are intertwined. 
And accordingly she concurs with Lacan that the space is marked by a certain "spatial 
ambivalence" (Oliver 1993:253) that is to say, the boundaries between inside and 
outside are uncertain. The matemal body cannot be neatly separated into subject and 
object - there is no separation between self and mother and thus none between self 
and other; subject and object - 'The I truly is an other' (Kristeva 1996:95). 
Lacan's notion of the mirror or the imaginary stage in a child's development 
marks the next stage of psychic maturation and sees a distinct separation between self 
and other. Lacan's key observation concems the behaviour of infants between the 
ages of 6 and 18 months. At this age, Lacan notes that children become capable for 
the first time of identifying with an image outside him or herself. This occurs when 
the child catches a glimpse of its own reflection in a mirror. Initially the infant 
attempts to grab the mirror for they mistake the mirror image of themsel ves to be a 
real object that "indicates an initial confusion between the self and the other" (Dor 
1997:96). Gradually however the child learns to distinguish between a real being and 
a reflection of it and therefore no longer attempts to appropriate it. In this period the 
child is able to recognise him or herself in the mirror or recognise hislher own 
behaviour "reflected in the imitative gestures" of an adult or identifies with the image 
of another child (Bowie 1991:21). Consequently, the child begins to model itself on 
others. As was argued in the previous chapter, such imitative behaviour is a defining 
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characteristic of human beings; our most primal desire. Through the instinctual 
imitation of the behaviour, speech patterns and desires of others, we learn to talk and 
act and thus are able to take up a place as a subject in the social order. In 
psychoanalytic terms we may say that imitation allows the child to move through the 
imaginary phase toward the Symbolic. 
The child is fascinated, or for Lacan, captive by its own image and gains a 
great deal of narcissistic pleasure from its reflection. Lacan accordingly associates 
narcissism with the infant's identification with its own image (Gallop 1985) and is 
best defined as 'self-love ' or the love of seeing one ' s own image, which is first 
possible in this mirror phase. Whilst previously the infant had to be supported if it 
were to sit up straight; the pleasure of recognition of a self-image in the mirror, causes 
the child to "jubilantly assume the upright position" (Gallop 1985 :78). For Lacan this 
'jubilation' can only be explained as a testament to how, in the recognition of its 
mirror-image and the discovery of a corporeal unity that was previously absent in 
their development, now presents a vision of what the child 'will only later become' 
(ibid.). The child, born prematurely, is still totally dependent on others for every 
aspect of its survival and still has very little control over its own bodily functions. 
Therefore, reflected in the mirror "are the would-be autonomy and mastery of the 
individual in their earliest draft forms" (Bowie 1991 :22). It is such anticipation of 
fulfilling future potential - it is the promise of co-ordination, self-sufficiency and 
autonomy - that captivates the child and marks the turning point in the child's 
development as it puts an end to, what Lacan terms, 'the fantasy of the fragmented 
body' (Dor 1997:95) that subsumed the Real phase. At the end of this period the 
process of identity formation has begun but the child's existence is still strongly fused 
with that of the mother. The important point is that in the mirror the infant has gained 
a glimpse of a cohesive, stable identity that will have assembled 'body bits and 
pieces' into unified totality (Gallop 1985:79). The infant also understands that the 
image is its own and that it must be perpetually guarded as it is "constantly threatened 
by a retrospective pull toward fragmentation" (Bowie 1991:26). The infant thus finds 
itself awkwardly situated in a space between the forward progression to selfhood, and 
the backward regression to corps morceM. 
This ability to identify with his or her own image then marks the child's first 
attempts to become a unified and autonomous individual, or to become a self. Indeed 
it is through this primordial experience, in which the subject conceives of himself or 
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herself through the reflection of the other, that the 'I' becomes an imaginary construct 
(Lacan 1968). It is imaginary precisely because it reveals the possibility of what the 
child will become by presenting an illusion of corporeal unity. Imagination therefore 
plays a vital role in stimulating a desire for self-mastery and to this end the mirror, or 
imaginary stage for Lacan, is the 'originary moment' of subjectivity fo rmation. 
Gallop explains, "It is ,the founding moment of the imaginary mode, the belief in a 
projected image" (1985:81). Lacan contends that there is nothing on the other side of 
the mirror. If we believe there is, then we have been duped by a retrospective 
projection from this side. In contrast Kristeva believes that there is something on the 
other side of the mirror. In developing this argument, Kristeva criticises Lacan and 
argues that narcissism is predicated "on the existence of the ego but not of an external 
object" (Kristeva in Oliver 1997:253). She contends that primary narcissism emerges 
in the semiotic (pre-subject, pre-object) phase, in the processes of identification 
between mother and child. The precise nature of this semiotic relation between the 
child and the mother that is neither object (as Freud and Lacan would argue) nor non-
object, but 'something in between' (ibid:226) will become clear in the discussion to 
follow. The important conceptual marker for now is that in placing the ego of primary 
narcissism in the pre-Oedipal phase, Kristeva suggests that subjectivity begins to form 
prior to child' s experience of its own reflection. Within the semiotic (Real) stage the 
infant's narcissistic identity is inseparable from identification with the mother and the 
infant internalises this as a fragmented body image (Fletcher and Benjamin 1990:82-
83). She contends it is precisely this initial feeling of lack of corporeal completeness 
or independence that stimulates an alienating identification of the "subject" and 
constitutes the earliest phases in psychic development. This 'something' for Kristeva 
is thus the semiotic or pre-Oedipal phase of experience (Oliver 1993 :57) that 
constitutes a beginning of selfhood prior to the mirror stage and contributes to the 
gradual constitution of the self. 
2.3. The Oedipal predicament 
For Lacan the mirror stage ends with the onset of the Oedipal conflict in which 
the object of the child ' s fascination is no longer its own mirror image. In Freud' s 
earliest descriptions of the emergence of the Oedipus complex, he explains a situation 
in which the young boy imitates his father, then falls in love with his mother and ends 
up fighting his father for the mother's attention as the father intervenes and becomes 
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an impediment to the child's attainment of his Oedipal aspiration. The repressed and 
intertwined wishes of the Oedipal process are also well illustrated by Freud's story in 
Totem and Taboo (1913:142) in which he speaks of a violent and jealous father who 
takes all the women in the tribe - most notably the mother - for himself and expels 
his sons from the community. He continues that the father is the feared and envied 
model of each one of the sons, who return from their banishment and in a unanimous 
act of violence against the father, the sons devour him and in so doing accomplish 
their identification with him. The sons are caught in a terrible predicament as they 
love and admire the father yet at the same time despise him because he poses an 
obstacle to their sexual desires. Similarly, the Oedipus myth in The Ego and the ld 
reveals that whilst the 'father' is idolised, he becomes both a rival and obstacle to the 
sexual interests of the child: 
At a very early age the little boy develops an object-cathexis of his mother, which 
originally related to the mother's breast. . . the father the boy deals by identifying 
himself with him. For a time these two relationships exist side by side, until the 
sexual wishes in regard to the mother becomes more intense and his father is 
perceived as an obstacle to them; thi s gives rise to the Oedipus complex (Freud 
1923:40) 
From this insight it is clear that the boy displays two psychologically distinct 
attachments: both an object-cathexis toward hi s mother and an identification with his 
father whom he takes as his model. The distinction between the two desires depends 
upon whether the attachment ties to the object (desire to have the mother) or the 
subject (desire to be the father). Freud explains that the convergence of the two stands 
at the dawn of the normal Oedipus complex. In discussing the second attachment, 
Freud wrote in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego "A little boy will 
exhibit a special interest in his father, he would like to grow like and be like him and 
take his place everywhere. We may say simply that he takes his father as his ideal" 
(Freud 1921 : 105). For Freud, the cathexis or strong libidinal attachment toward the 
mother is a sign of our autonomous desire, born from the self and directed at the 
mother. Girard disagrees and instead contends that in the Oedipal complex, the child 
first identifies mimetically with the father. Later, the child's focus shifts to that which 
they would like to have namely the mother that the father desires. The child's desire 
for the mother is not autonomous. Quite the contrary, when the boy falls in love with 
mother he does so because he is still imitating the father (Girard 1977: 169). In 
wanting to 'be like him' and 'to act like him' it is logical that the mother only became 
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desirable to the boy when he perceived that the father desired her. In his actions the 
child is guided by the aspiration that he 'would like to be' the father. There are 
ominous undertones in the suggestion that the boy would not only like to imitate the 
father but in fact take the father's place, as the son's feelings toward the father grow 
increasingly jealous and aggressive, as Freud describes "His identification with the 
father takes on a hostile colouring and becomes identical with the wish to replace the 
father" (Freud 1921:105). The object (the mother) effectively drops off the radar and 
the relation is centred on the rivalry between the boy and the father. The subject 
becomes more concerned with the model of desire, with becoming the model, than the 
desired object, which is the mark of a true mimetic engagement. We may therefore 
say that processes and desires of the infant's formation are mimetically mediated by 
the behaviour of the father figure (Anderson 2000). More specifically it is only 
through the nascent self s primary identification with the imaginary father figure, or 
the model, that the child gradually develops an autonomous identity linked to the 
separation from the maternal body. 
Mimetic rivalries run their course from the desire to be like the father to the 
desire to have what the father has and finally the desire to be the father. In terms of 
psychoanalysis we can say that the child ultimately breaks its unity with the maternal 
body by way of desire to be like the other. Anderson (2000) notes a parallel between 
this model of subjectivity formation and the model developed by Girard. In Girard's 
triangular model of mimetic desire, mimesis acted as a catalyst for the violent rivalries 
that threatened to destroy society and the violence that restores the collectivity. 
Similarly at the level of the individual , Freud through Kristeva concurs that mimetic 
proclivities play a fundamental role in generating rivalries, and in generating 
subjectivity. Anderson summarises: "the common pattern in the formation of 
individual and collective identities is mimetic" (ibid:217). Such is the power of 
mimesis, that it "forms identity and mind in conjunction with the process of mimetic 
identification" (Ragland-Sullivan 1986:162). Chapter 3 will explore in greater detail 
the specific nature of this pattern or similarity in the way that mimetic desire functions 
in the formation of identity at both social and personal levels. For the purpose of this 
chapter though, I look to fully understand the relationship between the mother, 
mimesis and murder. 
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2.4. The imaginary father 
In both the origin and resolution of the Oedipus complex, the 'Father' plays a 
key role and ultimately guides the child's transition to the social or Symbolic order. 
After the initial break with the mother' s body Lacan contends that the subject finds 
itself in the imaginary phase trying to see itself in relation to others and to negotiate 
the move from corps morcele to corporeal unity within the Symbolic order. It's the 
'Father' figure who intervenes from the exterior to act as mediator between mother 
and child. Following Lacan ' s logic, Anderson writes that it is "the imaginary 
figure . .. as the mediating third term between the receptacle of maternal forces and the 
child gives a symbolic ego-ideal, which makes possible the transition to the Symbolic 
order of language" (2000:221). This quote reveals that at the threshold of the 
symbolic the subject takes its first steps toward the new Symbolic order, through an 
imaginary identification with a third party. This party is the 'Father' figure who 
becomes the child's ego-ideal, or in terms of mimesis, what the child wants to 
become. How are we to conceive of this 'Father'? Lacan offers the following: 
The father is not a real object, so what is he? ... The father is a metaphor. What is a 
metaphor? ... It' s a signifier that takes the place of another signifier ... The father is a 
signifier substituted for another signifier. And this is the province and the only 
essential province of the 'father' as he intervenes in the Oedipus complex (Lacan in 
Dor 1997:94; emphasis added). 
The 'Father' then is not a real father but rather a metaphor for the phallus, which 
signifies the mother 's desire and acts as a symbolic agent with which the child 
identifies. It is confusing to say that a child can identify with an abstraction and it 
seems that this identification would need to manifest or concretise in some 
form/representation; in something that represents "separation" as such. This is clearer 
if we understand that the child identifies with the phallus as he wants to be the 
phallus, so he may become the object of the mother's desire. Later, in bringing the 
Oedipal complex to a close, the child severs its dependency on the maternal body and 
renounces its desire for the mother by mimetically identifying with the phallic 
signifier as associated with the 'imaginary father ' . The child no longer wants to 
satisfy the mother but wants to take a place next to the Father in the Symbolic order. 
The little boy is more able to make this break as he possesses a like signifier - his 
penis - which means that he can more readily identify with the phallus (Appignanesi 
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and Garratt 1999:93). The misogyny in privileging the phallus as a means of transition 
from imaginary to the Symbolic and the important implications for women who are 
effectively abandoned outside the social order, and thus outside meaning, will be 
addressed in chapter four. 
For now we must continue to develop the Lacanian connection between the 
'Father' figure and the psychic development of the child. He writes that the 
"imaginary (phallic) figure" stimulates the separation between the mother and the 
child within the Oedipal process and "the human ego establishes itself on the basis of 
the imaginary relation" (in Kristeva 1987:22). The most important 'weapon' in the 
'imaginary father's' arsenal to ensure this transition is the threat of castration that is 
different depending on the gender of the child. Lacan's specific interest is in the case 
of the boy and the way in which the 'father' forcefully prohibits the incest relationship 
between mother and child by threatening the boy with castration. The boy therefore 
renounces the ambition of becoming the phallus for the mother and detaches the child 
from maternal dependence (in Kristeva 1984:46-47) due to his 'castration anxiety' or 
fear that the father will cut off his penis. Therefore in Lacan' s conceptualisation it is 
the overly strict father, who forces the child into compliance with the threat of 
castration that instigates the separation from the maternal body in the constitution of 
subjectivity. It is such a Freudian concept of prohibition, in this instance against 
incest, which Lacan elaborates in defining the Law of the Father. 
Against Lacan, Kristeva conceives of a more 'loving' father that she roots 
genealogically in the work of Freud: 
At the dawn of psychic experience Freud saw a primary identification, a direct and 
immediate transference of the nascent ego to the father of individual prehistory who 
according to Freud possessed the sexual characteristics and functions of both parents 
(Kristeva 1987:25; emphasis added). 
In Tales of Love (1987b) Kristeva argues that the child's identification with the 
prehistoric mother-father is a primary identification with an 'imaginary father' that 
contains both masculine and feminine characteristics (also Oliver 1993:77). Her 
argument contains two bold propositions that need be elaborated. One, that the child's 
primary identification is pre-historical, that is to say it occurs pre-mirror stage and 
pre-Oedipal, and two, that the 'father' figure is a conglomeration of both maternal and 
paternal functions. In so stating, Kristeva challenges Lacan's argument that the child's 
primary identification occurs in the mirror stage and his theory of subjectivity 
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formation in which the Oedipal Father demands the rejection of the maternal. Kristeva 
thus sets herself apart from Lacan in rethinking the Oedipal triad and ultimately 
rethinking the transition to selfhood. 
Kristeva counters the Oedipal narrative with its portrayal of a threatening and 
authoritarian father, with recourse to the tale of Narcissus. In this myth, Narcissus is 
gazing into a pool and he is overcome with the desire to reunite _with the 'other' that 
he sees reflected before him. According to Kristeva, he longs for the union with the 
other, which can be traced back to his sense of loss in separating from the m( other) in 
the process of ego formation (in Lechte 1985:171). Although Narcissus is mistaken in 
taking his own image for an image of (an)other, the important point is that he 
identifies with an object (Oliver 1993:71) which for Kristeva recalls an archaic 
(uncanny) identification. Thus whilst she acknowledges that a narcissistic 
identification does occur in the mirror stage, Kristeva contends that it is not the first. 
Her proposal is that "the narcissistic identification in the mirror stage is merely the 
reduplication of earlier narcissistic identifications" (in ibid:72). In other words, the 
archaic identification of pre-mirror, pre-Oedipal stage becomes the model or the 
pattern whereby identifications are reduplicated in latter phases of psychic 
development. It is this identification to which Narcissus responds - namely, the 
earliest narcissistic identifications in the mother-child relation (1983:22) of the 
semiotic phase of experience. On these grounds Kristeva disagrees with Freud's claim 
that primary narcissism is a developmental stage and argues instead "primary 
narcissism is already a structure" (1983:374). 
The child naturally cannot remain entirely in this semiotic phase as dependent 
on the mother and needs to separate - to make the transition from the maternal body 
to the Symbolic order - in order to develop an individual identity. Kristeva proposes 
that initially it is not the Lacanian 'Father' but the mother that is the agent of 
separation who "must instigate the break-up of the primary symbiosis" (Kristeva 
1983:260) in order to allow the child to make this move. The mother recognises the 
importance of the separation and what she does out of love for her child. This gesture 
of love is what Kristeva names "the mother's gift" (1982). The mother's gift to the 
infant is to display that s/he is not the object of her desire but that she desires another. 
The mother's desire is elsewhere; it is deferred to the phallus, which is identification 
with the 'imaginary father'. In saying that the mother's desire is for the phallus, we 
are saying that this desire is part of the mother. Therefore we may say that the 
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paternal function "already exists in the mother" (Oliver 1993:79; in original). In other 
words, the mother's desire for the phallus qua 'father' involves her in the paternal 
function and as such the 'imaginary father' is an amalgam of the maternal and 
paternal function or a combination of the mother and her desire (ibid:77). 
Kristeva' s imaginary father plays a support role in facilitating the child in the 
thetic break: "He is a presymbolic imaginary_ father who stands in as a support for the 
place of the mother's desire" (Oliver 1993:78). The emergence of this supportive third 
figure, which Kristeva calls a godsend, makes both the primary separation and 
amatory identification possible (1987: 40) as it allows the mother to defer her desire 
from the child to the phallus. Oliver elaborates, "It is the mother's love and her love 
for her own mother, a narcissistic love from generation to generation, that supports 
the move into the Symbolic order" (1993:68; emphasis added). It is this primary 
identification qua amatory identification (Keltner 2004: 100) that is reduplicated from 
generation to generation. For Kristeva, the primary amatory identification causes the 
child's separation from identification with the mother's body to identification with the 
mother's desire. Oliver summarises that the imaginary figure mediates the move 
"from the mother's body to the mother's desire through the mother's love" (Oliver 
1993:70-71). So, whereas Lacan understands narcissism as a result of auto-
identification that generates 'self-love', Kristeva places it in the semiotic phase where 
the self is not yet formed and love is contained in the pre-Symbolic, pre-linguistic 
dyad between the pre-subject, the mother and her desire. 
Kristeva's novel conception of the 'imaginary father figure' has two important 
consequences. Firstly, it challenges the traditional maternal/paternal dichotomy. In 
traditional psychoanalytical discourse, the maternal function belongs to the semiotic 
and the paternal function to the symbolic. In this conceptual frame, a move to the 
Symbolic order required identification with the mother's body. The form of this 
identification was abjection - the sacrificial rejection of the maternal body as a rite of 
passage into the Symbolic. Kristeva has reconfigured this to allow for an alternative 
catalyst in the form of an amatory identification with the mother's desire , or a union 
of the mother and the phallus. According to Oliver (1993) this union recalls the primal 
scene: the child's conception. The archaic 'imaginary father' is a metonymic 
ussociation that forms in the child's imagination of the union of father and mother that 
the child imagines was present at conception. As Oliver clarifies, an identification 
with the 'father of individual prehistory ' is an identification with the child's 
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conception (ibid:79). Through an identification with the 'imaginary father' , "the child 
can rejoice in a (re) union with the mother" (ibid:80), thus shifting emphasis from 
exclusion to union. 
Secondly in postulating "the loving imaginary father as the archaic disposition 
of the paternal function preceding the Symbolic, the mirror stage, and the Oedipal 
father" (Oliver 1993:81l Kristeva offers two different (albeit interwoven) narratives-
one of sacrifice and one of love. The former, the traditional account of the origins of 
subjectivity centres on Lacan 's harsh authoritarian 'father figure ' and is set up against 
the maternal semiotic. The latter points to a post-sacrificial account of subjectivity 
formation, which invokes Kristeva's archaic imaginary father as "an imaginary agent 
of love" (Oliver 1993:69). This primary direct and immediate identification of the 
child with this 'father of individual prehistory' is conceptually prior to the stern, 
severe 'father' that Lacan posits as the primary agent of the Oedipal phase. In this 
scheme the child identifies with the loving imaginary (maternal) father that gives the 
child support so that he or she may take up a place in history. 
2.5. Of signs and subjectivity 
In Lacanian discourse, it is the 'Father figure ' that creates and enforces the 
transference from the imaginary to the Symbolic through the repression of the mother. 
The Father is thus representative of the entire Symbolic order or the order of 
signification which constitutes social systems such as Law, culture, religion, family 
and language. Such systems precede the birth of a child and when an infant learns to 
gauge its place in the world and negotiate the networks of the symbolic, the child 
would have attained a sense of self-identity (Hook 2003). Lacan was particularly 
fascinated with the role of language. He argued that the subconscious functions 'like' 
a language insofar as it' s comprised of signs, metaphors and symbols (Appignanesi 
and Curry 1999:89) however the infant can only acquire it after the symbolic break 
with the maternal body. Furthermore it is only through language that the child takes 
up a place in the Symbolic order as a subject (ibid:91). Because the transition to the 
social world is premised on the repression of the mother, Lacan argued that language 
too was the domain of the Father. Women, situated in the imaginary, were therefore 
stranded 'without language' (ibid:93) and without access to the Symbolic. Against 
Lacan, Kristeva argues that 'signification' is not the exclusive domain of the 
Symbolic and that instead meaning may be found on the 'other side ' of the mirror - in 
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the space where 'semiotic bodily drives' fuse with symbols in language to create 
meaning (Oliver 1993:76). In bringing to light the complicated pre-Oedipal relation 
between mother and child and the complicating processes of identification and 
separation (Oliver 1997:226), Kristeva argues that there are traces of meaning in 
semiotic stage of experience. The very aim of Kristeva's psychoanalytical discourse 
of.love is "to get behind static linguistic representations in order to discover pre-
linguistic traces of another space of experience" (Pateman and Gross 1987:130). By 
uncovering the repressed mother-child dyad and writing meaning into a space that 
was previously deemed to be without, Kristeva begins to challenge the dominant 
discourse of the Symbolic. 
Kristeva and Lacan are both concerned with the linguistic processes through 
which subjectivity is constituted. For Kristeva the child must be able to identify with 
words and become capable of enunciation in order to survive as a subject, in "the 
universe of signs and creation" (Kristeva 1989:23) as it is only through language that 
the subject can make meaning of anything. Lacan argues that the signifiers from the 
parent's speech act as elements of identification and the identity of the child will 
depend on how he or she assumes the words of the parents (Leader and Groves 
1995:43). This is a mimetic process as the subject imitates and reproduces the words 
of another who becomes a model. In incorporating the speech of another, the subject 
becomes like the model; the child too becomes a speaking being. This capacity for 
speech and enunciation allows for the emergence of the autonomous self. Kristeva 
goes so far as to argue the subject only exists in its capacity to identify itself with a 
'speaking other' (Kristeva 1984). For Lacan this acquisition of language and 
subjectivity is a "battle" (Bowie 1991:21) that acts upon aggressive impUlses. 
Kristeva argues that this latent aggression manifests in acts of symbolic violence, or 
what Kristeva titled abjection that stimulates the shift to selfhood and supports the 
Symbolic order. 
2.6. The horror of the abject mother 
The logic of abjection was deeply ingrained in Lacan's work yet it was never 
articulated as such. Lacan's endeavour to "return to Freud" and excavate Freud's 
connection between words and symptoms of psychosis was fundamentally shaped by 
the Saussarian distinction between signifier and signified. The signifier is the 
materially produced representation - a particular sound, sign or image (West 
65 
1996: 165) and the signified is the mental idea or concept that the signifier represents 
(Kearney 1994:243). Lacan however sought to move beyond the simple flow 
between signifier and signified, word and meaning. He contended that a word led on 
to other words in a linguistic chain just as a meaning led on to other meanings and 
groups of meanings then are arranged by the links between the words rather than the 
words themselves (Leader and Groves 1995). He argued, along Freudian lines, that 
when an element is suppressed, it can return and manifest itself in one's speech in the 
signifying chain, or in the symbolic. However "if the element is foreclosed, it can ' t 
return to the symbolic for the very simple reason that it never existed there in the first 
place. It was banished, rejected" (ibid: 107; emphasis added). The notion of banishing 
rejecting, or expelling something, most notably of elements of self is the embodiment 
of Kristeva' s notion of abjection. In this context, 'abject' is used as a verb, but 
Kristeva also uses the word as an adjective describing something wretched and 
despised. When confronted with the 'abject' the subject may literally want to vomit or 
recoil in repulsion - such is the potency of the feeling of disgust. A sensation of 
disgust, according to Winfried Menninghaus, is "a state of alarm and emergency, an 
acute crisis of self-preservation in the face of an unassailable otherness, a convulsive 
struggle, in which what is in question, is quite literally, 'to be or not to be'" (2003: 1). 
As I shall illustrate with reference to Kristeva that the self is intimately and 
intrinsically tied to the abject and feelings of nausea and repugnance emergence from 
the deep-seated awareness that the abject poses not only a threat to subjectivity, but 
that the expulsion of such wretched forces literally becomes a question of life and 
death. 
According to Kristeva, the first and primary abjection is that of the mother. It is 
the moment in which the child separates definitively from the mother and subjectivity 
is set up against her. Here the binary logic that underpins western metaphysics is 
expressed in an understanding of the autonomy of the self defined by the abjection of 
the maternal/feminine. In Powers of Horror (1982) Kristeva points out that the self's 
transition to the Symbolic order entails violence as one body is violently separated 
from another in birth. It is this initial separation of the subject from the unity within 
the maternal body that constitutes the founding moment of subjectivity formation. 
Kristeva exquisitely highlights the nexus between the violence of abjection and 
identity formation: 
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Abjection preserves what existed in the archaism of pre-objectal relationship, in the 
immemorial violence with which the body becomes separate from another body in 
order to be (1982: 10; emphasis added). 
If the subject wishes to take up a place in the Symbolic then the subject must violently 
reject the mother's body. The transition from the semiotic to the Symbolic order of 
signification is then seeped in violence and abjection stands at the threshold at which 
the child acquires language. Reineke powerfully elaborates, "Human violence is 
murderous because only humans, at the very borders of language, linger over the flesh 
they tear in the accession to a social space" (Anderson 2000:224). This conjures a 
provocative image of the physical process of birth. The subject passes violently 
through the birth canal to be born into 'social space' (Oliver 1993:55) and therefore 
what lies on the other side of the canal, within the maternal body, is the incarnate 
threat to the subject'S autonomy. The mother's vagina, as a portal to the birth canal, is 
seen as threatening as it provides a visual recollection of the semiotic which the 
subject rejected in order to be born. The mother's genitals designate the literal 
boundary between inside and outside and they are viewed with horror by the subject. 
In constructing her sexual organs as abject, and within a patriarchal social order 
reducing the mother to her sex, it becomes easier to reject or expel her in the asseltion 
of selfhood. Indeed Kristeva (1982) argues that the subject comes to hate the mother 
that is expressed through the abjection of all traces of her body. 
Subsequently all such corporeal crevices, hollows and orifices, namely the 
mouth, anus, genitals, eyes and ears that designate the boundary between inside and 
outside the body generate abjection as do the bodily functions which with which these 
sites are associated, such as vomit, faeces, urine, blood and phlegm (Fletcher and 
Benjamin 1990:88). Beyond this Kristeva labels food loathing as perhaps the most 
elementary and most archaic form of abjection: 
Food becomes abject only if it is a border between two distinct entities or territories . 
A boundary between nature and culture ... [AlII food is liable to defile, food can 
designate the other (the natural) that is opposed to the social condition of man and 
penetrates the seWs clean and proper body (Kristeva 1982:75; emphasis added). 
When exposed to any of these, the subject's reaction is one of di sgust as they straddle 
the ambiguous, dangerous boundary between inside and outside; nature and culture. 
They thus beckon the threat that the mother poses to the Symbolic order as she 
occupies the ground between nature and culture. Ragland-Sullivan (1986) explains 
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that the very transition of the self from the Real to the Symbolic can be re-interpreted 
as a movement from nature to culture. We know from Kristeva that traditionally the 
semiotic (Real) space is associated with the maternal function and by extension with 
nature and disorder (or the impure) which must be perpetually purged to sustain the 
paternal, symbolic, ordered side. The 'mother' is subsequently constructed as "Other" 
and is seen as a threat to both the subject's identity and the entire social order due to 
the intimate nexus which has developed between the sacrificial expulsion of the 
maternal and subjectivity. 
Kristeva attributes this to the fact that abjection is largely a social construction 
that repels our being and is a function of mimetic repugnance rather than nature. By 
way of illustration she argues that bodily excretions are culturally represented as 
unacceptable or impure: 
The ability to take up a symbolic position as a social and speaking subject entail the 
disavawal of its modes of corporeality, especially those representing what is 
considered unacceptable, unclean or antisocial (Fletcher and Benjamin 1990:86; 
emphasis added). 
Building upon this Kristeva proposes that the subject's corporeal functioning, or 
modes of corporeality, can never truly be expelled, but rather linger at the margin of 
both culture and the subject's identity. The original construction of subjectivity 
entailed the violent expUlsion of traces of the maternal body, and beyond this that the 
sustenance of a 'proper' or a 'clean' self require the expunging of the improper or the 
unclean elements of its corporeal existence. It is the subject's recurring "disavowal of 
its mode of corporeality" which can be reread in Girardian terms as the re-enacted 
sacrificial expulsion of a part of the selfin the (re) construction of subjectivity. 
These abject forces present the self with a threatening or menacing force that 
must be perpetually expelled although it is impossible to definitively exclude them, as 
the abject, in all it forms and guises, returns like an inescapable boomerang, always 
retuming to the same place. It is expelled and inevitably returns to the real rather 
than the symbolic: 
It is the real in the Lacanian sense of the word, something outside symbolisation and 
meaning, constant and always returning to the same place to bring you suffering 
(Leader and Groves 1995: 141 ; emphasis added). 
This idea of recurrent anxiety and the haunting feeling of dread and horror is found in 
Freud 's writings on the uncanny, which he takes to be "a particular shade of what is 
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frightening" and in particular, "that class of the frightening which leads back to what 
is known of old and familiar" (Freud 1919:220-21). It is a feeling much akin to that of 
(disturbing) deja vu which dates back to "a very early mental stage, long since 
surmounted" (ibid:236). The uncanny then is that frightening archaic force which was 
once repressed and now returns. The best definition of the feeling of abjection would 
be a similar sickly reaction of dread and disgust that stirs in the su_bject in response to 
the re-emergence of repressed forces that were expelled to the margins of the 
symbolic in the construction of the self. Such traces must be continually repelled and 
contested to assert a stable ordered identity, fulfilling the "prime operation of 
abjection [that] is exclusion" (Hook 2003:54) or the expulsion of Otherness. The 
uncanny is thus the conceptual predecessor of abject forces that cannot be annihilated; 
yet continually threaten to annihilate the self. 
Why is it impossible to eliminate this threat? The answer is precisely because 
the abject is parI of the subject and not a separate, detached object. By nature of the 
subject ' s emergence into society through the abjection of the mother, the abject as a 
force which may destroy the self, becomes a necessary precondition of selfhood. The 
abject is therefore both a part of the self but must ironically be kept separate from it. 
Kristeva clarifies: 
It is an extremely strong feeling which is at once somatic and symbolic, which is 
above all a revolt of the person against an external menace from which one wants to 
keep oneself at a distance, but of which one has the impression that it is not only an 
external menace but that it may menace us from the inside (in Hook 2003: 135- 136; 
emphasis added). 
The acknowledgment of the impossibility of definitively expelling this menace haunts 
and disgusts us . The subject must keep this wretched and despised abject in check in 
order to define and redefine its identity. Even though the abject forces are expelled to 
the margins of the Symbolic, they still threaten the social order from a distance. "The 
Symbolic can maintain itself by maintaining its borders; and the abject points to the 
fragility of those borders" (Oliver 1993:56). Both the subject and society, situated 
inside the Symbolic order require the abjection of the maternal that embodies 
remnants of the semiotic , which threatens from outside its borders (Gross 1990:87). 
But in paradoxical terms, it is precisely that which disrespects borders and rules and 
disturbs identity that confers order within the symbolic. Consequently the Symbolic 
order is defined by abjection and vice versa, and their existences are mutually 
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inclusive. The abject is then a necessary condition - or a necessary supplement 
(McKenna 1992) - of both the subject and the Symbolic order and acts in the 
development of subjectivity as well as the cultural order. In understanding that the 
expulsion of all traces of the maternal body in the assertion of selfhood occurs at both 
the personal and the social level, we may speak of abjection as having a systemic 
dimension. 
2.7. Rituals of abjection 
As a counter to such systemic threats and a means of protecting its fragile 
borders, the Symbolic sets up rituals to keep the abject at bay. But because the abject 
can never be totally banished there is no absolute guarantee of security and autonomy 
- violent rituals of abjection only provide "flimsy protections against disintegration" 
(Oliver 1993:58). Kristeva argues that sacrificial rituals illustrate the boundary 
between semiotic authority [mother] and symbolic law [father] (in Oliver 1997:259-
261). This sets up a clear binary between the maternal (the womb, the semiotic) and 
paternal (the phallus, the phallic order), the former sacrificed in the (re)creation of the 
latter. Indeed, the violence of abjection is locked into such binary logic; that there can 
be no order without disorder, law without crime, purity without impurity or morality 
without immorality. This is the rooted in the original duality between self and other 
(symbolic and abject) that manifests in the abjection of women. In light of this, 
Kristeva's move to open up the pre-mirror space to both paternal and maternal 
functions as a means to challenge such binaries becomes particularly pertinent. It is 
exactly the historical tendency to associate it with the feminine alone that lies at the 
root of patriarchal gender binaries like home/work, private/public , nature/culture, 
semiotic/symbolic. Such binaries I shall argue collectively constitute much of the 
patriarchal violence associated with identity formation in Western culture. It is this 
insight to which we shall return in chapter four as it will assist us in our aim of 
severing the nexus between [in this instance, sexually differentiated] violence and 
subjectivity formation by reconceptualising the relation between self and (m)other. 
My immediate concern is the ways in which the creation of distinction 
between self and other (that creates the boundary between inside and outside; pure 
aad impure) contributes to the sacrificial construction of identity. In Kristeva's 
analysis all the impure, unclean, disorderly forces that pose a threat to the subject, 
society or the Symbolic order are ritually abjected in a bid for purity and order. To be 
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in the Symbolic order, there is a prohibition against the 'abject' that instructs the body 
must be clean and pure in order not to transgress the laws and conventions of society. 
Similarly for Girard, prohibitions and rituals designate the things that the members of 
society must and must not do (Girard 1987:93) as means to distinguish the pure from 
the impure to keep disorderly forces to the outside of the social order. In this instance 
it is the scapegoat as a P?isonous presence - as the omnipotent source of disorder and 
impurity - that originates from the inside of the community is expelled to the outside, 
in a bid to restore social cohesion. Moreover it is only through the victim's violent 
expulsion that the parameters of the symbolic or social order are reaffirmed. These 
two authors provide personal and social readings of identity formation in purely 
sacrificial terms and this will allow the terms sacrifice and abjection to be used 
interchangeably in this discussion of violent identity formation. The purpose of 
Kristeva's sacrificial abjection is akin to the sacrificial scapegoating proposed by 
Girard: to illustrate that in the process of abjecting the mother or sacrificing the 
scapegoat, the 'other' is disfigured in their construction as impure, antisocial and a 
grave threat to selfhood. Therefore just as Girard says that violence lies at the origins 
of collective identity, Kristeva too argues that violence is originary (in a constitutive 
sense) to the subject's emergence into society. 
To facilitate their sacrifice, the abject and the scapegoat are both constructed 
as 'other' prohibited from the social order, and thus become taboo . This notion 
resonates with Freud's Totem and Taboo in which he argues that civilisation is 
founded on the sacrifice or expulsion of "pre-oedipal pleasures and 'impure' incestual 
attachments to parental love" (in Fletcher and Benjamin 1990:86), which sets a 
precedent for the creation of prohibitions and restrictions that are placed on the 
actions of members of a community. It is precisely these prohibitions that allow for 
the existence of the social order. This is the restrictive and destructive aspect of 
'taboo' - the aspect to which Girard and this, the first reading of Kristeva in this 
study responds. That is to say that one primary taboo is a prohibition set up against 
the (feminine) semiotic, which like Freud's Oedipal prohibition against incest is 
directed at the maternal body (Oliver 1993:56). In the process an important creative 
dimension is overlooked or neglected and its re-appropriation will be the subject of 
my second reading of Kristeva (chapter four) and the critique of Girard (chapter five). 
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2.8. The eternal fascination of the threshold 
As early as 1895 Freud had spoken of "symptoms joining in the conversation" 
(in Leader and Groves 1995:35), which means that on the psychoanalysts couch, the 
patient will reveal things not said - or subconsciously recall the repressed - by 
experiencing pains at specific moments in their speech. His hypothesis was that words 
can then literally act as symptoms revealing some inner torment. Kristeva firmly 
agrees: 
Your headache, your paralysis, your haemorrhage may be the somatic return of an 
unsymbolised repressed object. The repressed language of hatred or love, or of 
emotions too subtle for words, then reactivates energies no longer filtered by any 
psychic trace or representation; these attack and disrupt the functioning of the body's 
organs ... By reviving them in therapy, I immolate them (l987a:6). 
The reference to immolation brings us beautifully back to Kearney's insight from the 
previous chapter in which he argued that the constructed 'other; is immolated on the 
altar of the same for the sake of the collective's identity. Similarly here, parts of the 
self or unsignified repressed objects (which are perceived as 'other', impure and 
antisocial; and torment the subject in menacing their very autonomy) are immolated, 
or abjected in a bid to secure the subject's identity. Kristeva believes that the 
immolation of such objects is a form of abjection, which I believe can be read as a re-
rejection of the mother or re-enactment of its sacrificial logic. In chapter one I argued 
that collective identities, which are challenged by the violence that erupts from the 
triangular model of mimetic desire, are constructed violently and therefore must be 
sustained violently. Following the same logic I am here proposing that in Kristeva's 
analysis of boundary work and the formation of individual identity, "the triangular 
form of primary identification is retained and recalled" (Anderson 2000:221; 
emphasis added). Anderson continues: 
When boundary work takes place it evokes violence which tends to be sexually 
differentiated. Thus for Kristeva a violent struggle with the abject (in hatred for the 
mother) ensues, until ultimately at the point of representation - at the threshold of the 
symbolic - the violence of sacrifice enacts matricide (ibid:22l-222; emphasis added) . 
Kristeva argues that murderous violence recalls or re-enacts the initial violence tied 
to the semiotic and its eruption into the symbolic (Anderson 2000:223). The repetition 
of the initial sacrifice (qua matricide) becomes a pattern for future murders 
(ibid:225). This murder is a function of an Oedipal identification with a 'father' that 
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III traditional psychoanalysis is conceived of as stern and authoritative figure (the 
Law) that demands the symbolic sacrifice of the maternal body in the formation of 
self-identity. In this model, the phallus is the metaphor for the mother's desire and a 
means to sever dependence on the mother. By way of critique, Kristeva argues that 
the primary cathexis is not the paternal Phallus as suggested by Lacan in his reading 
of the Oedipal complex, but rather a pre-oedipal, pre-objectal identification with the 
mother's breast (1983:125). However such identification is semiotic occurring in the 
pre-objectal phase and Kristeva is clear that this breast is not an object for the child 
but a model or a pattem (ibid:25). It is based upon a semiotic need, which denotes "a 
pattern that sets up the possibility of desire" (Oliver 1993:74). And because the 
child's identification is with the model, Kristeva argues that such narcissistic 
identifications are mimetic (1983:22). Oliver summarises, "this archaic semiotic 
identification with the mother's breast. .. becomes the first in a series of reduplications. 
It prefigures and sets in motion the logic of object identifications in all object 
relations, including discourse and love" (1993:72). Mimesis is the generative principle 
that accounts the child 's development through reduplicative identifications. Like 
Girard, Kristeva contends, "mimetic desire is mediated by the model " (Anderson 
2000:221). The pre-objectal model is reduplicated and the 'imaginary father figure' 
becomes the model (Kristeva 1987:26) that mediates the child 's move beyond the 
Imaginary. 
The aim of this chapter has been to develop a model of how self-identity is 
created and sustained. From a traditional psychoanalytic paradigm, subjectivity is 
born from the symbolic (violent) break of the subject with the maternal body and 
therefore, obeying the logic of reduplication, too must be sustained violently. Kristeva 
terms this transition from the semiotic to the imaginary and the eruption to the 
symbolic (or the transition from one identification to another) the "soma". Reineke 
analyses this aspect of Kristeva's work in a passage that this very illuminatory and 
worth quoting in full : 
She observes in the nascent subject two factors relevant to their proclivity for murder: 
language has a very specific impact on their accession to a social world, and soma 
plays a di stinct[ive] role in confirming for subjects their linguistic achievements. 
Drawing on these factors, Kristeva can demonstrate that violence escalates ... initially 
when humans, invoking and exercising their capacity for language, fmd that they 
literally struggle for the sign. It continues to escalate because they return repeatedly 
to the somatic bridge they have traversed ... seeking to secure themselves against loss 
by crossing it again and again (in Anderson 2000:224; emphasis added) 
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It is the foundational violence of subjectivity formation that is re-enacted among 
humans, who return constantly to the threshold of the symbolic, believing that if they 
repeat the violence of previous struggles, they may prevail over existing forces which 
threaten, menace and haunt our being with annihilation. 
2.9. Conclusion 
The nature of the Symbolic necessitates the sacrifice of sexual difference as 
ensured through the abjection of the mother. Such sexually differentiated violence 
enforces modernist binaries of self/other; symbolic/semiotic and order/disorder and 
moreover, rituals and prohibitious are set to ensure that these binaries (upon which the 
social order is erected) are sustained. In analysing the community' s relation with the 
scapegoat (Girard) and the subject's relation with the abject mother (Kristeva) we 
have arrived at a statement in systemic terms that the identity of the self is ineluctably 
bound to the sacrifice of the other. However this nexus between violence and identity 
is not inescapable. This chapter has offered the tentative beginnings to be pursued in 
the chapters to follow of a way to transcend thinking of autonomy in terms of 
sacrifice, or the assertion of order by expelling disorder. By following Kristeva into 
the realm of the imaginary it is possible to rethink the nature of the semiotic 
separation and the role of the ' imaginary father' as an authoritarian figure , situated in 
the minor stage and the instigator of 'castration'. In other words, in thinking before 
Lacan's minor stage and beyond the Law of the Father it becomes possible to 
conceive of the subject's shift from the maternal body to the Symbolic order in the 
absence of abjection (Oliver 1993:70). The hinge of this move is Kristeva' s loving 
'imaginary father' who not only facilitates the child' s transition to selfhood but as I 
shall elaborate in chapter four, also provides the means whereby the subject is saved 
from melancholia and mourning of the maternal Thing by helping us to get to grips 
with the rejection of the mother that is a 'vital necessity' for our selfhood (Kristeva 
1989). The important point is that whilst a thetic break with the mother is necessary in 
order to be, within western patriarchal culture, separation by way of maternal sacrifice 
is constructed as vital and inevitable in the originary invention of self-identity. In 
other words the violence of abjection has been set as the default state. Logically that 
which is created violently must be sustained violently and this accounts for the 
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continuous expUlsion of abject forces that return from the semiotic, which we 
perceive as a mortal threat to our subjectivity. 
Kristeva describes the notion of abjection as something ambiguous that both 
defines the ego and threatens it with dissolution. Moreover Kristeva claims that the 
mother-as-abject delineates the boundaries of the Symbolic order. To this end she 
compares 
[t)he way in which an individual identity is constructed against the exclusion of the 
abject maternal to the way in which a cultural or national identity is constructed 
against the exclusion of maternity and the feminine (in Oliver 1997:226). 
While Kristeva develops a compelling argument that both the subject and the social 
are constructed and sustained by maternal sacrifice, she fails to develop a 
methodology to really conceive of the systemic connected-ness between the two 
levels. In other words, she fails to produce a comprehensive model or methodology 
that can contain the systemic dimension of the violence in question. In this she is not 
alone for the history of modern political theory eSpinoza, Hobbes , Kant, and 
Rousseau) is haunted by the same failure. Having argued for a synthetic unity of 
Girard and Kristeva's analyses of sacrificial violence, in the following chapter I 
intend to borrow from complexity theory to combine this synthetic unity in a holistic 
model of society that will account for the formation of sacrificial identities at all 
levels in comprehensive terms. 
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Interlude: I 
The analogies o/violence: a modernist view 
Our miseries are ineluctably the product of our natures. The root of all evil is man, 
and thus he is himself the root of a specific evil, war 
- Kenneth Waltz (1959) 
In the previous two chapters I argued that collectivities (sucn as ethnic groups, 
nations, states and cultures) and subjectivities employ sacrificial violence to establish 
and assert their identity where identity is inescapably (7) understood in terms of the 
sovereignty of the collective or the post-Oedipal autonomy of the individual. In both 
the political and psychoanalytic discussions of identity formation as represented in the 
theories of Girard and Kristeva, the root assumption or metaphor is concerned with 
the pursuit of autonomy that is enacted violently. Such a reading of identity in terms 
of sovereignty/autonomy is decidedly modernist and my task in this interlude is to 
briefly elaborate on this modernist assumptions and its consequence, namely that it 
posits violence as the default state of human nature and culture in general and identity 
in particular. 
This modernism is clearly reflected in 17th century contract theory, and my 
particular interest is in the narratives of Hobbes and Spinoza whose views of human 
nature contributed to a specific understanding of society and state. I propose that the 
focus of contract theory is on autonomous individuals and sovereign states whose 
definition is a function of a Newtonian ontology, or the atomistic 17th century 
world view that allowed for the creation of violence as default at the level of the 
individual, the state and the international system. In chapter three, I shall explore the 
profound consequences of creating and sustaining a world in which violence is the 
default state and in which values such as co-operation, interdependence and care have 
been sacrificially excluded through their construction as a threat to the autonomy of 
both the social and the self. From there, I shall seek to open a conceptual and political 
space that allows for such values to be re-integrated in the articulation of more holistic 
accounts of the nature of the individual and the collective. To this end I believe that 
post-Newtonian/complexity theory is useful as it provides us with the theoretical 
frame to begin conceiving of identity outside its association with au tonomy. 
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1. The social contract and the self 
Social contract theorists from Hobbes to Rousseau to Spinoza to Kant and 
Locke have erected their political philosophy from their respective understandings of 
the nature of human existence in pre-civil states. The optimistic view, represented by 
Locke that people are inherently good and co-operative and therefore that society is 
inherently harmonious, did not prevail. In f~ct it was fundamentally rejected (i.e. 
sacrificially excluded) in favour of a starkly different (pessimistic) view of human 
nature; one that replaced peace and co-operation with war and aggression and placed 
violent conflict at centre stage in human relations. This dominant view is found in the 
work of Hobbes, Rousseau , Kant and Spinoza who contend that humans are flawed 
(defective) and evil, are driven by instinct and self-interest and whose relations are 
plagued by distrust and conflict. 
In accord with the teachings of Newtonian science Hobbes (followed by 
Spinoza who used Hobbes as a springboard for his own philosophy) endorsed a 
mechanical view of universe and all things in it, including man (Allison 1987). 
Accordingly all human beings were seen as separate, physical objects, governed by 
physical laws and thus human action, which was fundamentally mechanistic, could be 
explained in terms of these laws. A billiard ball game was often used as an analogy to 
depict the pre-determined behaviour of atomistic entities that collide and rebound off 
one another in accordance with the laws of motion. This model was applied in social 
theory to describe the deterministic behaviour of atomistic individuals in society. This 
analogy is important for two reasons. Firstly it painted individuals as solitary, 
antisocial (atomistic) individuals whose contact, following the laws of nature, is brief 
and forceful. Secondly, these laws governed individuals like atoms and in acting in 
accordance with such deterministic laws, human behaviour was naturalised. In other 
words, the assumptions about how men necessarily behave were thought to be 
scientific laws that illuminated the method men employ to ensue their primary goal, 
namely self-preservation. Hobbes (l914:XVI) writes, "These dictates of reason, men 
use to call the Lawes, but improperly for they are but Conclusions or Theoremes 
concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves". Indeed 
for Hobbes as with Spinoza, the driving force for all human beings was the effort to 
preserve their autonomy in relation to the external environment and especially other 
men acting in it. 
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2. State of nature 
Social contract theorists commence their political philosophy with a 
description of such an external environment that pre-dated civil society. It is the State 
of Nature, which is essentially a description of human behaviour in the absence of 
civil laws and the government to enforce them. According to Hobbes the state of 
nature is a state of perpetual conflict (Allison 1987: 181) or a 'war of everyman 
against everyman'. In this state Hobbes famously writes, "Worst of all, continuall 
fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish 
and short" (Hobbes 1914:XIX). Faced with such profound insecurity, men are 
deemed to act in accordance with the law of nature (lex naturali) that "is a Precept, or 
a generall Rule, found out of Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that which is 
destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same" (Hobbes 
1914:66). He concludes that man has a "natural right" or jure naturali to do whatever 
seems necessary for self-preservation, "The right of nature is the liberty each man 
hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own 
Nature; that is to say, of his own life" (ibid:66). Spinoza enlarges this logic to say that 
each man's 'natural right' is only limited by the power he has to assert this right. 
Because no man is safe from the predations of other men, Spinoza claims that 'might 
makes right' (Allison 1987:183). This is the logic of jure naturali that Spinoza takes 
one step further and extends to include the right to do all things that the individual 
does, provided it is done in accordance with the laws of human nature. Thus in a 
natural state, the only 'wrong' that a human being can commit is an action that results 
in the loss of autonomy, as being at the mercy of another creates a dependence that 
threatens self-preservation. Consequently, violence is accorded a central place in 
human nature (Spinoza, Hobbes) and social relations (Rousseau) as cognisant of the 
impossibility of a secure life in this state; men seek out a form of collective security 
that would provide a guarantee of autonomy against annihilation that is unattainable 
individually. 
3. The sovereign and the civitas 
The realisation that self-preservation and autonomy can never be assured in 
the state of nature, where life is defined by the constant threat of death, individuals 
coalesce into a collective - a statu civili or civil state. As such the state is understood 
to be an artificial product, or the result of an agreement or contract between men to 
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curb the inherent nature of men. Hobbes explains, "The state was meant to be 
essentially, deduced from the eternal nature of man, depending on the immutable laws 
of nature" (Hobbes 1914: XII). It is proposed that men enter into such a covenant as a 
means to escape the horror of life without it. Outside the state of nature, as within, the 
fundamental motivation that spurs human beings on is self-interest: all human beings 
wis~ to secure their autonomy against the threat of death. Man thus does not 
transform into a social being as his motives are still purely egoist and exclusionary. 
Notions of duty or obligation are completely alien and thus men are incapable of 
living in relative harmony unless they agree to enter into a "Contract of Submission" 
(Allison 1987:180) and accept the laws of the civitas as dictated by the Sovereign. By 
creating such obligations, it is the Sovereign or the Leviathan that mediates the 
transformation of the primal horde into the body politic and enforces the terms of the 
contract through threat of violence or sanction. The goal of men in submitting to the 
authority of the Sovereign is still the preservation of autonomy; however they change 
the means whereby they attain and assert it. 
4. An anarchic international system: in the shadow of violence 
There is consensus among contract theorists that the characteristics, beliefs and 
behaviour found in human nature condition human relations, that these are "reflected" 
at the level of the state (civitas) and in the interaction of states in the international 
system. In other words, they looked to articulate a political theory and theory of state 
based on or derived from assumptions about the behaviour of man. Hobbes (1914) 
planted the seeds of this comparison when he suggested that the international state 
system was "akin to" a pre-civil state of nature, the behaviour of states "echoing" that 
of man, "equally govemed" by the physical laws of nature. My interest here is the 
way in which the same assumptions of self-interested, atomistic individualism that 
found reflection in Hobbes' original social contract were later to provide the 
ontological framework of political realism as a theory of state (Morgenthau 1948; 
Waltz 2001). These assumptions that underpinned the notion of autonomy/sovereignty 
were borrowed from the much-revered Newtonian scientific discourse and 
accordingly we need to situate the wholesale fascination with "autonomy" in the 
wider modernist discourse of the day. The reason being that if violence is a function 
of this fascination with autonomy/sovereignty, then an understanding of the 
possibility of a non-violent future depends on understanding the wider, ontological 
79 
assumptions on which this discourse of autonomy is based. There are two especially 
important assumptions of the Newtonian mechanistic sciences that had important 
consequence in the social sciences and are thus relevant here. The first presents us 
with a mechanistic view of the universe in which nature is a perfect machine governed 
by immutable scientific laws. The mechanical image of living organisms argued that 
humans and animals worked like clockwork, in accord with a large number of 
chemical and electrical phenomena (Capra 1982:100). These 'machines' could be 
understood by reducing them to their most basic constituent parts or 'building blocks' 
(ibid: 102). Secondly it was assumed that this world-machine was composed of 
distinct, individual, autonomous things like planets and atoms. From as early as 
ancient Greece, scientists developed a theory of particles based upon an understanding 
of the atom as the most basic invisible units of matter. It was believed that atoms 
were the smallest constituent building blocks of all matter and this was the launching 
pad for Rutherford's (Newtonian) solar system model of the atom. The atom was 
adjudged to be the smallest part of an element that has an independent existence. This 
was reflected originally in the work of Hobbes and Locke who sought to elevate the 
social sciences to the level of the natural sciences by conceiving of individuals as 
having an independent existence, or as autonomous, atomistic entities that constituted 
the building blocks of society. In the state of nature, men were truly autonomous, 
unaccountable to any authority for actions within the bounds of natural law and as 
such autonomy was actualised and asserted through violence. We may therefore 
conclude that just as the laws that govem atoms are naturalised, so too was autonomy 
naturalised as an immutable social law inherent in human nature and its cultural 
formations like states and societies. 
The same assumption of atomised individualism subject to universal laws that 
was used to explain human behaviour in the state of nature was applied to the 
behaviour of states in the modern world. Waltz writes, "The social contract theorist, 
be he Spinoza, Hobbes, Locke Rousseau, or Kant, compares the behaviour of states in 
the world to that of men in the state of nature" (1959: 172). At both levels of existence 
the concern then is with the autonomy of the actor or "unit of analysis". Since the 
signing of the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the international system was seen to 
comprise a multitude of states which are deemed to be autonomous, atomistic entities 
that invoke their claims to sovereignty - the political equivalent of autonomy - to 
guarantee or enhance their own power. In other words, the Hobbesian heuristic device 
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of the State of Nature was extrapolated to the level of state and adopted by realists as 
a means of describing the behaviour of states in the international system. In 1977, 
Hedley Bull articulated the analogy of the Hobbesian State of Nature and what he 
coined 'The Anarchical Society' of the international system. He argued that the 
system of states is in a perpetual flux of anarchy and bits of security can only be 
snatched, can only be achieved and enlarged through war. Thus just as pre-contractual 
men define their relations conflictually, so too is violence the blood that pulses 
through the veins of the international system. The International System is, as Hobbes 
put it, the State of Nature writ large, and inter-state relations, a stag hunt writ large. 
Therefore I propose that assumptions of not only the behaviour of men in the state of 
nature but also states in the intemational system are guided by the maintenance of 
autonomy masquerading as an individual "right" to self-defence. "Masquerade" 
because this nexus of identity, violence and self-defence constitutes a vicious circle 
that is the conceptual grandfather of the cold-war dilemma. Self-defence conceived in 
these anarchic terms only becomes inescapable and "natural" when premised on the 
very notion of (violently invented) autonomous individualism that creates insecurity 
in the first instance. In Girardian terms, autonomy violently invented can only be 
violently sustained - hence the "need" for security discourses. Nonetheless, by 
naturalising it with reference to Newtonian atomism autonomy is established as an 
immutable law that regulates the conduct of atomistic individuals and states. 
5. The inevitability of violent engagement 
Extrapolated from the behaviour of men in an anarchic pre-civil society, we 
understand that this conduct is inherently violent as war was deemed to be the modus 
through which states could consolidate their sovereignty in response to the chaos and 
disorder of the international system in which states were the threat of annihilation was 
ever present. In both instances, anarchy bred the perpetual promise of war and 
accordingly co-operation or dependence were adjudged to be a recipe for self-
destruction. Underpinning this logic is a deep-rooted suspicion of the intentions of all 
other human beings and this mutual mistrust is augmented by the knowledge that, if 
given the opportunity, any individual would betray another. Fear or suspicion of the 
intent of others fuelled the actions of states. "Suspicion of otilers ' motives led to 
behaviour characterised by aggression, self-interest, and the drive for autonomy" 
(Tickner 1992:46; emphasis added). In this anarchic international environment the 
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'brooding shadow of violence' looms large and dictates the behaviour of the states 
who become inherently suspicious and rely on their own power - realised through 
military capabilities - to defend their sovereignty because failure to do so would have 
led to the annihilation of the state. In this model , violent warfare enacted against 
enemies is adjudged to be the modus by which the state consolidates greater order and 
control. Bodin (in Waltz 1959:81) writes that war most often promotes the internal 
unity of each state involved: 
The best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion, civil 
war is to keep the subjects in unanimity with one with another, and to this end, to find 
an enemy against whom they can make a common cause. 
Once again we find ourselves in Girardian terrain supported, this time, by Tickner 
(1992:47) whose emphasis on the link between identity of the state and a violently 
expelled 'other' could not be clearer: "Without spurs to greatness energized by 
fighting the enemy, the polity would collapse". The seeking out of an enemy other as 
a means whereby states preserve a form of unity, or guarantee an enduring national 
identity encapsulates the logic of generative scapegoating. Hence the processes of 
state identity formation are not simply violent, but sacrificially so. And in Girard, as 
with Hobbes, such violence is inevitable and the only modus whereby the autonomy 
of the agent (be it man or state) can be affirmed. From a Realist perspective, war is 
just as inevitable among states as it is among men precisely because if one wants to 
understand the recurrence of war one must look at the inherent defects within human 
nature, for the very locus of war is the nature of man. Waltz writes, "Wars among 
states are then as inevitable as are the defects in the nature of man" (2001:162). 
Whether we are dealing with the individual or collective level, the employ of violence 
is inevitable or pre-determined for autonomy (like self-preservation) is an immutable 
Jaw inherent in their nature. 
6. 'Just ... so' stories 
Thus far we have ascertained that individuals in a Hobbesian state of nature 
assert their autonomy violently in much the same way that the post-Westphalian state 
asserts its sovereignty violently, and what theorists like Spinoza, Rousseau and Kant 
all offer us are so many variations on the same "just as" story: "just as in a state of 
nature individuals ... so do states in what is effectively a global state of nature". But 
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what exactly do these authors mean by this "just as" argument in all its different 
variants (italicised throughout this section)? It seems to be an analogy that connects 
the behaviour of the individual in a pre-civil state to that of the state in the anarchic 
international system. However, in the absence of some kind of interpretative model 
that tells us how methodologically the levels relate, this line of reasoning becomes 
problematic. What we do know is that there is a definite and dam,aging connection 
between violence and autonomy that holds for both the individual and the collective, 
as personal autonomy and state sovereignty are conceived of in the masculine terms 
of Western modernity. Critics of such a view, notably pluralists and IR feminists, 
have proposed peaceful alternatives. But their suggestions that, for instance, 
international law and co-operation between states could curb the use of war as the 
primary instrument of national policy have been sacrificially excluded from the 
discussion on the grounds of idealism or naivety (Tickner 1992). The long enduring 
hegemonic status of Realism I believe is largely attributable to its epistemological 
roots in the Newtonian paradigm, which as the dominant discourse of modernity, has 
been extremely difficult to transcend. If it is difficult to imagine peace and co-
operation it is exactly because, given the hegemony of Western modernity, it is 
difficult to imagine identity outside or separate from it's violent assertion and 
sustained fascination with "autonomy" or the separateness of things. I believe that we 
currently find ourselves on the cusp of a shift that will allow us to reconsider the 
nature of identity-autonomy and also to account for the relation between the 
individual and the social quest for identity. Complexity helps us to chart both these 
dimensions of the contemporary shift - a shift that is perhaps as significant and far-
reaching as the 16_17th century shift away from an organistic to a mechanistic 
worldview. 
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Chapter 3 
Charting the change toward Complexity 
The beauty of geometry is that is a language of extraordinary subtlety that serves 
many purposes 
A Fractal Life, Benoit Mandelbrot 
3.1. Introduction 
Whilst the modernist paradigm did provide speculations around the nature of 
the relation between the level of the individual and the collective, the connection has 
not been theorised in systemic terms. Accounting ontologically for the systemic 
violence-identity nexus at all levels requires a heuristic or interpretative model. 
Indeed, the development of such a model that contains both an individual and 
collective explanation of the violence-identity nexus seems to be a methodological 
necessity as it allows us to challenge the fundamental root assumptions or, in 
Foucauldian terms, the epistemic a priori's employed to construct violence as default 
state. Methodologically there are at least two ways of pursuing and representing the 
systemic nature of the fascination with the autonomy of (masculine) individual and 
(masculine) state. One could either pursue a Foucauldian "order of things" 
archaeology or one could read them both as representative of a 16_17th mechanistic or 
Newtonian paradigm in terms of an interpretative model of society that will capture 
this similarity in a comprehensive fashion. In The Order of Things: An Archaeology of 
the Human Sciences (1973) Foucault theorises around what makes certain knowledge 
possible and what causes sudden and significant changes in discourse. He claimed 
that all periods of history are erected upon "the fundamental codes of a culture" 
(ibid:xx) that constituted the foundations of knowledge. He argued that the codes of 
discourse changed over time, from one period's episteme to another. Thus the 
epistemic a priori's are the conditions of knowledge in a particular culture, at a 
particular time. The second option is an investigation of the extent to which 
complexity theory allows us to unify the theories of social and individual identity 
formation as already mapped out in order to account methodologically for the 
hietorical systemic nature of the violence-identity nexus. Unlike the Foucauldian 
option, the complexity model will better enable us to consider identity formation as 
"hybrid" phenomenon (Urry 2003: 17), that is, as phenomenon like migration, 
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population growth, health or the stock exchange that really are a combination of 
natural and social phenomenon. The emergence of such hybrid phenomenon testifies 
to the current systemic convergence of social and natural studies. While the social 
sciences paradigm has offered many theories on the relation between violence and 
identity, only complexity can help in understanding identity formation as such a 
hybrid phenomenon. This _will allow us to chart a way forward, beyond the systemic 
fascination with the "autonomy" of things such as atoms, individuals and states. 
If we are to reveal the true "systemic" or comprehensive association between 
identity formation and violence I believe it is necessary to identify a paradigmatic set 
of assumptions that can unify the analysis of the autonomy of the individual, the 
sovereignty of the state and the violence involved in construction of both. I believe 
that this set occupies a masculine, scientific epistemology and in this chapter I shall 
therefore look firstly at the masculine assumptions of the paradigm and after that, the 
scientific assumptions. This will constitute the first step in an investigation into the 
nature and possibility of a non-violent future. I therefore turn first to Ann Tickner and 
other IR feminists to dissect its masculine dimension. 
3.2. Human nature without humanity 
In Waltz's book Man, the Stale and War (2001), he observes that the 'three 
images' of international relations (human behaviour, war and international anarchy) 
are intimately connected and he adopts a "levels of analysis" approach in seeking to 
identify causal explanations for war at the levels of individual (level 1), state (level 2) 
and international system (level 3). As a proponent of methodological holism, he 
rejects the reductionism that places the causes for international conflict in the hands of 
individual states. He proposes instead that an adequate account of the composition of 
the international system (and the behaviour of states that constitute it) can only be 
ascertained by exposing the laws that operate at the systemic level (level 3) . It seems 
counterintuitive to speak of laws in reference to an otherwise lawless, anarchic 
international system. These laws however are, for political realism, analogous to the 
laws that govern the behaviour of individuals and reign in the State of Nature as 
Tickner (1992:34) explains in saying that "politics .. .is governed by objective laws 
that have their roots in human nature". These are the laws of nature that permit each 
autonomous entity to do whatever is deemed necessary for self-preservation. Tickner 
(1992) clarifies, arguing that international relations and security studies are rooted in 
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the assumptions of human nature found at Levell, namely in the state of nature. She 
contends that the political realist assumptions of the state and the international system 
are rooted in Hobbesian assumptions of what constitutes human [read: male] nature. 
In the narratives of Hobbes and Rousseau male nature is taken to be constitutive of 
human nature and women were markedly absent from Hobbes' state of nature , as they 
are fr?m IR and security discourses. Tickner argues that the assumptions linking level 
2 (the state) and level 3 (the international system) are rooted in a discourse of 
hegemonic masculinity that devalues femininity at each of these three levels (Tickner 
1992:29-30). She writes, "A socially constructed type of [hegemonic] masculinity has 
been projected onto the international behaviour of states" (ibid:37). Political realism 
therefore postulates an exclusively masculine theory of state. From this it follows that 
the problems generated by and through such a theory of state and state relations, 
problems such as war and violence, are a function of the masculine values in terms of 
which the state system and the state qua unit of analysis is conceived. 
What needs to be highlighted here is that the identity of both man and state are 
established conflictually and reciprocally: men use metaphors of state to justify their 
violence while states, use the metaphors of masculinity to define and legitimise their 
actions. Underpinning such metaphors is a glorification of certain "masculine" virtues 
associated with autonomous political man such as discipline, order, rationality, 
control, strength and aggression (Pettman 1996:8) that have always been lauded and 
extrapolated to a discussion of state, it is only through assertion of these virtues that 
the perils of life in anarchic systems could be held at bay. This sentiment is strongly 
expressed by Waltz who explains that security depends on avoiding dependence and 
as a result "the greatest rewards for a state come, not from an increase in well-being, 
which might be attained through heightened interdependence, but from the 
maintenance of autonomy" (Waltz 2001: 106-107). In modernist discourse then, 
selfhood and autonomy are tied to masculinity and these are pursued and achieved 
violently. This nexus between war and autonomy is illustrated in the Hobbesian 
project, which constructed autonomyl sovereignty sacrificially, was premised upon 
the violent expUlsion of values associated with interdependence such as such as 
nurture, care, tenderness and compassion from human nature. These qualities that are 
associated with the feminine were translated as signs of weakness that could lead to 
the ultimate demise of the (masculine) individual. Thus, within the Hobbesian state of 
nature atomistic self-reliant individuals sought to sever all relations that would breed 
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any sense of dependency. War acted as a catalyst from the transition from a self-
interested, fearful existence in the state of nature to a higher form of selfhood as 
realised in the civitas (Pateman and Gross 1986:68). Similarly within the international 
system, realism prescribes that individual states must centre values such as 
independence, strength, aggression and the capacity for war-making (all 'masculine' 
traits) to defend their autonomy. Dependence and other weaknesses, such as 
irrationality, emotionality, compassion and compromise, as values associated with the 
'feminine' , were seen to threaten the man and state with dissolution. As Tickner 
explains; "the most dangerous threat to man and the state is to be like a woman, 
because women are weak, fearful, indecisive, and dependant" (1992:39). We can 
conclude that the assertion of identity-in-terms-of-autonomy of both the manly state 
and stately man is achieved violently and in both cases, autonomy/sovereignty is 
premised upon the sacrificial exclusion of the feminine. Tickner traces this to 
Machiavelli: 
Machiavelli's construction of the citizen-wan-ior required a devalued 'other' against 
which true manhood and autonomy could be set, in Machievelli' s writings this 
feminine other is "fortuna" originally a Roman goddess associated with 
capriciousness and unpredictability ... Fortuna is presented as the feminine power in 
men themselves against which they must continually struggle to maintain autonomy 
(Tickner 1992: 38-39 emphasis added). 
"In men themselves" ... how strongly this reminds us of Kristeva' s description of the 
abject as a powerful threat to the subject's identity that constitutes not only an 
external menace but also that which "may menace us from the inside". The struggle 
for subjectivity is the struggle to maintain autonomy against the feminine power 
embodied by fortuna - as everything that a true man, an autonomous subject, must not 
be. In chapter two, I discussed how Kristeva argues that the abjection or re-enacted 
expulsion of the maternal body stood at the birth of subjectivity. We have just seen in 
the above example of modernity, that self-identity (here masculine human nature) is 
constructed sacrificially through the exclusion of the feminine. It seems there is a 
fruitful connection here: do the feminine traits or values, perpetually expelled from 
human nature since the birth of modernity, represent the abject? From chapter two let 
us recall to important points. 
Firstly, Kristeva (1982) contends that within Western patriarchal societies all 
bodily excretions associated with the female form are viewed with repugnance, as 
abject precisely because the primary abjection that stands at the birth of subjectivity is 
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that of the female body. From here she argues that the sacrificial immolation of 
objects that threaten both the self and the symbolic order with dissolution is a form of 
abjection, which can be read as a re-rejection of the mother. Pateman and Gross 
(1986: 130) elaborate that the movement toward an autonomous self-hood requires 
that the maternal bond must "be denounced, sacrificed, repressed or censored in order 
that the pre-oedipal child acquire a stable social position and identity through its 
submission to paternal oedipal edicts". This reveals the intimate nexus which has 
developed between the sacrificial expulsion of the maternal and subjectivity. This 
echoes DiStephano's argument that the Hobbesian invention of human nature and the 
founding on civil society were premised precisely on this sacrificial denial of the 
mother (in Gatens 1991) which leads to the second point that all traces of the maternal 
body are abjected both individually and collectively (Anderson 2000) in order to 
construct and sustain the symbolic order as both a personal and a cultural system. I 
subsequently argued that the purging of all traces of the female body-as-abject in the 
processes of construction of self-identity (that is hegemonic masculinity) and the 
society as a whole displayed a systemic dimension. Kristeva provides us with an 
opening to the next piece of the puzzle with her observation that the all-embodying 
notion of "the maternal" is associated with nature (read as chaos, disorder) and is 
deemed to pose a threat to the existence of the cultural order. Such binary logic leads 
us to the next dimension of our critique of Political Realism, namely its scientism. 
3.3. Violence and science 
Hannah Pitkin notes that Machiavelli 's portrayal of fortuna is often associated 
with nature "as something outside the political world that must be subdued and 
controlled" (in Tickner 1992:47). Fortuna is associated with chance, capriciousness, 
di sorder and unpredictability and such attributes can only be controlled violently. 
Extrapolated to the arena of Realpolitik, this portrayal of fortuna by Machiavelli is 
similar to the Realist depiction of the chaos and anarchy of the international system. 
States are acutely aware of the ever-present threat posed by international anarchy, 
against which they must continually struggle for power in a bid to assert their 
sovereignty. The order or the autonomy of the polity depended upon the perpetual 
expulsion of the chaotic encompassing international environment, which threaten the 
state with disintegration, as Pateman and Gross clearly support, "War is associated 
with a kind of autonomous selfhood that escapes domination by mere nature" (J 986: 
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67). The above feminist critique must be placed in the historical context of the rise of 
the mechanistic model of tbe universe witb the Scientific Revolution of tbe 16th and 
17th centuries. In her book, the Death of Nature: women, ecology and the scientific 
revolution (1983) Merchant argues that this pre-modern world view was erected on a 
vastly different set of assumptions that viewed tbe self, society and tbe cosmos in 
terms of organismic metaphors (ibid: 1). Indeed, the entire universe was seen as a 
living, vibrant and sensitive organism that was comprised of interconnected organic 
relationships of people with one another and other living organisms and 
interdependent parts that "mutually affect each other and the whole" (ibid:99). The 
earth was seen to be both a living organism and a protective mother and humankind 
thus developed a profound respect for the Earth Mother who was their nurturer and 
provider (ibid:20). This worldview was thus characterised by the dissolution of all 
distinction between the spiritual and material realms and the pursuit of a holistic 
understanding of "tbe natural order [toJlive in harmony with it" (Capra 1982:40). A 
fundamental assumption of the world-as-organism view was that all parts of the 
organism are mutually dependant on all other (living and non-living) parts as well as 
existing in a dynamic relationship with the whole. 
With the Scientific Revolution in Europe, changes in physics and astronomy 
led to the birth of a new intellectual order. The combination of the scientific 
discoveries of Newton, Copernicus and Galileo coupled with the mathematical 
description of nature as espoused by Francis Bacon as well as the analytical metbod of 
reasoning as conceived of by Descartes gave rise to a radically different method of 
scientific discovery (Debus 1978:102). This in tum fundamentally altered the way in 
which humans perceived the natural world (Henry 1997: 1). In its totality the ideology 
was named scientific materialism, which referred to tbe fundamental belief that tbe 
world was composed of matter which could be dissected, scrutinized, and fully 
understood by science (Wilber 1998). Merchant (1983) contends that the rise of the 
Newtonian worldview stimulated a shift in mankind' s view of nature from a living 
vibrant organism into tbat of a passive machine. Her fundamental critique of the 
general attitude toward nature as exemplified by Francis Bacon, dubbed the 'fatber of 
modern science' , is that nature was objectified, mechanised and despiritualised by the 
unbridled and ruthless inqui sition of man ineo tbe natural world through technology 
and scientific experiment. In his description of King Salomon's House in New 
Atlantis Bacon's faith is placed in scientific method to ascertain absolute truths and 
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laws that govern nature, or "the knowledge of causes and the secret motions of 
things" (in Redwood 1977: 147) is resounding. The organismic belief in the 
interconnectivity and interdependence of man and nature was displaced by man's 
desire to control and subjugate nature through the application of scientific methods. 
The mechanised version of the earth was subject to external forces to be dominated 
and dismantled by man in his quest to discover its secrets . There w!ls no leash upon 
man's pursuit of these undisclosed truths. "The new man of science must not think 
that the inquisition of nature is in any part interdicted or forbidden. Nature must be 
'bound into service' and 'made a slave' ... and moulded by mechanical arts" 
(Merchant 1983:169). The organismic image of nature restrained the actions of 
human beings as the earth was perceived to be sensitive and responsive to these. 
However with the rise of the Newtonian world machine man lost any scruples about 
his treatment of nature and did thus not feel any moral obligation to protect and 
cherish it (Capra 1982:42). The metaphor of the universe as an organic, living and 
spiritual being was forcefully replaced by the analogy of the natural world with 
machinery (Henry 1997 :57) as encapsulated by the new idea of beres-machines 
(literally animal machines) to describe living creatures (ibid:69). The methods of 
science provided the knowledge that could classify all living entities and explain their 
behaviour causally following the laws of mechanics. 
The awe of women that accompanied the admiration of Mother Earth in pre-
modern societies was transfigured by the scientific project into fear and loathing of 
the feminine. Masculine metaphors referred to autonomy, rationality or separateness 
of things, whereas feminine metaphors were used analogously to those forces (be it 
disorder, irrationality, interdependence, impurity) that threatened them. As Merchant 
(1983:2) explains, women were seen as symbols of the disorder of nature; associated 
with "wild and uncontrollable nature that could render violence, storms, droughts and 
general chaos". Consequently it was believed that chaotic nature and disorderly 
women (bracketed as "the feminine") needed to be dominated and controlled and, not 
surprisingly, it was the task of masculinised science to perfect this mastery and 
command. The glorification of masculine autonomy was a function of binary logic. It 
was women and the corrupted virtues that they allegedly embodied whose "disorder 
engenders all the vices and can bring the state to ruin" (Pateman 1989: 18). This fear 
of the female only emerged in the modern world, framed by the Newtonian worldview 
that imbued dichotomies with a value judgement. Indeed, the discourse of modernity 
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is a specific constellation of binaries - mind-body, culture-nature, reason-emotion, 
public-private - to which the association masculine (order) and feminine (disorder) is 
fundamental. Pateman summarises this position in saying, "Women, by virtue of their 
natures, are a source of disorder in the state" (1989: 18). The female body tied 
women immediately and physically to nature, which facilitated the construction of the 
female as disorder. Specifically, it was in fema.ze bodily functions that lay women's 
potential for disorder. Pateman (ibid:25) continues, "Women are direct mediators 
between nature and society. However, women face nature directly, and, in giving birth 
and in their other bodily functions, they appear as part of nature". The acute fear of 
childbirth and menstruation will be explained in psychoanalytic terms in chapter four. 
For now it is suffice to understand that the autonomy of the Symbolic order is 
sustained by the perpetual purging of semiotic space, associated with the maternal 
function and by extension with nature, disorder and impurity (Kristeva 1982), thus 
demanding the cleanliness of the body as a means to attain purity and the expUlsion of 
impure and disorderly elements to the furthest margins of the Symbolic Order. This 
buttressed the belief that there was something inherent in female nature that, like the 
forces of nature itself, was disruptive to social life to such a grave degree that 
disordered women could lead to the destruction of the state. Gatens contributes, 
"Women are constructed as close to nature, subject to passion and disorder, and hence 
excluded from the self-conscious creation of the body politic, which is precisely 
where passion and disorder are transcended" (1991 :70). Nature posed the greatest 
threat to culture, women the greatest threat to man, and both these forces of disorder, 
a threat to the ordered stability of the polity. Therefore the ability to separate oneself 
from disorder, in its various forms, was the mark of a subject's autonomy or a 
society's sovereignty. 
Order or the autonomy of the self is a function of the expUlsion of disorder and 
impurity, as exemplified in the body of the (maternal) Other. Identity is a function of 
the exclusion of the abject, here, as Kristeva writes, the feminine. This is based upon 
an understanding of identity that ties the masculine to that which is ordered and pure, 
or on the side of the logos. As such it is taken to be the default identity in relation to 
which all other identities are defined. The connection she makes between women and 
disc,rder and the violence enacted against them in western patriarchal communities is 
irrefutably rooted in the Newtonian worldview. Together Merchant, Tickner and 
Kristeva clearly articulate the masculinised violence of Western modernity. They 
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illustrate not only the masculine dimension of the paradigm but place that feminist 
critique in the bigger historical, context of the paradigm shift from world-as-organism 
to world-as-machine that sanctioned both the vicious exploitation of nature and the 
violent treatment of women. This is simultaneously the shift away from femininity to 
masculinity and from organism to mechanism. We thus end up with an understanding 
of how autonomy and so~ereignty are both functions of this masculine, scientific 
epistemology. 
3.4, Toward a comprehensive account 
This conclusion reveals a certain consensus between IR and psychoanalytical 
feminists that the violence necessary to invent and sustain the autonomy of the subject 
is conceptually and historically related to the violence necessary to invent and sustain 
the sovereignty of the state. In other words, they seem to suggest that the violence of 
modernity is not only systematic but also systemic in some sense but they fail to 
articulate beyond the use of metaphors like "manly states and stately men" "or 
masculinity projected upon the world stage" and similar "just as" stories. In other 
words, they fail to address the systemic nature of the violence-autonomy/sovereignty 
nexus methodologically. To conceive of the rise of hegemonic western masculinity 
and the emergence of the Westphalian state system in cotenninous terms gives us a 
clue as to how we can proceed to read autonomy and its violence systemically, in 
terms of modernity as a specific "order of things". This goes to broader critique that 
existing theories of identity formation address either the social or the individual level. 
Authors who have been studied in the preceding chapters make statements either 
about human nature as such (Kristeva, Levinas) or collective violence as such 
(Girard). What is notably lacking is an explanation of the violence-identity nexus as a 
systemic phenomenon. The intention of this chapter to bridge the gap between the 
two, arguing that neither is exclusive, or that neither is sufficient in and of itself to 
make comprehensive sense of identity formation per se. It is therefore necessary to 
develop a fuller understanding of the "relation" between the level of the individual 
and that of state, in a bid to understand what precisely is meant by "related" or 
"systemic". 
In the rest of this chapter I have two aims. The first is to suggest that 
complexity theory offers us a methodology or paradigm that encourages us to 
conceive of this "just so" relation between the micro and the macro in terms of self-
similarity. If society is, as complexity theory suggests, a complex dynamical self-
organising system, then we can expect such a system to display the characteristics of 
other such a living organisms, notably an analogical or self-similar relation between 
the parts and the whole. Many authors have suggested that contemporary complexity 
theory is a re-appropriation of the pre-modern organistic world view (see Gare 2000). 
In th~t pre-modern organistic world the relation was captured by the suggestion that 
the macro is reflected in the micro. Henry explains, "The essential unity of approach 
to the nature of the physical world, from the macrocosm to the microcosm, was seen 
as unshakeable testimony to the truth of the system" (1997:56) . However this 
approach relied too heavily on religious mysticism, natural magic and alchemy to be 
considered here. The idea was carried forward and is embedded in the 19th century 
organistic world views of Herbert Spencer and Karl Marx, which I shall investigate 
and situate vis-a-vis the contemporary complexity reading of the micro-macro 
relation. 
The second aim consists in providing a methodological frame for answering, 
in the following two chapters, the question: "How does it help to say, in complexity 
terms, that the violence of Western modernity is self-similar?" In response, I believe 
that the very postulation of the fractal self-similarity carries with it a different set of 
assumptions that offers hope for conceiving the dawn of a less violent future. For, if 
the root assumption of complexity is relational then violence can/will no longer be 
invoked to sustain the myth of autonomy. The question then is of whether we can find 
traces of such an embrace of the relational at the levels where individual and 
collective identities are being articulated? And, if there is a shift in the way we think 
of chaos, disorder and interdependence, then this would suggest that there might yet 
be hope for a non-violent future or, at the very best, for a future that does not embrace 
violence as default state for human nature and politics. 
3.5. The Social Organism 
Viewing the relation between the social and the individual in terms of such a 
self-similarity implies a conception of both individuals and society as complex 
dynamical systems. Since it is crucial to an argument concerned with post-sacrificial 
identity formation, I will explore what it means to describe individual and society as 
complex dynamical systems. Such a view in many ways entails a revival of the 19th 
century organismic view of society. In order to trace the development from this 
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classical conception of society-qua-organism to the contemporary conception that 
finds reflection in the post-Newtonian worldview, I will focus on two themes of 1) 
change as endogenous or immanent; and 2) teleology in the work of Spencer and 
Marx to provide historical continuity for the contemporary complexity discourse but 
also to highlight important differences. Moreover I shall illustrate the extent to which 
these concepts are informed by Newtonian discourse. The final analysis is critical as 
on the hand Marx and Spencer revived the pre-Scientific Revolution, organismic 
sentiment in viewing society and social change in organic terms yet the 
epistemological foundations of their thought also reflected a Newtonian paradigm and 
the scientific, utopian, teleological assumptions underpinning it. Consequently this 
world-view projected a static and rigid conception of change (as progress, as 
evolution), conceived of in a unidirectional, linear fashion. The result was a 
methodology that accommodated the belief that the mechanistic laws of the growth of 
individual organisms could be extrapolated to make sense of the growth of society. 
Society, in other words, was yet another type of hete-machine. 
3.5.1. Change as Immanence 
Spencer's methodology relied heavily on the metaphorical analogy of society 
as an organism and he drew parallels between the laws that govern the behaviour of 
living (e.g. an animal, the body) and social (human society) organisms. Rumney 
(1934:42) explains, "A society as a whole, considered apart from its living units, 
presents phenomena of growth, structure and function, analogous to those of growth, 
structure and function in an animal". He argued that growth is common to all social 
and organic bodies, which grow from what he terms, 'germs' into large masses 
(ibid:48). Such processes of continuous growth unfold from innate processes. This 
idea of 'growth from innate processes', or functionalism, is a touchstone of 19th 
century organic models of society. Functionalism looked at society in isolation and 
understood change as inherent and a function of the system itself, as analogous to the 
growth of an organism, from which emerged the idea of change as immanent (Nisbet 
1970: 170). The assumption of immanence that arose in the 18th century, most notably 
in the work of Leibniz, was manifest in 19th century theories of development and the 
convictions of the aforementioned theorists. According to Durkheim social evolution 
was seen to be function of differentiation within the unified social system, occurring 
(or modernising) gradually (Walby 2003:4; emphasis added). The focus of 
94 
functionalism then is order within society and ignores the relationship between 
society and the environment. Parsons was concerned with society's ability to control 
its environment (Baker 1993: 125) through the capacity for self-equilibration - or the 
ability to balance itself once again after a disturbance or perturbation - indicating that 
society was separate from the environment which it sought to harness and control in 
true Newtonian fashion. 
Spencer, as a proponent of functionalist thought, argued that change is 
endogenous, that is to say a function of internal influences. Spencer argued that it was 
a tendency of social bodies as well as of living bodies - indeed the inherent tendency 
of all things - to increase in structure as they increase in size (Andreski 1971:120). In 
so doing Spencer equated increasing structure with increasing complexity, which is a 
movement toward ever increasing perfection. As such, progress or an immanent 
evolution toward greater perfection was a key feature in the growth of all organisms. 
Equally for Marx, progressive, directional change as a function of the contradictions 
generated at the economic base was immanent to social systems. "No social order 
ever disappears before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have 
been developed, and new, higher relations of production never appear before the 
material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society" 
(in Nisbet 1970: l71). Like biological organisms, the social organism then unfolds 
from qualities contained within. Marx 's organic model therefore understands organic 
changes as developed internally through the resolution of internal contradictions. 
Marx, as a historical materialist understands progress and changes at the level of 
superstructure to be a function of the interaction of the forces and relations of 
production at the level of the economic base. He proposed that societies changed or 
evolved when sufficient contradictions between the relations and forces of production 
have been generated. According to Marx, production is situated in a dominant 
position in the hierarchy but Rader clarifies that hierarchy and interrelatedness go 
hand in hand. As he explains, "although production is dominant in the organic 
hierarchy, it is not independent, it is part of the organic whole" (Rader 1979:60l 
5" By employing vocabulary such as interdependence, integration and most obviously, organic whole, 
Marx invokes an organic model of social structure at odds with his other mechanistic methodology and 
epistemology. See Marx 's lnterpretalioll of History (Rader 1979) 
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This notion of an organic, structural whole reflects the functionalist belief in the 
systemic nature of societl. 
3.5.2. Teleology 
The influence of the Newtonian worldview is reflected in Marx's keen interest 
in "disclosing the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development and 
death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one" 
(Rader 1979:57). This idea of progression toward a 'higher one', made intelligible 
by the laws of science, forms the basis of Marx's typical 19th century optimism and 
this movement is by and large tied to the transition of man from bondage to freedom 
by 'striking the fetters' of the contradiction between forces and relations of 
production. This progression is marked by differences in the stages of historical 
development - from the 'Primitive' to Asiatic to Classical to Feudal to Capitalist and 
Communist modes (Marx 1977:21), with the communist state envisaged as what 
Fukuyama famously termed the 'end of history' (in Appignanesi and Garratt 
1995: 166). 
In Progress: Its Laws and Causes (1857) Spencer expresses a similar reliance 
on the laws of nature to explain the laws of social progress: 
The law of organic progress is the law of all progress. Whether it be in the 
development of the Earth, in the development of life upon its surface, in the 
development of Society, of Government, of Manufacture, of Commerce, of 
Language, Literature, Science, Art, this same evolution of the simple into the 
complex through successive differentiations holds throughout (in Rumney 1934:120). 
In one of his later works, First Principles (1911) Spencer argued that evolution 
denotes a change toward increasing heterogeneity. Lewin (1992: 147) summarises 
Spencer's Law of Evolution in saying "systems have a tendency to become more 
concentrated and heterogeneous as they evolve". The movement to greater 
heterogeneity denotes an increase in structure and order that is a mark of both 
biological and social systems. As Lewin (ibid: 149) writes 
6 Marx's account of the organic nature of society comprises both a diachronic (historical) and a 
synchronic (structural) analysis. Analysed synchronically. all societies display fairly constant 
structural characteristics such as the existence of the base with its interaction of man and nature and its 
dialectical interplay between forces and relations of rroduction (Rader 1979:57). This displays the 
variation of the nature of the activities at the economic base, for example the differences in the 
interface between forces and relations of production. thus presenting us simultaneously with the 
synchronic similarities that accounts for social structure and diachronic differences accounting for 
social change. The organic analogy can be applied at the both levels. 
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The pure Spencerian view of the world, therefore, is that increased complexity is an 
inevitable manifestation of the system and is driven by internal dynamics of complex 
systems: heterogeneity from homogeneity, order out of chaos. 
Spencer proposes directionality for all things, from seeds to societies, whose 
evolution is a function of internal factors. This evolutionary progress is necessary 
(Lewin 1992:147). In other words, it is teleological as it amounts to a "study of ends 
of final causes" (Woodfield 1976: I) . When we talk of final causes we are essentially 
referring to the idea of 'purpose' or the idea that the evolution of all things from ants 
to empires are bound up in an inextricable march toward a necessary and inevitable 
end. Following such logic, classical evolutionists all subscribed to the doctrine of 
historicism as a blend of immanence and teleology. As a doctrine it argues that every 
action, every thing, every change have a specific purpose and function and are guided 
by an underlying teleology or are caused to occur by the 'machinery of history' 
(Berlin 1969:50) and it explains "historical transformation as the result of the 
actualization of the potentialities inherent in the entity from the beginning" 
(Sanderson 1990: 17). It is clear that the theory of historical inevitability, with its 
metaphor of history as a machine, is firmly embedded in mechanistic Newtonian 
paradigm. In this paradigm, absolute knowledge or true ends are attainable through 
science, as there is only "one complete and all-embracing pyramid of scientific 
knowledge, one method, one truth". Accordingly it is held that history obeys 
fundamental laws (Berlin 1969:51) and if one is able to identify the directional laws, 
as an expression of immanence and have knowledge of all the facts , then one is able 
to predict what will happen, when and why with absolute certainty. Marx clearly 
reiterates this, defining historicism as "the doctrine that there are laws of historical 
development and that, on the basis of knowledge of these laws, it is possible to make 
large-scale historical prophecies" (in ibid:87). Marx puts his faith in the possibility 
of certain future predictions on the basis of study of absolute laws. 
Nineteenth century attempts to identify patterns and laws that could account 
for historical change of social systems then relied on a teleology of history. Such 
historicism became problematic, however, when the western experience of change 
was taken as model of all change. The teleology of modernity coupled with social 
Darwinism legitimated the colonial project of conquest and domination. Later in the 
1950s, modernisation theory (as an advanced, thinly veiled stage of colonial 
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imposition) dominated as a direct descendant of social evolutionism, following the 
belief that all societies, viewed as separate, autonomous entities or units of analysis, 
develop through the same inherent logic. The radicalisation of the organismic 
metaphor suggested by complexity theorists (See Baker 1993; Lewin 1993) however 
allows us to appropriate the organismic view of society and recast it in post-
Newtonian terms that exclude such problem~tic linear notions of progress or 
teleology. The new conception of system offers us an approach that is anti-
reductionist, multi-linear, un-teleological and against notions of self-balancing 
equilibrium. In other words, complexity equips us with the tools needed to develop an 
organismic view of society, which, contrary to its predecessors, is stripped of 
functionalist and teleological baggage and serves as a corrective to traditional 
assumptions about change, equilibrium and the isolation of a system from its 
environment. Below I look to radicalise the metaphor in illustrating that, outside such 
a Newtonian world-view, when we speak of societies that evolve like an organism we 
are effectively looking at societies as complex, or adaptive dynamical systems. 
3.6. Sketching complex systems 
How then do we conceive of a contemporary version of the complex system 
that remedies the pitfalls of the social organism analogy yet is cognisant of the 
complementary and useful assumptions it offers? And furthermore , to what extent 
does complexity offer us a new conceptualisation of the complex system and its 
modus of generating and regenerating itself? But first, what does it mean to say that a 
system is complex? It is not sufficient to say that the complexity of a system is a 
result of the large number of parts that constitute it as this neglects the relation of a 
system with its environment. From a functionalist perspective, Marx makes this 
mistake in arguing that there is "a total functional integration in which each element is 
what it is because of its relation to other elements and to the whole" and it is this 
interdependence or mutual interaction of part to part and part to whole that is 
"characteristic of all organic wholes" (Rader 1979:59). However by focussing on the 
web of internally related parts, the relation of the organic whole with its external 
environment is ignored. Cilliers distinction between "complicated" and "complex" 
systt,ms is useful here: 
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If a system ... can be given a complete description in terms of its individual 
constituents, such a system is merely complicated. Things like jumbo jets or 
computers are complicated. In a complex system on the other hand, the interaction 
among constituents of the system of the system, and the interaction between the 
system and its environment, are of such a nature that the system as a whole cannot be 
fully understood simply be analysing its components. Moreover, these relationships 
are not fixed, but shift and change often as a result of self-organisation (l998:viii-ix). 
The integrity of the system is sustained through its own astonishing ahility to organise 
a network of innumerable factors that interact in innumerable ways, and to adapt and 
reorganise these webs in response to changing conditions from within and around the 
system itself. Such systems, whether we are looking at cells, plants, animals, brains, 
ecosystems or hybrid entities like societies, states or even the global economy, are 
comprised of (an often infinitely large) number of elements. It is the nature of 
relations between elements within a system and between the system and its 
environment, rather than the number of elements, which give the system its complex 
identity. Thus the behaviour of a system cannot be understood in terms of simple 
cause and effect because there are "massive disproportionalities between cause and 
effect" (Urry 2003:7). Contrary to Newtonian logic, in the world of complex systems 
there is no linear proportionality between large causes and large changes. Rather, a 
touchstone of complex systems is that they are governed by non-linear relations and 
are thus extremely sensitive to even the smallest changes. The internal structure of the 
system is therefore constantly shifting and evolving yet "despite the ti·enetic internal 
activity, outwardly the system seems to be unchanging" (Rihani 2002:8). In this light, 
their ability to self-organise and to absorb or accommodate change seems even more 
extraordinary. This characteristic is best captured in the butterfly effect that has 
become something of a complexity catch phrase that "a flap of butterfly'S wings in 
Brazil could set off a tornado in Texas". Lorenz first alleged that given the dynamic 
and sensitive web of systems it was easy to conceive that one small change in a given 
system could reverberate throughout the whole, leading to large-scale changes 
(Hawkins 1996). This process of system renewal in the face of dramatic change is 
generated through positive and negative feedback. Positive feedback within and 
between systems exacerbates initial stresses by reinforcing or amplifying initial 
changes; it acts in the same direction and is self-reinforcing (Jervis 1997:97). This 
makes predictions about the future state of the system more often than not, 
impossible. Negative feedback on the other hand insulates the system from 
environmental changes; it minimises the impact of external change. "Positive and 
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negative feedbacks are powerful drivers of systems" (ibid:98) however it is uncertain 
how the system will be affected, as generative feedback loops move a system away 
from a state of equilibrium (Byrne 1998:29). Given such profound complexity and 
unpredictability, the movement of systems, in contrast to Newtonian wisdom, could 
never be towards an optimal and predictable end point, conceived of as a static state 
of eq~ilibrium. Such non-mechanical , unpredictable systems are bound to be 
inherently unstable and operate infar-from-equilibrium conditions (Rihani 2002:70). 
In many regards, disequilibrium is the key in understanding the dynamic 
nature of complex systems. For Spencer, the universal tendency of social organisms 
was "toward harmonious adaptation, perfect equilibrium" (Rumney 1934: 10). 
Spencer, faithfully echoing the sentiments of 19'h sociology, acknowledges that 
societies grow and expand and that this growth may lead to disturbances and conflict. 
He maintains however that equilibrium will be attained and at such a time, society 
will be at rest as a result of the "lubricating oil of Evolution [that will] minimise and 
ultimately abolish all social friction" (ibid.). This reflects the long pervasive 
assumption in the natural and social sciences that all systems, human included are 
driven toward a stable equilibrium, and that only one such equilibrium-state exists for 
a given system. The rise of the (complex) new complexity paradigm has brought with 
it a new notion of equilibrium; a notion that can, in part, be traced back to 19'h century 
theorists like Marx who, theorising about process of changes, combined "both gradual 
evolution and the processes of sudden transformation" (Walby 2003:5). This theory of 
change accommodates both prolonged periods of development and sudden critical 
(revolutionary) changes that give birth to a new political form. Contrary to Parsons 
and Spencer and more in line with complexity thought, Marx 's conception of the 
social system was not built upon the assumption of self-balancing equilibrium. Walby 
(ibid:5) explains, "[it] allows that the social system may be far-from-equilibrium, 
generating sudden and violent change to the path of development". In so saying, I 
believe Marx takes a critical step toward an understanding of complex dynamical 
systems. In conceiving of society as an organism, which is constantly changing, the 
key in understanding development is homeostasis or 'dynamic inner equilibrium'. 
This is a moving equilibrium in which equilibrium is never perfect but yet the 
organism is well balanced (Rader 1979:86). An organism is said to be in dynamic 
equilibrium "if it has not only achieved homeostasis but has established a modus 
vivendi between its inner play of forces and its external environments" (ibid.). 
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In complexity terms systems are open systems - 'open' to the influence of 
both environmental conditions and the history of the system. It is in this respect that 
the complexity model departs radically from its 19th century counterpart that 
underplayed environmental influence. Contrary to functionalist logic, which deemed 
that systems were inward orientated and teleologically directed, complexity proposes 
that the system is not immune to the influence of the environment and while growth 
may display "an arrow of time" (measured through entropy) such directionality, far 
from being teleological, occurs instead as a function of interaction in a fitness 
landscape. In order to deal with a changing environment, a complex system must be 
able to internalise external fluctuations, which is greatly facilitated by the knowledge 
of the environment that the system has stored in its memory (Cilliers 1998: 10). 
Insofar as the current adaptation of a complex system is influenced by past behaviour, 
we may say that it is displays a diachronic aspect as it evolves through time. As I shall 
argue, such a (re) generation of the system over time is a function of continuous and 
dynamic self-organisation, which is in contrast to closed systems do not interact with 
the environment and as such exist in a state of equilibrium, or die in accordance with 
the law of entropy (Rihani 2002:69). It is precisely the open, continuous interaction 
with their environments that allows complex systems to adapt to changing 
circumstance and maintain the balance of stability and instability, quite 
extraordinarily, at the edge of chaos. 
3.6.1 Where chaos and order collide 
Complexity theorists are fascinated with the ability of complex adaptive 
systems to evolve toward a critical state between order and disorder that is situated at 
the edge of chaos. It is imperative that the delicate, dynamic balance is sustained as, 
"in the ordered regime, the system is too rigid and both information exchange among 
components and responsiveness to a changing environment are therefore limited. In 
the disordered regime, on the other hand, the system is too turbulent and its 
connections are too disorganised to allow it to function at peak effectiveness" 
(Eidelson 1999: 15). Neither will do as it is only at the tumultuous vortex of order and 
disorder, constancy and change, that stock markets crash, volcanoes erupt, diseases 
mutate and new governments are elected. It is what John Biggs dubs, "the most fertile 
area of chaos study" (in Hawkins 1996:8). 
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All systems naturally evolve to the edge of chaos through the process of self-
organisation (Eidelson 1999) where new patterns emerge as a function of the interplay 
between order and chaos without jeopardising the survival of the system, or its 
identity, as a whole (Rihani 2002). In stark contrast to Newtonian thought, order and 
disorder are not rigid binary rivals but rather two faces of the same phenomenon 
(Baker 1993). This is the most revolutionary and stirring contribution made by 
complexity. The consequences of this shift are immense, for as Hayles notes: 
When a dichotomy as central to Western thought as order/disorder is destabilised, 
it is not exaggeration to say that a major fau lt line has developed in the episteme 
(1991:16). 
This reconceptualisation of the order-disorder interplay will have profound 
consequence for my re-readings of Kristeva (chapter four) and Girard (chapter five) 
when we shall re-view subjectivity and culture to emerge not sacrificially by virtue of 
the exclusion or abjection of disorder and chaos but as a function of the way complex 
dynamical or open systems self-organise. 
For now I am concerned with the phenomenal power that self-organisation 
unleashes and the miraculous structures that it sustains, by weaving together 
unimaginable numbers of elements in a complex web: 
Consider the cascade of biochemical reactions in a single cell and their disruptions 
when the cell turns cancerous; the booms and crashes of the stock market; the 
emergence of consciousness from the interplay of millions of neurons in the brain; the 
origin of life from a meshwork of chemical reactions in the primordial soup ... In 
every case, astonishing patterns emerge spontaneously. The richness of the world 
around is us is due, in large part, to the miracle of self-organisation (Strogatz 
2003:34). 
But how do we account for the capacity of complex systems to self-organise? 
Courtesy of Spencer we know that growth proceeds by multiplication and 
recompounding and results in increasing heterogeneity, complexity and differentiation 
of parts and functions. In the case of social growth, "[itl continues either up to times 
when societies divide or up to times when they are overwhelmed" (Andreski 
1971:109). In the language of complexity, we may rephrase this and assert that 
"when societies (or indeed all living organisms) are overwhelmed (or critical 
parameters are exceeded) then it divides (or bifurcation occurs)". To say a system 
bifurcates is to say that it splits as a resu lt of sudden changes in its critical parameters. 
When the system's critical parameters undergo stress, it changes - instability 
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increases and appears to enter a chaotic state, thus the elements that make up a system 
and its environment to interact in new ways. Miller (1999:2) explains that "The 
elements compete with one another and those that co-operate successfully form an 
organisation stable enough to attract the remaining elements into its organisational 
structure. These stable organisational forms are called attractor states". Within this 
new environment there is competition between elements, quite certainly, as conflict 
and competition form a vital basis for evolution and adaptation. Self-organisation 
through bifurcation as a function of the order-disorder interplay - or the interface of 
conflict and co-operation - then is the generative engine that allows system's to grow 
and assume 'new higher order, more differentiated, structures' (Urry 2003:28). Such 
change may be induced by either internal (within the system) or external (within the 
environment) forces and the results thereof are inherently unpredictable: 
This change comes not only from the unpredictability of the impact of external 
effects, which in far-from-equilibrium systems have unpredictable outcomes, but also 
from an inherent unpredictability in nature (Baker 1993: 133). 
Unpredictability goes hand in hand with the non-linear behavioural patterns of a 
system and although this seems to generate unbridled chaos, bits of stable ordered 
behaviour spontaneously return, giving birth to more complex adaptive forms of 
organisation, or what Prigogine describes as "islands of new order in a general sea of 
chaos" (in Urry 2003:101). It is the attractor that generates such 'pockets of order' 
(ibid: 102) within the general mass of disorder and thus acts as catalysts for the 
movement of a system from one organisational state to another. Of particular interest 
to us are strange attractors, which are found in both the social and natural world, and 
are thus a touchstone of hybrid phenomena. These do "not have neat edges, smooth 
surfaces or clear boundaries between it and the next attractor. Indeed some attractors 
are so open that one or more other attt'actors, entirely different, can occupy the same 
time-space dimensions" (Milovanovic 1997:31). As a result of such highly complex 
overlap such attractors are seen messy and disordered. Mathematical models have 
attempted to map the emergence of ordered patterns from the (apparent) disorder of 
phase transition that is characteristic of any hybrid phenomenon. When looking at all 
such phenomena, the potential for change - for renewal or decay; for creation or 
destruction - lies in the transformative power of attractor states unleashed at the edge 
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of chaos, the point at which order gives way to chaos and/or chaos gives birth to 
order. 
3.6.2. The complexity of change 
Complex systems are adaptive III the sense that they change or transform 
though an organic interaction with other complex (changing) s:rstems (Walby 
2003:8). The complexity of this interaction and co-evolution of systems is captured in 
the notion of "fitness landscape" that describes the phenomenon whereby the 
evolution of one system, leads to the evolution of the landscape. To illustrate, the cell 
is a complex system embedded in a greater complex system, the hand, which in turn is 
exists in a greater system, the body. Similarly in the social world, the individual as a 
complex system is nested in complex system (society) , a society in a nation state, 
which in turn is nested in regional blocks at an international level. A change in one 
system is manifest in all other systems, thus we are able to interpret the way in a great 
number of individuals enact with one another and their environment in a dynamic 
way. In other words, systems all interact with one another and internal changes in one 
system manifests as changes in the environment of other systems. Walby writes, 
"since every system is understood to take all other systems as its environment, 
systems co-evolve as they complexly adapt to the environment" (ibid: 8). The 
pertinent point is that systems change - they grow or decay - and this has important 
consequences for the development of other systems precisely because every system 
acts within a larger environment that in turn is situated within a greater system. We 
know for certain that systems that share the same space do not grow in isolation but 
rather are in a continual flux and systems adapt intemally to external influences with 
time. 
In classical sociology the debate over societal evolution has been polarised 
between idealist and materialist accounts of history, which is echoed in the division 
between autonomy (internal adaptation) and environmental dependence (external 
adjustment). The former (supported by the likes of Spencer and Hegel) proposed that 
change is inherent in nature, and unfolds following directional laws according to an 
internal logic, blueprint or clockwork within the living organism. At the opposite 
extreme, the latter (advocdted strongly by Marx) contended that change is historical 
and contingent and all living organisms are functions of the environment; thus setting 
up a binary between the two. The root of this binary is the Cartesian body-mind split 
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(Capra 1982) as the mind is represented by idealist account of history and the body, 
by material accounts. In his later work however Marx hypothesised that the 
development of both biological and social organisms was a function of the interplay 
ofimvard adjustment and outward adaptation (Rader 1979:86). In incorporating both 
endogenous and exogenous influences he clearly pre-empted the life sciences concept 
of the holon, which is a neologism used to expre~s the dual nature of every organism. 
Capra explains, "Each holon as two opposite tendencies: an integrative tendency to 
function as a part of a larger whole, and a self-assertive tendency to preserve its 
individual autonomy" (1982:27). The idea that systems are self-organising and 
capable of internalising change, whilst still maintaining order is captured in the term 
autopoesis (Marx's "inward adjustment"). The trait of a system's dependency on 
other systems, marked by the exchange of energy and information with the 
environment, is termed dissipation ("outward adaptation"). All complex systems qua 
holons (as both autopoetic and dissipative) are defined by the interplay of self-
assertion and integration. As Baker clarifies with an example from the natural world, 
"the entire cell, including its membrane and cell wall, is a creative autopoetic system. 
But the cell is dependent on a broader environment, making it a dissipative structure 
whose continued existence is dependant on interaction with its environment" (Baker 
1992:129). No living organism is completely autonomous or completely dependent on 
the environment in which it exists. The cell, the individual, the society or the 
ecosystem as a complex system is subject to the same forces of integration and self-
assertion (Capra 1982:27). 
We may therefore speak of the identity of a complex system as created and 
asserted through the dynamic interplay of a functional struggle to define its autonomy 
in the face of adaptation to the environment. Such a synthesis is accommodated in 
Roy Francis' term "idergy" by nature of its definition accommodates both "the 
domains of material energy and cultural ideas" (Baker 1993: 132) thereby refusing to 
accept the Cartesian binary body/mind split at the root of idealist versus material 
accounts of history. The application of this logic allows us to resolve the debate 
between idealist and materialist accounts of social evolution. The growth of the social 
organism is a function of both an internal logic as offered by Spencer and Hegel and 
the illfluence of environment as Marx suggested. Similarly the influence of idergy is 
present at the level of the individual. Baker contends that all human behaviour 
dispJays both energetic and ideational aspects and it is this interplay that structures 
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social relationships, as Baker explains all "cultures involve human social activity that 
is autopoetic and dissipative" (ibid: 133). Indeed the identities oj all holons are idergic 
- both ideational and material. This testifies to the "hybrid" nature of phenomena that 
emerge or become understandable as complex phenomenon at the interface of social 
and natural sciences. This means that the identities of complex systems from cells to 
individuals to states and e~pires are viewed holistically in terms of idergy as an 
interplay of autopoetic (idealist, self-maintaining) and dissipative (material, 
environmentally dependant) influences. We can conclude that it is a systemic 
phenomenon as all holons, regardless of level, engage in this activity (Capra 
1982:304). A specific pattern ofJractal reflection seems to be emerging as all systems 
at all levels are subject to the same interplay of integrative and self-assertive forces. 
The fractal in many ways is the conceptual hinge of this study, as I believe it is the 
tool that will allow us not only to make sense of subjectivity violence and collectivity 
violence in terms of their organic self-similarity (that is, their systemic nature) but 
also lay the foundations for a holistic post-sacrificial account of identity formation. It 
is to this concept that I now turn. 
3.7 The fractal life of complex systems 
In his groundbreaking text, The Fractal Geometry oj Nature (1983), Benoit 
Mandelbrot coined the word fractal to describe the rough-edged, irregular, non-
Euclidean shapes of nature that he derived from the Greek word, frangere, to break up 
or to create irregular shapes or patterns. To understand what is peculiar about fractals, 
consider that the length of the coastline depends on the scale used to measure it and 
not on the "objective" length (which in fact does not exist) . Although it is impossible 
to measure the coastline, a pattern emerges - that at whatever scale the fractal 
displays comparably complex detail. Every time we zoom in, the subsystem revealed 
is equivalent in appearance, that is, geographically, to the whole (Hall 1994: 123). 
Whilst they are irregular allover, they have the same degree of irregularity at all 
scales - so much so that if not provided with an indication of the scale it is impossible 
to judge scale solely on the basis of the coastline's appearance. This is summarised by 
Mandelbrot who defined a fractal as "any curve or surface that is independent of 
scale. This property is referred to as self-similarity and it means that any portion of the 
curve, if blown up in scale, would appear identical to the whole curve" (Mandelbrot 
1983: I). The self-similar pattern of fractal objects can be generated mathematically 
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e.g. in the Mandelbrot set or it can be found in nature e.g. a broccoli. The benefit of 
mathematical modelling enlightens us to the fact that despite the apparently chaotic 
nature of natural systems, if you zoom out far enough or zoom in close enough, you 
will see that ordered patterns are discernible, albeit often difficult to identify. Lest we 
be reminded that order is chaos and chaos is order. 
AI~ complex dynamical systems have a fractal dimension; that is to say they 
di splay a self-similarity that is independent of scale (Hall 1994). The different parts of 
complex systems are linked and affect one another and equally the constituent 'parts' 
of the system are self-similar to one another and the whole. Miller explains, 
The ways in which the elements interact with one another on the microscopic level 
becomes the algorithms by which the system self-organises on the macroscopic level 
(1999:2). 
The proposition that all complex, dynamical systems grow in self-similar ways acts as 
a counter to the inherently aggregative and reductionist connections made by classical 
sociology between the micro and macro level, hereby refuting the absolute analogy of 
behaviour and growth between the social organism and the living organism. Having 
said this, an astute awareness to the logic of the fractal self-similarity of the organism 
can be found as early as Marx's organic model. This is summed up by Rader 
(1979:80) who writes, "In the organism each organ has a structure that is related to the 
structure of the other organs and to the structure of the organism as a whole". At the 
macro level, the fractal increases as Rader explains: 
Thus Marx thinks in terms of the wider and wider structures of organic wholeness. 
The psycho-physical individual is an organic structure; the society of which he is an 
organic member is a wider structure, nature of which mankind and its social 
formations are organic parts in still a wider structure (ibid:6 I -62). 
Marx's contribution mirrors the post-Newtonian assumption of "ontological depth" 
(Walby 2003: 10) that is opposed to a single level analysis, or the privileging of one 
ontological level, and searches rather for connections between levels . With regard to 
the social sciences, such an approach suggests that the individual, the society and the 
state are linked, exist simultaneously (ibid: 11) or are generated "by the same 
algorithm" . Each level is necessary for the existence of the others - they co-evolve 
through dynamic processes of conflict and co-operation - and therefore neither the 
micro nor macro level can logically be privileged. As James Crutchfield (in Hawkins 
1995:18) supports: 
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Chaos brings a new challenge to the reductionist view that a system can be 
understood by breaking it down and studying each piece. The interaction of 
components on one scale can lead to complex global behaviour on a larger scale that 
in general cannot be deduced from knowledge of the individual components. 
An understanding of the ontological depth of individual and social structure can, with 
the aid of complexity, be unified into a single framework. The benefit of such a non-
reductive approach is that neither the micro nor the macro is considered sufficient in 
and of itself. Rather than attempting to displace one approach at the expense of the 
other as classical social theory attempted, the model offered here recognises the 
complexity of macro-micro linkages and the emergent phenomenon that result from 
the interaction. As Walby summaries, this would "not deny the self-reflexivity of the 
human subject while yet theorising changes in the social totality" (2003:2) . Indeed 
one of the major breakthroughs of complexity is that it enables us to make systemic 
connections and establishing clear patterns between levels of phenomena within 
complex systems (ibid:4). 
According to Baker (1993) the ontological depth of levels that are linked in a 
complex system are subject to the forces of centriphery. Centriphery as a term denotes 
the tendency of complex systems to centralise their world by funnelling energy, 
resources, values or information toward itself while marginalizing or peripheralising 
other, contending systems in the fitness landscape (ibid: 139) . The centre creates the 
periphery but is also dependent on the periphery for its existence. Centriphery is 
divided between centre and periphery in a way that is structurally similar to the split 
between autopoesis and dissipation and as such the autonomy of the system is a 
function of its interaction with other systems in the larger environment and hence 
each is necessary for the existence of other. Otherwise said, the idergic identity of the 
centre is defined relationally to that of the periphery and vice-versa. Baker contends 
that processes of centring and peripheralising are something that cells, individuals, 
communities, states and even empires do and thus states that centriphery creates a 
recurring pattern in the social world: "Like the repetitive pattern in the Mandelbrot 
set, it [centripheryJ keeps emerging at various levels of social organisation and 
through various changes over time"(ibid: 140). It holds at all levels of social 
interaction, as entities engaged in all manner of social behaviour are attracted to 
behaviour associated with centriphery. To this extent, centriphery is a recurring 
phenomenon that is self-similar at all levels (ibid: 142). In other words, centriphery is 
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an attractor that "creates the turbulence and recreates the order in social life" (Baker 
1993: 135). In generating a dynamic interplay between order and disorder, centriphery 
behaves as an attractor algorithm that occupies the critical space at the edge of chaos 
where it recreates a dynamic pattern of order and disorder at all levels of social life. 
3.8. Conclusion 
In this chapter I explored the fundamental epistemological and ontological 
parallels between the analyses of Kristeva and feminist IR theorists. In their work 
there are discussions that engage the role of sacrifice in the construction micro level 
identities, such as the nascent self (Kristeva), the modem hegemonic male (Tickner), 
the citizen-warrior (Elsthain). Similarly, they explore the role of violence in the 
formation of macro identities such as the socio-Symbolic order (Kristeva), the civitas 
(Elsthain) or the modem nation-state (Tickner). However these theorists fail in 
developing a model, or a unified theory, that can account for the nexus between 
violence and identity in comprehensive terms. In a bid to remedy this, in what 
follows, I hope to present such parallels in terms of the fractal self-similarity of 
society viewed in complex dynamical terms and this as a critical move toward an 
understanding of the systemic nature of sacrificial identities. This will allow me to 
explore in the last chapters a different reading of identity formation in the emerging 
post-Newtonian paradigm. 
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Interlude II 
The self-similarity of violence: a complexity view 
What is carved in human flesh is an image of society 
Mary Douglas (1970) 
Where in the first Interlude the systemic nature of the violence-identity nexus 
was represented in terms of Hobbesian "just so" stories, from the organistic world 
view of complexity I now seek to re-read these "just so" analogies in methodological 
terms as self-similarities. 
1. The self-similarity of sacrifice 
Psychoanalysis traditionally acknowledges the existence of a connection 
between the levels of the self and the social and the role of violence in the creation 
and sustenance of each. Lacan for example noted that the birth of the subject in a 
signifying system is reflected in the birth of civil society: 
Thi s mini-version of the founding of civil society as the founding of the form of 
individuation, with its dialectic of dependence on the presence of others whom one 
opposes to found one's own identity and of the simultaneous desire for independence 
from them ... can also be read in Rousseau and Marx (in Whitford 199J:176; emphasis 
added). 
Armed with the tools of complexity however we may now move beyond reductionist 
analogies that employ 'just as ' arguments and 'mini-version' logic and assert in more 
meaningful terms that we are dealing with a micro reflection of a systemic 
phenomenon that presents itself in terms of a self-similarity once we view, as I argued 
in the previous chapter we should, society in terms of complex dynamical system. 
In chapter two, I elaborated an understanding of the birth of the self as a 
foundational act that requires sacrifice of the unity between mother and infant in the 
semiotic space as a condition of separation and autonomy. In other words the violent 
rejection of the mother's body stands at the threshold at which the child acquires 
language and hence a position in the cultural order by claiming an autonomy of self 
from the (m)other. This originary violence is re-enacted in the reconstitution of the 
self through the expulsion of the abject that reappears sporadically at the edges of the 
Symbolic and threatens identity and order. In other words, it is only through the re-
enactment of the sacrificial violence at the micro level (in the micro-version) that 
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founded subjectivity that the subject can be regenerated. This logic is supported in the 
substance of complexity literature, as Miller argues, for example, "patterns of earlier 
organisation formed earlier in a system's development are used as the patterns for 
subsequent development of the system" (1999:6). 
Moreover, the return of the semiotic has severe implications in not only the 
processes of subject but also social formation. Kristeva clearly expl~ins that abject 
forces pose an omnipotent threat to the integrity of the self and the collective: 
Abjection is coextensive with the social and the symbolic order, all the individual as 
well as on the collective level .. . one encounters it as soon as the symbolic and/or 
social dimension of man [sic] is constituted, and this throughout the course of 
civilization (1982:68; emphasis added). 
Kristeva explains that the traces of the semiotic overflow, ultimately disturbing and 
unsettling the norms and boundaries of the symbolic order. These overflows or 
"symbolic ruptures" (Pateman and Gross 1986: 130) can never be fully banished and 
thus continually cause the strength and stability of the Symbolic to quaver. Whether at 
the personal or the social level, the abject hovers menacingly and it must be ejected, 
excluded and sacrificed not only to obtain but also to sustain a stable cohesive 
identity. Consequently Kristeva posits a sacrificial dimension as intrinsic in the 
positing of the subject in the Symbolic order (Keltner 2004:102). Moreover, the very 
parameters of the cultural order demand the sacrificial exclusion of all that is impure, 
antisocial or abject. This emphasises the necessity of sacrifice (of the feminine) in the 
forging of a socia-symbolic unity and the constitution of the unified self and reveals 
abjection as a necessary precondition of the subjectivity and a precondition of society 
(Hook 2003:53). 
The logic of abjection therefore presents us with a manifestation of the 
sacrificial violence engaged in identity formation in patriarchal cultures in which the 
identity of the self and the Symbolic is constructed through the repeated, 
peripheralisation or exclusion of the feminine in general and the (m)otber specifically. 
The sustenance of an ordered polity and stable subject at both levels then is a function 
of the expUlsion of disorder; using the abject to define the limits of inside and outside 
as such. This perpetual process of sacrificial exclusion generates a renewed socio-
political unity and a revitalised cohesion of self. We may thus say that at both the 
micro level of subjectivity formation and tbe macro level of the Symbolic order tbe 
identity of the system is created and asserted through the violent sacrifice of forces of 
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disorder as embodied by the abject. In short, there is a systemic fractal dimension in 
the way in which the self and the Symbolic are sacrificially constructed and asserted 
which suggests a self-similar dimension to expulsion of the abject as a generative 
sacrificial mechanism between the micro and the macro level of social existence. 
2. The fractal of (Western) modernity 
What remains to be investigated is, given the organismic model of society 
implicit in complexity theory, whether the self-similar dimension to the sacrificial 
construction of the subject and the Symbolic excavated in Kristeva 's work bears any 
resemblance to the critique of individual and state formation suggested by feminist IR 
authors. Thus far, following the contributions of Tickner et al I concluded that 
masculinity asserts its autonomy violently in much the same way that the Post-
Westphalian State asserts its sovereignty violently. However with the benefit of the 
heuristic or interpretative model that can accommodate the violence-identity nexus at 
all levels, as developed in chapter 3 and now applied to psychoanalytic discourse, it is 
possible to return to the Hobbesian world-view so clearly captured in statements like 
these: 
The international system that resembles Hobbes' state of nature is a dangerous 
environment. Driven by competition for scarce resources and mistrust of others' 
motives in a system that lacks any legitimate authority; stales like mel! must rely on 
their own resources for self-preservation (Tickner 1992:46; emphasis added). 
May we plausibly say that as another illustration of the same systemic phenomenon, 
the Hobbesian sacrificial invention of human nature is afractal reflection on the large 
scale of relationships between nation-states, both of which were seen to exist in a 
violent state of nature? Following from Baker's argument that centriphery has a 
fractal dimension it seems logical that modern societies that are created and sustained 
through the processes of centriphery must also have a fractal dimension. The question 
then is whether a fractal self-similarity exists between modern individuals and states? 
Indeed, a complexity paradigm would strongly suggest that Western modernity 
exhibited exactly the kind of fractal self-similarity that Baker describes. To clarify, let 
us return to Tickner's argument, that the entire structure consisting of the state system 
at level three, state identities at level two and gender identities at level one is premised 
upon the notion of autonomy. I believe that modern western societies can be re-read 
as having constructed themselves through the centralising of masculine values. In the 
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process feminine values such as interdependence, negotiation and compassion were 
peripheralised, or sacrificed. The notion of centriphery enacted sacrificially is the 
attractor around which identities are generated and sustained and becomes the 
algorithm by which the system self-organises on the micro and the macro level. Given 
its masculine bias, this self-similarity is reflected in the way masculinity is 
en tropically asserted as self-?efinition in much the same way that states articulated 
their sovereignty. In short, the centring logic of modernity that produced the identity-
violence nexus has had an enduring entropic effect on feminine values. Accordingly 
we may provide a fractal interpretation of the violence-identity nexus that is peculiar 
to modernity insofar as the sacrificial modus through which states asserted their 
sovereign identity is self-similar to the way in which men centre their autonomy. In 
other words, identities created and sustained in patriarchal cultures display a 
sacrificial logic independent of scale. 
Beyond this, by casting Kristeva and feminist IR authors ' critique of this 
sacrificial logic in this holistic mould of society, I am able to propose that sacrificial 
violence and, mutatis mutandis, the process of identity formation is self-similar at all 
levels. When viewed as complex dynamical systems, societies and civilisations, 
communities and culture construct and assert themselves sacrificially in a way that is 
structurally self-similar to the sacrificial construction and reconstruction of 
subjectivities. Having thus revealed the systemic nature of sacrificial violence, it is 
this very assumption of sacrificial exclusion that lies at the base of subjectivity and 
the way nations conceive of their identity, which I hope to deconstruct. 
3. Unlocking a logic beyond violence 
In the final chapters I shall attempt to uncover alternative ways to conceive of 
identity formation in such systemic terms beyond the need to invent and sustain such 
identities violently, by situating my study in the cusp of the transition to a post-
Newtonian world. This will entail reading individual and collective entities as 
complex dynamical systems that exist as a function of the interplay between order and 
disorder, which will allow us to transcend the exclusionary binary logic that has 
haunted the modern world and led to the dichotomous definition of both individual 
and collective identity in terms of autonomy. Complexity teaches us that certain 
'feminine' values, which have historically been sacrificed, are also attractor states that 
are vital for the very survival of the system. Within complex adaptive systems then 
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we are able to centre certain ideational values that have long been banished to the 
periphery (translated in social discourse as inferior and thus infinitely sacrificeable). 
Co-operation is one such value that is of critical impOltance in the evolution of a 
system in a fitness landscape. Miller (1999:3) elaborates, "Within this competitive 
environment, co-operation among elements and schemas fosters the development of 
increasi~gly novel, complex and adaptive structures". It is the elements that co-
operate that make the greatest contribution in maintaining the identity of the system, 
in an ever-changing landscape. 
This propensity for co-operation takes the form of a centring activity that 
seems to be emerging at various levels of life, in the form of a fractal reflection, as 
Rihani supports, "there is undeniable evidence of widespread co-operation at all 
levels from genes to nations" (2002:101; emphasis added). This denotes the systemic 
emergence of a complex dynamical ethic of co-operation and interdependence that 
resonates co-terminously at the level of the individual and the collective. This will 
make a significant contribution in the following chapters discussions in which I seek 
to revisit and question and even re-imagine the role played by violence in the 
construction of human nature (subjectivity) and the state (collectivity) by employing 
the conceptual tools articulated in this chapter. Viewing violence as a historically 
constituted habit rather than the default-state, poses the challenge of articulating 
alternative non-violent catalysts that can account for the system's evolution. I believe 
the key to making this move lies at the edge of chaos, where systems remain alive by 
balancing themselves between order and disorder, constancy and change. It is at the 
edge of chaos that the tussle between conflict and co-operation unfurls and the status 
quo is gradually eroded until eventually the system is radically transformed and "even 
the most entrenched old guard will be overthrown" (Waldrop 1992: 12). Herein we 
find our glimmer of hope, for little could be more entrenched that the violence 
engaged in identity construction that has become an ontological necessity at all levels 
of social life. 
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Chapter 4 
Toward a Post-Sacrificial Subjectivity 
From being the subjects of an amorous discourse ... we are allowed to talk about the 
wounds we have suffered aud to search for possible new identities and new ways of 
talking about ourselves. 
In the beginning was love, Julia Kristeva 
4.1. Introduction 
The very idea of a non-violent future is a binary product of modernist 
discourse, which is a sentiment strongly echoed in Girard ' s ultimatum regarding our 
future. Faced with an engulfing sacrificial crisis Girard proposes an extreme choice 
for the survival of humanity: either the complete embrace of violence or the definitive 
renunciation thereof (Girard 1987: 137). While Girard's suggested alternative follows 
conceptually from his theory it does present us with an unworkable binary because to 
aspire to a non-violent default state is as unrealistic and as much of a 
misrepresentation of human nature as violence as default state. In order to truly get a 
sense of what a future would be like in which violence is not the default state, we 
have to follow the fault-line suggested by the post-modern and complexity suggestion 
that order/disorder is not a binary but a process or interplay. The consequences of 
reconceptualising the relation between order-disorder are immense and it bears re-
iterating Hayles assertion that "When a dichotomy as central to Western thought as 
order/disorder is destabilised, it is not exaggeration to say that a major fault line has 
developed in the episteme" (1991: 16). I suggest that this fault-line be traced through a 
critique of Girard's definition of the sacred, as I believe from here we may begin 
theorising a future beyond binary thought. 
Girard reads the relation between violence and the sacred in modernist binary 
terms. Through the employ of the sacrificial mechanism, violence gives birth to a new 
form of the sacred. From this it is clear that Girard posits violence as the default state, 
which he set up by separating order (as culture) and disorder (as Sacred) in order to 
read the sacred in purely destructive terms. I believe however that the originary 
sacrificial act cannot simply engender a view of the violent sacred. Using complexity 
it is possible to engage Girard's primordial understanding of the central place 
accorded to violence and it becomes possible to make sense of a metaphysical reading 
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of violence/disorder in complex terms as destructive and generative. This will entail 
looking at the way in which individual and collective identities are formed as a 
generative interplay of these forces and not as a battle between them. In this chapter I 
will re-read Kristeva on these terms and in chapter five illustrate that this 
phenomenon also seems to be emerging at a collective level. 
4.2. In the space between 
In traditional psychoanalytic discourse the transition from the semiotic to the 
Symbolic order of signification is seeped in violence and according to Kristeva this 
violence is enacted against the mother. Her central argument in Powers of Horror 
(1982) is that abjection - or the sacrificial rejection of the semiotic maternal 
dependence - stands at the threshold at which the child acquires subjectivity and the 
subject must therefore keep abject forces (as remnants of the semiotic attachment) at 
bay in order to assert its identity. This is complicated by the fact that the abject can 
never be annihilated; instead it perpetually haunts and menaces the subject with the 
promise of annihilation. The abject is an indestructible threat precisely because it is an 
intrinsic part of the self. By nature of the subject's emergence into society through the 
abjection of the mother, the abject as a force that may destroy the self, becomes a 
necessary precondition of selfhood (Hook 2003:54). Therefore we may conclude that 
the social subject is dialectically constituted by the imerplay of the semiotic and the 
symbolic. The semiotic (qua disordered nature) and the symbolic (qua cultural order) 
cannot be cast in binaried terms, as the two are necessarily interdependent, so much so 
that the semiotic forms the underbelly of the social order. Pateman and Gross 
acknowledge that the relationship between the two is an ambiguous one, the "semiotic 
being both a precondition of the social order as well as the site of its disruption" 
(1986:129). A like ambiguity emerges at the micro level insofar as the abject is both a 
part and not a part of the subject - simultaneously separated from and integrated with 
the self - which Kristeva captures in the phrase, '''1' am in the process of 
becoming ... at the expense of my own death" (Kristeva in Oliver 1997:231). While 
Kristeva has insisted upon a similarity between the maternal abjection that is re-
enacted ritually at the level of the subject and society, she has failed to articulate this 
'likeness' methodologically. In chapter two I proposed that the logic of reduplication 
provided a psychoanalytical model to account for the means whereby self-identity is 
created and sustained. Specifically, I argued that the archaic identification of the pre-
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Oedipal stage becomes the model or the pattern whereby identifications are 
reduplicated in latter phases of psychic development. With the benefit of the 
complexity-based model we may now say that the logic of reduplication is a self-
similarity that is also not only reproduced in different stages but also on different 
levels. Oliver writes, 
Patterns are reduplicated on level after level until thresholds are crossed; the semiotic 
gives way to the Symbolic; biology becomes culture [and] like the fractals in 
geometry, the pattems are recognisable (1993:73). 
This provides us with the methodological frame to say that the violence of abjection 
has a fractal dimension or in other words that the sacrificial exclusion of the semiotic 
at the micro level becomes the algorithm by which the symbolic system self-organises 
on the macro level. The very postulation of the fractal self-similarity facilitates my 
next move to argue that subjectivity and the social order emerge not sacrificially by 
virtue of the exclusion or abjection of disorder but as a function of the way complex 
dynamical or open systems self-organise. 
Keltner has already suggested that the processes of abjection that constitute 
the boundaries between self and other, inside and outside is "a strange and open 
system" (2004:98). The subject as open and complex system is defined by the 
interplay of inward adjustment (an autopoetic desire for independence) and outward 
adaptation (dissipative dependence on others). It is the open, dynamic continuous 
interaction with their environments that allow complex systems to generate and 
regenerate themselves by self-organising to changing circumstance and maintain the 
balance of stability and instability, order and change, at the edge of chaos. Both the 
individual and society, as complex system, create and assert a self-identity through 
processes of struggle and adaptation to change within the ever-changing terrain of 
systems. The subject is 
The site of contradiction, and is consequently perpetually in the processes of 
construction, thrown into crisis by allemations in language and ill the social 
formation , capable of change. And in the fact that the subject is a process lies the 
possibility of transformation (Gatens 1991: 118; emphasis added). 
This echoes the complexity suggestion that order/disorder is not a binary but a 
process. Whilst modernism is the necessarily vi'llent construction of an autonomous 
subject, from a post-modern, complexity perspective it is not a matter of establishing 
the identity of an entity in and for itself as autonomous or the assertion of order by 
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expelling disorder. Within complex open systems the crisis involved in the perpetual 
processes of transformation does not equate chaos; as such processes do not simply 
generate disorder. Rather, change occurs from the dynamic interplay of order and 
disorder, creation and destruction, dependence and independence. In terms of idergy 
we can say that the Symbolic, or the site of 'language and social formation ' 
constitutes the ideational component and nature qua maternal body o~ the forces of 
the Semiotic, embody the material. It is not a matter of examining the semiotic or the 
symbolic, the material or the ideational as dichotomies but rather to examine the 
space between them and the dynamic processes that create them. To do so, is to re-
read the modernist binary between the semiotic and Symbolic in complexity terms. 
Only in acknowledging the complexity of the contradiction generated from the 
interplay between terms, can we begin to articulate a holistic reading of the processes 
involved in the construction of the self-identity. 
4.3. Rethinking the abject 
Just as the order-disorder dichotomy is a refraction of a historically (and 
scientifically) contingent worldview, so must the processes of abjection be seen as a 
socially constituted habit rather than a historical necessity. Gross writes (in Hook 
2003:49; emphasis added) : 
Abjection is the body' s acknowledgement that the boundaries and limits imposed on 
it are really social projections - effects of desire, not nature. It testifies to the 
precarious grasp of the subject on its own identity, an assertion that the subject may 
slide back into the impure chaos out of which it was formed. 
The mention of an identity premised upon the expulsion of chaotic nature draws us 
immediately back into the Newtonian realm where order is obligatorily defined 
through the violent expUlsion of disorder; the self defined through the forceful 
oppression of the other. The analysis of Machiavelli 's fate/fortuna from chapter 3 
well illustrates this. Machiavelli postulated a devalued feminine other named 
"fortuna" whose devaluation was a necessity in the moment of self-invention of 
masculinity/autonomy. Associated with capriciousness, unpredictability and disorder, 
it was believed that fortuna could only be controlled violently. So once again we are 
dealing with the binary pairs of order-chaos, purity-impurity or nature-culture and the 
violence involved in sustaining these. Or are we? The employ of the word 'slide' 
opens another curious interpretation of abjection. It implies motion and fluidity; it 
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conjures the image of nascent subject who in search of a self-identity erupts from the 
chaos of the semiotic into Symbolic order, only to (possibly) slip back into chaos once 
again. The quest for autonomy is cast as a constant struggle; the continuous, fluid 
movement between order and disorder; pure and impure; the semiotic and the 
symbolic. This refinement, if pursued in more detail can allow for an understanding of 
identity formation that is not a function of the s,acrificial expulsion of forces, but 
rather a dynamic and dialectical interplay between them. 
Despite the intrinsic importance of the semiotic in the constitution of the self 
and the social, it has historically been devalued. The discourse of modernity has 
constructed the semiotic space as a fearful and ominous force that is associated with 
nature and, understood as specifically feminine, is subordinate and must be violently 
sacrificed. Gross (1987:128; emphasis added) writes: 
While the West can accept the necessary reliance it has on law- and rule-
governed ... masculine functioning, on the symbolic, Kristeva claims it is incapable of 
accepting its necessary dependence on a fragmented, chaotic, bodily, libidinal, 
feminine energy. 
The edifice of western metaphysics has been constructed such that the symbolic 
occupies a privileged space and is premised upon semiotic sacrifice, negating the 
significance of semiotic in social formation and the importance of the feminine in 
identity articulation. The fear that the cultural order could perish from the disorder of 
women is underpinned by a specific scientific discourse that privileges the masculine. 
However this entrenched paradigm has come under vigorous scrutiny and many of its 
key assumptions have been refuted with the rise of the post-Newtonian worldview as 
illustrated in the previous chapter. Logically therefore modernist, sacrificial account 
of subjectivities premised upon such scientific assumption must also be 
problematised. The instructive term in the above citation is 'necessary' - it tells us 
that the symbolic needs the semiotic; the one cannot exist in the absence of the other. 
This is the point that Derrida makes in his critique of logocentric discourse. In Of 
Grammatology (1976) he argued that the terms presence/absence; science/myth; 
male/female; mindlbody; high/low and culture/nature are pairs of binary oppositions 
in which the (primary) positive term is given priority and placed on the side of the 
logos. Derrida radically challenged the practice of definition qua opposition, arguing 
that if rigorously challenged, these "oppositions break down and collapse into each 
other" (in Palmer 1997: 134). Therefore neither one can be prioritized for any 
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experience is a combination of both absence and presence: "every moment of the 
present is loaded with a no-longer extant past and is at the same time pregnant with a 
future" (ibid: 135). Indeed any experience of self-identity is a combination of semiotic 
and symbolic influence. Neither can therefore be logically prioritized. 
It is this notion of necessary interdependence that allows us to conceive of 
distinctions without entrenc~ed, damaging opposition, which Grosz (in Hook 
2003:51) describes in her conceptualization of the Semiotic phase of experience: 
[It] is an anarchic formless circulation of sexual impulses and energies traversing the 
chi ld' s body before sexuality is ordered [and] the body becomes a coherent entity. 
[These energies] predate the distinction between subject and object and thus also the 
child's notion of entity. They defy unification, distinctive boundaries and social 
regulation . The semiotic thus preceded all unites, binary oppositional structures and 
hierarchical forms of organisation. 
The conceptualisation of the semiotic space as the whirling flow of formless energies 
and impulses in which all notions of binary distinction or rigid, hierarchical unity are 
obsolete is pre-modern but also strongly in line again with post-Newtonian thought. If 
anything, this second reading of Kristeva and the abject alerts us to the impossibility 
of rigid distinction between the clean and the unclean, the pure and impure, order and 
disorder (Hook 2003 :54). Nature and culture, chaos and order must no longer be 
considered binary opposites but, instead, viewed as an interplay of forces arranged on 
a continuum from order to disorder (Baker 1993: 123). Similarly the maternal body 
must be situated on such a continuum between nature and culture if the scorn for 
woman-as-female body within phallocentric societies is to be transcended. 
In having revisited and recast the semiotic/symbolic distinction in complexity 
terms as order/disorder interplay, the logical next step is to revisit the place of 
abjection, which has traditionally sought to enforce the divide between order and 
disorder. Modernist authors like Hobbes, Machiavelli and Lacan read sacrificial 
expUlsion or "abjection" as a process of autonomy affirmation concerned exclusively 
with the perpetual violent peripheralisation of those forces that are both menacing and 
revolting to the self. It is this very assumption of sacrificial exclusion that lies at the 
base of subjectivity that I hope to deconstruct. In other words, abjection or the process 
whereby the self defines and redefines itself must be more complex than the repetitive 
sacrificial repulsion of that which threatens it. The aim then is to read this interplay 
from a complexity perspective and to make comprehensive sense of the process of 
identity formation as dynamic process. Hook's (2003:52; emphasis added) reading of 
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abjection as an intriguing interplay of repulsion and attraction, offers a clue in this 
direction: 
As in moments of the uncanny, one is able to discern within abjection braids of 
revulsion and attraction, repulsion and compulsion - the abject confuses, fascinates 
and yet disturbs desire, just as does any variety of the uncanny which stems from that 
which is both strange and yet nonetheless originary. 
Abjection therefore stands at the originary foundational moment of society and the 
violence of abjection is reproduced to rejuvenate society from one generation to the 
next. This is a very Girardian point made in Kristeva's language, which allows us to 
use sacrifice and abjection more or less interchangeably. Abjection as the complex 
feedback of repulsed and attracted forces not only threatens the self, but the semiotic 
from which the abject emerges has a crucial role in sustaining the self. As a process, 
abjection is strange indeed. To be more precise, abjection displays behaviour 
associated with that of a strange attractor. I want to suggest that the movement of the 
self in and between fields of attraction and repulsion can be usefully conceptualised as 
the movement in and between the wings of the butterfly attractor. This image is 
generated by the interface of converging and diverging tendencies or, what 
complexity terms, positive and negative feedback. It is the attractor as the epicentre of 
attraction and repulsion that accounts for the "dynamic play of order and disorder, 
stability and change in human social life" (Baker 1993: 124). It is thus imperative to 
acknowledge the dynamic attractor force in play between the symbolic (order) and the 
semiotic (disorder) that accounts for self-identity. Indeed, at the originary moment of 
subjectivity is the interwoven confused web of contradictory forces, which 
nonetheless complement one another beautifully in the formation of the self. 
4.4. The abject, the sacred and sacrifice 
Kristeva clearly contends that in the initial break from corporeal unity with the 
maternal body the boundary between inside and outside, order and disorder is created. 
Of all of the corporeal sites and bodily functions that designate the boundary between 
inside and outside and thus generate abjection, menstrual blood is viewed with the 
greatest abhorrence (Kristeva in Oliver 1997:260-261), as it provides a provocative 
statement of sexual difference and is the most forceful reminder of the maternal body 
that was repudiated in the construction of self. Girard offers a complementary 
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explanation. He argues that any bloodletting is a source of fear as it denotes violence 
seeping throughout society: 
When men are enjoying peace and security, blood is a rare sight. When violence is 
unloosed, however, blood appears everywhere - on the ground, underfoot, forming 
great pools. Its very fluidity gives form to the contagious nature of violence. Its 
presence proclaims murder and announces new upheavals to come. Blood stains 
everything it touches the colour of violence and death. Its very appearance seems, as 
the saying goes, to 'cry out for vengeance' (1977:22). 
Spilt blood however captures the duality of violence and has the power to either 
rejuvenate social bonds or contaminate the cultural order. On the one hand, it 
contaminates the social order, a provocative testament to the violence that has been 
unleashed in society. Yet on the other hand, the blood of a sacrificial victim, shed in 
appropriate rituals that will not invoke revenge (thus blood associated with sacrifice 
rather than random violence) can restore the good heath of society by functioning as a 
"blood-letting". It is therefore essential that pure and impure blood be kept separate 
(Girard 1977), as following the logic of the pharmakon, blood can be both lethal 
poison and miraculous cure. Menstrual blood as an ambiguous symbol of sacrifice 
embodies the pharmakon as it offers the possibility of both life and death and as such 
it "vividly illustrates the entire operation of violence" (ibid:36). According to Girard, 
menstrual blood is a pointed example of what many cultures consider to be 'bad ' 
blood. Indeed, it is seen to be the most impure of all impurities (1977:34). To account 
for the specific fear of menstrual bleeding, Girard ties the sexual dimension of 
menstruation to violence. He argues that there is an inherently violent aspect to 
sexuality, "sexuality is impure because it has to do with violence" (ibid:34) and 
suggests that women's blood is considered a taboo and a threat because its sexual 
associations imply violence. Therefore women's blood wields a corrupting influence 
within the social order through its association with violence. Girard writes: 
The fact that the sexual organs of women periodically emit a flow of blood has 
always made a great impression on men; it seems to confirm an affinity between 
sexuality and those diverse forms of violence that invariably lead to bloodshed. 
(1977:34-35 emphasis added) 
For men, the sight of blood speaks of violence, as men only bleed if their bodies have 
been wounded in some way. For women on the contrary, the sight of blood is a fact of 
life, associated with childbirth and fertility . Women's association with blood is taboo 
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as it serves as a reminder of original violence, of the bloodletting involved in the 
sacrifice of the Other. 
At the micro level menstrual blood invokes a potent image of semiotic 
overflow that frightens society as it recalls (periodically) the originary violence of 
matricide that lined the subject's entry into the symbolic (Kristeva in Oliver 
1997:260·261). Thus, when exposed to menstrual blood (as with any manifestation of 
the abject), the (male) subject's reaction is one of disgust and insecurity from the 
inability to discern between inside and outside, culture and nature, subject and non-
subject. It is precisely this feeling of repugnance or vilification that is for Derrida a 
corporeal response to the horror of the "undecidable" that is something such as an 
androgen, albino or zombie, which cannot conform to either pole of a dichotomy 
(Reynolds and Roffe 2004:46). Such is the abject, the "undecidable" that straddles 
both semiotic and symbolic, yet belonging decisively to neither. It occupies the 
ambiguous in-between, as Oliver describes it is "the undecidable between subject and 
object, the unruly border, birth" (1993:57). The abject blurs boundaries; it menaces, 
haunts and disgusts us precisely because we understand that it is not' only an external 
menace but that it may menace usfrom the inside' (in Hook 2003:135-136 emphasis 
added). 
Whilst the abject (as impurity; as taboo) threatens to destroy the very 
boundaries of the Symbolic and the self, it simultaneously creates them and therefore 
embodies the duality of the pharmakos. Oliver explains the abject is "[a]t once the 
guarantee and the threat to its stability" (ibid:66). The abject mother fulfils a dual 
role for the subject and the social order that is both destructive/poisonous and 
restorative/remedial. This signals a metaphysical reading of violence in complex 
terms as destructive and generative. Freud understood the ambivalence captured in its 
ambiguity, "One the one hand it means to us sacred and consecrated: but on the other 
hand it means, uncanny, dangerous, forbidden and unclean" (Freud 1938:26). It is 
conceived of as a fluid and ambiguous flow between the sacred and accursed, which 
is at one and the same time creative and destructive. It is therefore necessary to re-
read Kristeva and to re-appropriate the creative-destructive ambivalence of the sacred, 
in order to move beyond the violence/non-violence binary. 
The ambiguous abject, being both restorative and destructive, cannot simply 
be understood through clear-cut oppositions. Equally, the semiotic cannot be 
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understood as purely poisonous. It is the source of the subject's malady but also the 
cure. Gross writes: 
Even at times of its strongest cohesion and integration, the subjecT teeters an the brink 
of this gaping abyss , which attracts (and also repulses) it. This abyss is the locus of 
the subject's generation and the place af its potential obliteration (in Fletcher and 
Benjamin 1990:89; emphasis added) . 
The subject straddles the space between life and death, perpetually confronted with 
the possibility of his or her own demise. In this regard the subject seems to balance in 
the critical state between order and chaos; stability and instability; constancy and 
change, with the unending imperative to self-organise and maintain his or her 
autonomy (or cohesive, unified selfhood) in the face of changes. To say that the 
subject 'teeters on the brink of a gaping abyss ' , which is 'the locus of the subject's 
generation and the place of its potential obliteration', is simply to say, in complexity 
terms, that the subject operates at the edge of chaos. At the edge of chaos the dynamic 
interplay of order and disorder achieves a critical complexity. It is where systems 
flourish or flounder, grow or decay. It is where the abject generates the autonomy of 
the subject and threatens to take it away. 
4.5. The self-similarity of ritual 
The subject must have a certain mastery of the abject; it must keep it in check 
and at a distance in order to define itself as a subject (Gross in Hook 2003:53). 
Similarly at the social level, the abject forces must be contained at the margins of the 
symbolic. This is necessary for the preservation of the social order and thus 
[r]equires some mode of control or exclusion to keep it at a safe distance from the 
symbolic order and proceedings. This is the social function of a number af rituals and 
religious practices which require a distinction between the sacred and the profane 
(Gross in Fletcher and Benjamin J 990:93). 
This originary act of matricide constitutes the thetic moment wherein the nascent 
subject renounces the mother. Such renunciation is the condition of the possibility of 
the social order. The 'abject mother' poses a grave threat to the very being of the 
patriarchal subject and structures of patriarchal society and therefore must be 
repressed or kept at bay by means of taboos that ensure law and order, thereby 
creating and recreating social life (Kristeva 1982:72-73). Taboos and prohibitions 
demarcate the space between the sacred and the profane - the realm of the sacred 
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constantly repudiated to uphold the profane. When autonomy fades, the subject seeks 
to re-enact the thetic break though ritual sacrifice of abject forces threatening the self 
with dissolution. In Kristeva' s words, religious rituals negotiate the formation and 
reformations of the speaking subject in relation to the social and symbolic order 
(ibid:67). As pointed out earlier, for Girard a violent arche-sacrificial ritual enacted 
against a first victim accounts for the violent origin of human culture ~nd it is such 
acts of ritual sacrifice that can be revisited when the cultural order is in need of 
rejuvenation. In his conceptual scheme, sacrificial rites and rituals within society 
serve a preventative function in keeping violence to the outside of society. The tool 
employed to uphold the social order against dedifferentiating, disordering forces, 
thereby preventing the flood of both 'bad ' violence and 'bad' blood throughout the 
social order, is the surrogate victim mechanism (1977 :201). If masterfully deployed, 
the sacrificed scapegoat can rejuvenate the community by deflecting violence away 
from the community to achieve a renewed sense of social solidarity. 
Kristeva writes "The function of these religious rituals is to ward off the 
subject's fear of his very own identity sinking irretrievably into the mother" (1982:2). 
In other words, rites and prohibitions exist to prevent the collapse of difference 
between the identity of self and m(other). This loss of distinction from the return of 
semiotic attachment reverberates throughout the symbolic order, blurring oppositions 
between the pure and impure, culture and nature, which in turn requires controlled 
rituals so that difference may be re-instated. The failure to mythologise rituals of 
defilement cause social hierarchies to be destabilised precisely because fundamental 
distinctions upon which the social order is erected have been undermined. In 
contemporary culture it is becoming increasingly difficult to denote what constitutes 
"good taste" or "socially accepted behaviour" and to categorise that which is perverse, 
obscene or rude . It ' s the paradoxical embrace of all things abject as Mennighaus 
elaborates 
The vulgar, the low-minded, the perverse, the abject - which last is, according, to its 
authoritative theorist, Julia Kristeva, closely akin to the disgusting - all these have 
enjoyed .. . a downright epidemic and generally affirmative expansion in the realms of 
literature, art and the humanities (ibid: 14; emphasis added). 
For Girard such contagion testifies to a specific type of cultural crisis. If the employ 
of ancient scapegoating rituals fail to channel violence away from the community, 
violence erupts, stimulates a cultural catastrophe as "impure" violence blends with 
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"sacred" violence and as a result, "the violence will overflow its channels" (ibid:39). 
Violence becomes endemic. It seeps and overflows throughout the social order; 
spreading contagiously. The cause of this contamination is the blurring of the pure 
and impure, culture and non-culture; when sacrificial rituals fail to ensure difference 
and consequently individuals loose their distinctiveness , identity and place in social 
hierarchy. Similarly for Kristeva in contemporary culture we are witnessing the 
dissolution of the demarcating space between the abject and culture as the traditional 
construction of the abject as a menacing and repugnant entity that must be repelled 
violently to save the self from slipping back into its clutches, is increasingly 
contested. The mingling of the pure and the impure increasingly contaminates the 
social order. Subsequently we are witnessing such a crisis of culture, symptomatic of 
a culture that embraces rather than expels manifestations of disgust: 
The most surprising discovery may be this one: like a sweet that is all too sweet, the 
beautiful is in danger - from the first and by its very nature - of turning out to be in 
itself something disgusting (Menninghaus 2003:7 in original). 
Such a revelation may have a profound impact and however destabilising it may seem 
is well in line with post-Newtonian thought. That which disgusts us, which repels us 
and menaces us, is in fact in us. The abject is something upon which beauty and 
selfhood depends. We are beginning to understand that the abject is an inextricable 
part of our culture and us - disgust and beauty, disorder and order, expulsion and 
inclusion are faces of the same phenomenon. This denotes a failure of myth that is 
accompanied by the startling revelation that the violence of abjection is in fact our 
violence. 
But in what sense is it "our violence"? This is what Girard understands to be 
"the metaphysical attitude to violence" (Girard 1977:258-259) or as was argued in the 
first chapter, violence as the sacred. The violence that threatens to tear society apart is 
redirected onto the victim and in restoring harmony to the community the victim is 
thus turned into "a transcendental symbol not only of violence and disorder, but of 
peace and order as well" (Girard 1987:92). In this way, sacrificial violence invents a 
new form of the sacred, or the collective experience of calm and awe, which results 
from this ritualistic expulsion. There is a catharsis once the space occupied by chaotic 
violence has been transfigured into social order. Although Girard acknowledges that 
the sacred involves "peace as well as war, creation as well as destruction" 
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(1977:258), he is disparaging toward a metaphysical conceptualisation of the scared 
as a unified force of creation and destruction that structures culture, as it detaches 
violence from man, thus deculpabilising ourselves. 
My interpretation of Kristeva endorses such a metaphysical view, as the abject 
may be read in these very terms as a unified force of order and disorder, which it is 
both creative and destructive a!ld lingers, looms and menaces at the boundaries of the 
cultural order, or the Symbolic. For Kristeva, the abject is the dynamic space between 
the sacred and the profane and in the wake of sacrificial abjection the sanctity of the 
cherished cultural order is restored, rendering the subject secure within it. Like the 
Sacred, the abject is violence and the exercise of ritualised violence is accompanied 
by a moment of cathartic relief. Whilst acknowledging that both play a crucial 
preventive function in keeping disorder to the outside of the social order, the creative 
power they possess is equally vital. The abject and the scapegoat playa self-similar 
generative role insofar as the violent expUlsion of the abject and the violent 
eradication of the scapegoat galvanises, bolsters and recreates the socio-Symbolic 
order. To revisit Kristeva and Girard through the lens of complexity allows us to 
conceive of the means whereby subjects and societies as complex systems define and 
redefine themselves in dynamic terms. In a comprehensive sense we may say that 
ritual sacrifice is accorded a central position in the forms of human culture. Through 
the re-iteration of sacrificial rites that ensure the ideal distance between culture, the 
symbolic (as order) and the sacred, the abject (as disorder) the self and the social 
order are rejuvenated. Complex systems are thus constituted and reconstituted by the 
continual flux of order and disorder that makes possible an alternative conception of 
identity formation . It shifts the order-disorder interplay into a productive exchange 
that is no longer necessarily sacrificially based. 
4.6. Toward a discourse of love 
In the pre-Symbolic phase, the in/ans and the mother are inseparable however 
the loss or sacrifice of the mother is a "biological and psychic necessity, the first step 
on the way to becoming autonomous" (Kristeva 1989:27). In order to deal with the 
loss, or find compensation for, the maternal attachment the in/ans identifies with the 
'imaginary father' who plays an intermediary role in the process of separation. It is 
this transference of identification that is the mechanism that saves the subject from 
melancholia. For Kristeva women have greater difficulty murdering the mother 
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because they identify with her and are thus more prone to melancholia and become, 
what psychoanalysts' term 'depressed narcissists' (1982:28). Such are individuals 
who are incapable of coming to grips with the rejection of the maternal and pine for 
the semiotic attachment between mother and child, thus often seeking to replace 
matricide with suicide as this denotes "the final triumph over the void of the lost 
object" (i~id:9) . Kristeva elaborates: 
The lesser or greater violence of matricidal drive, depending on the individuals and 
the milieu's tolerance, entails when it is hindered, its inversion on the self; the 
maternal object having been introjected, the depressive or melancholic putting to 
death of the self is what follows, instead of matricide. In order to protect the mother, I 
kill myself (ibid:8) 
Such is the double bind that confronts women. On the one hand matricide is the vital 
necessity of selfhood, and the best way to sway the death-drive, yet in killing the 
mother she is committing a form of suicide. The female subject annihilates a part of 
her subjectivity as "she carries the mother or the maternal Thing with her, in the crypt 
of her psyche" (Tsu-Chung Su 2005: 170). Kristeva borrows from Freud the notion of 
"the impossible mourning for the maternal object" (1987 :9). Impossible, as it is the 
sacrifice of the mother that allows the subject to be born as such, thus needing to re-
enact rather than lament it. From a patriarchal modernist perspective the 'options' 
open to women are either matricide or suicide - the murder of the self or the murder 
of the (m)other. It thus seems the subject cannot escape the violence that for Kristeva 
is a reaction against melancholia, self-depreciation, dejection and depression as 
"murdering the other protects against suicide" (Tsu-Chung Su 2005: 196). 
But is it possible to locate a space between, and conceive of individuation in 
the absence of murder? Is there a way to break the cycles that seem to inevitably end 
in symbolic sacrifice and literal bloodshed? Kristeva believes that there is an 
alternative and asserts, "Forgiveness appears as the only solution, the third way 
between dejection and murder" (1987:199). To forgive requires an exceptional effort 
from the individual , reflected in the Herculean endeavours of the collective who, 
beyond sacrificial violence, must embrace gestures equally miraculous in 
transforming disorder into order. With reference to Dostoyevsky, Kristeva (1987:204) 
acknowledges the criticality of forgiveness in forging an alternative path: 
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Through my love, r exclude you from history for a while, I take you for a child, and 
this means that I recognise the unconscious motivations of your crime and allow you 
to make a new person of yourself. So that the unconscious may inscribe itself with a 
new narrative that will not be the eternal return of the death drive in the cycle of 
crime and punishment, it must pass through the love offorgiveness. 
Kristeva speaks of an alternative to the violence of sacrifice, a modus whereby 
humiliation, hatred and violence between individuals can be alchemised into a group 
harmony without recourse to more violence. Kristeva suggests that whilst the 
transition to the Symbolic is forged violently, it is not necessarily sustained violently 
and that the renunciation of violence may lead to a rejuvenation of the subjective 
Symbolic Order. Forgiveness then allows cycles of reciprocal violence to be broken, it 
allows violence to be brought to a close in the absence of punishment, which is a 
violence imposed by authority of law, or vengeance, which is decreed by the authority 
of the mob. Kristeva then proposes that forgiveness can be a generative mechanism 
that functions at the macro level in healing a badly fractured pollis and in self-similar 
terms, functions at the micro level in renewing or regenerating the self. In the 
following exquisite citation, Kristeva (1987:205) makes clear that forgiveness does 
not erase actions, nor does it forget them. It transcends them and in so doing provides 
the gift of forgiveness from a loving other, a gift that allows the self to be reborn: 
Forgiveness is a luminous stage of dark, unconscious timelessness - the stage at 
which the latter changes laws and adopts the bonds of love as a principle of renewal 
of both self and other. 
From Kristeva' s reading alone the possibility of forgiveness as a third way in identity 
reconstitution seems to be emerging systemically at the level of self and the social. 
This will be fully explored in the following chapter with close reference to the 
extraordinary transitional experience of South Africa. For now we must uncover the 
dynamic at the level of subjectivity that makes forgiveness possible - that which may 
best be described as 'bonds of love'. The first part of this thesis illustrated the 
systemic dimension to violence-identity nexus; the drive to sacrificially exclude or 
expel the other. In contrast Kristeva suggests in Strangers to Ourselves (1991) that 
we must learn to embrace the repressed within ourselves - in an effort to learn to live 
with, even love, others. The concluding remarks of this chapter are concerned with the 
means by which Kristeva weaves together the threads of the discourse of love qua 
forgiveness by revisiting the notion of the imaginary father with whom the infans' 
identifies in the articulation of self-hood. As Kristeva writes, "Whoever is in the 
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realm of forgiveness - who forgives and accepts forgiveness - is capable of 
identifying with a loving father, an imaginary father, with whom, consequently, he is 
ready to be reconciled, with a new symbolic law in mind" (Kristeva 1987:207). This 
will be followed in chapter 5 by an analysis into the extent to which social bonds can 
be reaffirmed in the absence of violence, through the non-sacrificial renewal of the 
social order. 
4.7. Symbolic reconciliation 
In conceiving of a 'loving' imaginary father Kristeva attempted to sever the 
existing and enduring association of the maternal, or feminine semiotic with women, 
arguing that the maternal body and feminine energies need to be conceptually separate 
to women as such. Pateman and Gross clarify, "For Kristeva there can be no specific 
or determinate relation between this powerful semiotic, maternal structuring and 
structured space, and women" (1987:130; emphasis in original). Kristeva therefore 
suggests that the maternal and paternal functions are not necessarily aligned with 
actual 'fathers' and 'mothers' (Anderson 2000:218) and for her the problem emerges 
if the semiotic space is restricted to women, as both men and women should have 
access to maternal and paternal functions. Kristeva appropriates Freud's 'father of 
individual prehistory' to enlarge our understanding of the 'father figure' as a hybrid 
of both parental functions - as a union of the semiotic (maternal, material) and the 
symbolic (paternal, ideational). On the basis of this idergic overlap, and in light of 
chapter two's discussion, the picture Kristeva conjures of the "father of individual 
prehistory" is a loving father quite contrary to the prohibitive father of the Symbolic 
as described by Lacan (Keltner 2004: 101). Kristeva acknowledges the need for a third 
figure with whom the child can identify to facilitate the split from the maternal body 
so that the child may situate his or her self as an autonomous agent within the socio-
symbolic order. It is the nature of the identification that she calls into question. 
Contrary to Freud who claims the primary identification is narcissistic and aggressive, 
in Kristeva's account the primary identification is an amatory identification (Keltner 
2004: 100) between mother and child. The mother offers the child a gift of love that 
encourages the infans to move forward from the maternal body to the mother's desire 
- toward the phallus or "toward the symbolic of the other" (Kristeva 1983:33). The 
mother's gift then is to the show the child that the phallus and not the child signifies 
her desire and as was argued in chapter two, this renders the 'imaginary father' a 
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mother-father amalgam or a combination of the mother and her desire (Oliver 
1993:77). This interpretation of Kistevan thought sites an amatory association as the 
catalyst for the self's transition to the Symbolic in the form of "an imaginary agent of 
love that allows the child to negotiate the passage between the maternal body and the 
Symbolic order" (ibid:69). It is to read a love story into the pre-Symbolic, pre-
linguistic relation between the mother and child. Beyond this, an amatory association 
with the 'father figure' is crucial for two reasons. One, it is the identification whereby 
an infans (pre-subject) becomes a subject proper. without necessitating the violence of 
sacrifice and two, it is the re-identification with the (loving) father figure that allows 
the subject to escape from the grips of melancholia and thus reclaim a stable selfhood. 
In other words, it is the reduplication whereby subjectivity, forged in an amatory 
rather than sacrificial gesture, regenerates itself. 
Kristeva's work has been criticised as endorsing "an ideology of matriphobia 
and misogyny" (Tsu-Chung Su 2005: 169) by gendering melancholia, privileging the 
male melancholic and symbolising the mother as death (ibid: 183). Yet in other 
aspects, as discussed in this chapter, Kristeva clearly and rigorously refutes Freudian 
and Lacanian accounts of identity formation which exclude the feminine 
(Appignanesi and Garratt 1999:98) For some conceptual clarity I turn to the 
postmodern feminist Luce Irigaray who is highly articulate in her critique of not only 
psychoanalysts such as Freud and Lacan but also social contact theorists. Despite their 
disagreements, Irigaray's primary ambition dovetails with that of Kristeva, namely to 
articulate a discourse of love. Irigaray too has 'a new symbolic law in mind'. 
Irigaray serves as an excellent supplement to Kristeva insofar as she does what 
Kristeva failed to do, namely to challenge Freud's application of the boy's Oedipal 
development as a model for the girl as well as the privileged place accorded to the 
phallus in the symbolic order. Freud contends that both male and female children's 
primary desire is for the mother and thus the object of the girl's love is also the 
mother and her sexuality is also phallic (clitoral). So although the girl shares the boy's 
desire for the mother (Freud goes so far as to dub the girl "a little man"; in Gatens 
1991: 105) the female lacks the phallus that is needed to satisfy the mother. For her, 
castration comes first; it is a fait accompli. The little girl therefore suffers from 'penis 
envy' and her attraction to her father as "sex-appmpriate love object" (ibid: I 05) is in 
part conditioned by her desire to (re)possess this missing part. In failing to become the 
object of the mother' s desire, the little girl feels inferior and takes a passive role and 
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in so doing 'represses pre-Oedipal activity in favour of passivity' (ibid: 106). In the 
transferring affection from mother to father the girl (in shunning the alternatives of 
asexuality or homosexuality) takes up a place in the social order, as the embodiment 
of 'normal femininity' with love toward the father (or a father-substitute). 
Freud's hypothesis is hugely problematic not least for it's phallocentrism in 
deeming the penis (phallus) to be the primary sex organ or his attempts ,to "disavow 
the specificity of feminine eroticism" (Gatens 1991: 106). The utility of Freud's theory 
in contrast is that, working within the Newtonian paradigm, it accounts for the 
creation of (post-Oedipal) sexed subjects (qua feminine females or masculine males) 
who repress all socially inappropriate desires or activities to maintain the rigid 
distinction between order and disorder, between culture and non-culture (ibid). 
Furthermore, Freud's description of the female body is articulated in terms of lack-
as the inverse of the male (phallic) form. Similarly in Lacan's system, the phallus is 
the privileged signifier. It therefore provided the benchmark against which the 
absence-presence dichotomy is delineated, and by application, women were 
constructed as imperfect pseudo-men and thus denied all authentic identity. Because 
these theories of sexuality are bound to the theories of subjectivity, Irigaray concludes 
that in the patriarchal world female subjectivity is based on a lack and in contestation 
of this develops a description of the female form as lacking nothing (Gatens 
1991: 115). Irigaray claims that there is an important overlap between 
psychoanalytical accounts of male and female body. Despite its construction to the 
contrary, "the masculine body is dependent on the feminine body for its 
morphological form, that is, for its phallic attributes" (ibid: 120). The feminine body is 
thus neither inferior, nor inverse and it is not a complement to the masculine body. 
The masculine body is dependent upon it. In forcing the "monosexual cultural 
imaginary . . . to make space for the female sex; it would have to recognise the Other" 
(Irigaray 1991:74) and the aim of this is to "end the domination of the phallus in 
language and culture. It would involve the articulation of (an)other economy of 
thought in which plurality and multiplicity could have a positive value" (Gatens 
1991: 121). Kristeva and Irigaray both employ heterogeneous, non-teleological models 
of signification and therefore clearly draw on insights from post-Newtonian thought, 
without specifically contex·,ualising it in that manner. In challenging binaries, 
rationality, linearity and teleology as a means to reject the patriarchal economy they 
(unwittingly?) enter into dialogue with the theoretical underpinnings of complexity. 
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4.8. Articulating an alternative economy 
Anderson (2005) contends that patriarchal philosophy is rooted in an economy 
of male self-sameness that privileges the relation between father and son and by 
extension orders society on a man-to-man basis. This is the origin of the paternal 
genealogy that has ensured the centrality of the phallus in patriarchal culture. In an 
attempt to develop a genealogy that accounts -for sexual difference, Irigaray 
hypothesises about the nature of an alternative account of Rousseau's 'Golden Age'. 
She argues it was a time "when the mother and daughter were the figure of a natural 
and social model" (in Whitford 1991:177). It was thus an age characterised by 
fertility, nurture, life and wholeness, which was starkly contrasted with the sterile 
logic of taboo that springs from the paternal genealogy. With mention to the fertility 
cults of the Greek goddesses, she suggests that such a religion would be cognisant of 
'women's values' and natural fecundity . Historically the relationship between mother 
and daughter has been totally repressed; unsymbolised in hegemonic paternal 
genealogy and completely written out of the myths upon which the symbolic order 
has been erected. 
We have looked extensively at the extent to which women individually are 
deemed a threat to the security of the social order; it is thus unsurprising then that a 
bond between women (a common voice, language, economy) presents an even more 
devastating danger to the symbolic order. 
The relationship between mother/daughter, daughter/mother constitutes an extremely 
explosive kernel in our societies. To think it, to change it, amounts to undermining 
the patriarchal order (Whitford 1991 :77). 
Ironically, the maternal genealogy is buried under the symbolic and it is from this 
foundation (feminine and fertile as it is) that culture grows. Irigaray's ambition is to 
create awareness about this dependency, thus bringing the mother-daughter relation 
into the realm of the symbolic. By tracing a maternal genealogy, Irigaray has sought 
to question the place of sacrifice as enacted in the Oedipus complex and sewn into the 
fabric of society thereby challenging the genealogy of patriarchal male self-sameness. 
Irigaray and Cixous suggest that the symbolic order (language, philosophy and 
culture) is only for men (masculinity) and consequently women are not only 
oppressed within it, the feminine is repressed from it (Gatens 1991: 113). "If the 
condition of patriarchal society is the repression of the feminine, then that which 
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writes/speaks of the feminine imaginary amounts to the return of the repressed" (ibid). 
It stimulates patriarchal consciousness as to that which has been sacrificed in the 
construction and sustenance of the social order. 
Irigaray argues that the paternal genealogy as expressed by Lacan is founded 
on the trinity of metaphor, substitution and sacrifice (Whitford 1991) - the Oedipal 
metaphor requiring the substi!ution of the mother in favour of the father and the 
subsequent act of matricide. The culture, the language and the imaginary of patriarchy 
is underpinned by the sacrifice of woman reproduces of the social order: 
All of western culture rests upon the murder of the mother. .. And if we make the 
foundation of the social order shift, then everything shifts (Whitford 1991 :81). 
Similarly Irigaray's vision for an alternative feminine economy revolves around three 
critical concepts. The first is metonymy, or the idea that a word or expression can act 
as a substitute for something with which it is closely associated or which it describes. 
Irigaray uses the notion of "two lips" to elaborate a novel metonymic mode of being 
(the feminine self relationally defined vis-a.-vis other women). She elaborates her 
thoughts on a metonymic association in her controversial book This Sex (1985 :24) 
The one of form, of the individual, of the (male) sex organ, of the proper name, of the 
proper meaning ... supplants while separating and dividing, the contact of at least two 
(lips) which keeps women in touch with herself, but without any possibility of 
distinguishing what is touching from what is being touched. 
The 'two lips' are a metonym for two types of relationships between women: the 
vertical pair (the mouth) speaks of the maternal genealogy and the horizontal pair (the 
labia), which represents the relation of sisterhood. The latter represents women's love 
of self and other women, whilst the former offers a different (maternal) economy that 
contributes to a new form of the symbolic. She proposes a relationship between 
women as subjects based upon a metonymic association - the two lips, like the 
mother and daughter are separate, yet interconnected and continually touching: 
As for woman, she touches herself in and of herself without any need for 
mediation ... Woman touches herself all the time and moreover no one can forbid her 
to do so, for her genitals are formed of two lips in continuous contact (Irigaray 
1985:24). 
It marks an inclusion of that which was excluded from the social contract and 
repressed from the symbolic order. This presents a psychoanalytic conceptualisation 
of a mother-daughter relation in the absence of the rivalry implicit in the Lacanian 
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model. In such a model there is a place for the mother but in the absence of a maternal 
genealogy there is a failure to distinguish between the mother and the woman so 
women are forced to fight over this place and girls come to be rivals with their 
mothers (Whitford 1991). By opening up the pre-Symbolic space to let the various 
voices of femme speak, woman and mother no longer need to compete for the unique 
place, trad~tionally occupied by the mother. This provides the possibility for women 
to differentiate themselves from the mother so that women in the Symbolic order are 
not reduced to the maternal function (ibid:89). 
This raises the second concern of contiguity or association from which an 
alternative account of social formation is gathered. Irigaray's description of lips 
depicts that which is in continuous contact, perpetually touching, combining, uniting. 
The lips are in an unending embrace. She argues that the Oedipal metaphor (with the 
phallus as the symbol of autonomy) severs the maternal "leaving only one parental 
figure , the father, and only one genealogy, the paternal one" (Whitford 1991:181). 
Women have been rendered silent, so they must enter into the realm of discourse -
made intangible by speaking/writing the mother-daughter relation. The genealogy of 
the maternal must be put into words, it must be signified. The critical point is that 
Irigaray does not seek to displace the patriarchal economy nor simply reverse the 
existing symbolic order for this, she argues, will eventually return to an economy of 
sameness. Rather she seeks to incorporate the metaphorical (the paternal economy) 
and the metonymical (the maternal economy) to foster a relation between the two 
(ibid: 181). To do so is to bring women into the symbolic order, not as objects of men 
but by tracing an authentic feminine trajectory. 
The third tenet is that fertility counteracts the place of sacrifice in the 
underlying social order. For Irigaray, "patriarchy is built on sacrifice, of which the 
primordial sacrifice is fertility" (in Whitford 1991:182). Fraternity is founded in the 
sacrifice of fertility, of the feminine. The intention is not to replace sacrifice with 
fertility but rather to present fertility as a counter-term to enlarge our understanding of 
the way in which a sociality is created and sustained. What Irigaray seeks to do then is 
present the possibility of symbolic change - not by replacing one metaphorical order 
with another, female sorority replacing a male fraternity (ibid: 183) but rather 
"solidarity or association has to be on a different basis: a metonymical form of 
association based on contiguity and the relation between women as subjects, that is 
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women who love themselves and each other" (ibid: 183; emphasis added). Love, the 
amorous exchange between women, then is a potential force of change. 
4.9. Conclusion 
According to Gatens (1991: 120) there is a complicity between Western 
patriarchal discourse and the phallocentric construction of the male body. This chapter 
has attempted to scrutinise the nature of this complicity, and by applying a 
complexity-based interpretative model that can accommodate the violence-identity 
nexus at all levels, articulate the relation between the phallocentricity of the (male) 
subject and the phallocentric construction of the patriarchal culture in comprehensive 
self-similar terms. My intention is not to sacrificially exclude a paternal genealogy but 
rather to read the interface of a metaphorical (the paternal economy) and the 
metonymical (the maternal economy) in terms of idergy as a touchstone of a post-
Newtonian communality. Neither do I wish to displace sacrificial violence, thereby 
sacrificially excluding sacrificial violence itself. For translated in complexity terms 
we can say that the modus of abjection and the surrogate-victim mechanism function 
to employ sacrifice in order transform chaos and randomness into order, ensured by 
religious rites and rituals that buttress the self and collective identities against the 
dedifferentiating forces of disorder. My intention is however to expose the creative 
and destructive duality of catalysts such as the scapegoat, the abject and even the 
melancholic, which operate at the edge of chaos. Yes, melancholia (as a modus of 
murder) serves a regenerative function at the level of the subject; in obeying the logic 
of the pharmakon it is at once a blessing and a curse. As Tsu-Chung Su surmises 
"melancholia is a blessed curse and a source of insight and creativity" (2005: 186). 
In suggesting non-violent mediating forces, I hope to enlarge our 
understanding of the generative experience by means of comprehensive or unified 
theory that illuminates the patterns of subjectivity formation as they are reflected in, 
and indeed define macro level social forms. As outlined in this chapter, much has 
been written about the possibility of a non-violent relation with the (m)Other, which, 
when applied, makes a valuable contribution to the micro-dimension of my quest for a 
post-sacrificial means of identity formation . The 'discourse of love 'provides us with 
an exquisitely provocative, albeit highly poetic and abstracted proposition. Indeed 
Irigaray admits that she is "deliberately ambiguous, paradoxical, poetic and 
metaphorical" (in Gatens 1991: 117). I do not wish to use the work of Kristeva and 
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Irigaray in a feminist context but rather, in the following chapter, integrate it into a 
more fundamental epistemological critique in seeking to disengage from the violence 
of inventing and reinventing the identities of subject and society sacrificially. In order 
to do so, it is necessary to translate the logic of conceptual markers such as 
melancholia, contiguity and fertility into something more concrete. For example, a 
shift to complexity provides a plausible scientific explanation as to the logic of 
contiguity, for this metonymic association is defined relationally in much the same 
way that the identities of complex systems as holons are understood. This translation 
therefore requires complexity and the need to cast Kristeva and Irigaray's critique of 
patriarchal sacrificial logic in this holistic mould of society. From here I can 
investigate the extent to which the holistic assumptions of the complexity paradigm 
make an important contribution in articulating non-violent identity formation . The 
greatest obstacle in the road to a post-sacrificial communality is fear. Not the fear of 
the femme, but the fear that the femme (as an omnipotent symbol of Other-ness) may 
be freed. Irigaray writes "What is feared is what has been repressed, there is a kind of 
cataclysmic end-of-the-world phantasy of total disintegration, dissolution and loss of 
self' (1991:97). To face this fear is an ontological imperative, and inspired by the 
fractal of love and forgiveness, individuals and communities may take tentative steps 
in their path to a non-violent selfhood. 
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Chapter 5 
The Complexity of Forgiveness 
To close our eyes and pretend none of this ever happened would be to maintain at the 
core of our society a source of pain, division, hatred and violence. Only the disclosure 
of the truth and the search for justice can create the moral climate in which 
reconciliation and peace wilI flourish . 
- Chilean President Alywin, upon assuming office in 1990 
True forgiveness deals with the past, alI of the past, to make the future possible. We 
cannot go on nursing grudges even vicariously for those who cannot speak for 
themselves any longer. We have to accept that what we do, we do for those generations 
past, present and yet to come. This is what makes a community. 
- No Future without Forgiveness, Desmond Tutu 
5.1. Introduction 
Given the omnipresence of violence in human culture that creates and sustains 
a deeply dehumanised social order, the aim of this chapter is to chart the contours of 
the macro or collective dimension of a comprehensive or unified theory of non-
sacrificial identity formation, that will allow us to think of ways to repair the torn 
moral fabric of society in ways that include but may also go beyond the assumption of 
sacrificial violence as default state. Fundamental to this move is an appreciation of the 
structural self-similarity of sacrificial violence in the construction of individual and 
societal identities. In search of a paradigm shift away from the traditional 
metaphysical ontology that is steeped in violence, in the previous chapter I turned to 
French psychoanalytical feminists such as Kristeva and Irigaray who, in their 
discourse of love, offer the basis of post-sacrificial epistemology valid for subjectivity 
formation. At the collective or cultural level, too, there appears to be a tentative move 
toward an embrace of the possibility of a post-sacrificial identity formation - the 
nature and basis of which will be fully explored in this chapter. Earlier in this thesis I 
used the new emerging organistic paradigm to recast the systemic nature of sacrificial 
violence in self-similar terms. More specifically, I used the notion of self-similarity 
implicit in this ontology to account for the assumed "analogy" or "similarity" between 
micro and macro always postulated by theorists like Hobbes, Kant and Spinoza but 
never accounted for in a methodologically satisfactory way. In a similar manner, 
chapters four and five suggest that there are indications, at both the micro level of 
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subjectivity and the macro, social level of a systemic change toward post-sacrificial 
identity fonuation. In terms of this new organistic vocabulary this would suggest that 
there is a fractal of non-violence emerging systemically at all levels of social 
existence. By post-sacrificial I am suggesting identity formation that is structured not 
by the binary opposition between chaos and order, but by their generative interaction 
- an interaction I am here describing or articulating in tenus of complexity_theory. 
5_2. Making sense of our (violent?) origins 
In seeking to understand the origins of subjectivity in a second reading of 
Kristeva, I argued that the lived experience of each subject testifies to the ambiguous 
reconciliation of forces of destruction and regeneration within us. There is a 
phannakon dimension to the abject. Self-identity is not merely a function of the 
violent expulsion of forces , is not purely sacrificial. The origin of the subject cannot 
be conceived of in Euclidian terms as a single point, achieved by a single means, but 
rather as constituted in the dynamic and dialectical interplay between order and 
disorder. We literally are - we live - the originary paradox of destruction and 
creation. In contrast Girard reads the sacred in purely destructive terms: the sacred is 
the force of disorder that threatens the order of culture. This is the root construction of 
the violence binary, in which Girard narrows down the meaning of the sacred 
(violence) to its destructive dimension and in the process sacrifices or excludes the 
generative dimension of the sacred. However it is precisely this view of violence (as 
sacred in the sense of being a unified destructive/generative force) that my second 
reading of Kristeva relied on and which must be embraced if we are to start mapping a 
road to a non-violent communality. Using chaos/complexity to engage Girard's 
primordial understanding of the central place accorded to violence, it becomes 
possible to make sense of, what he would describe (negatively) as a "metaphysical" 
reading of violence; one that is both creative and destructive. It is a true appropriation 
of the generative-destructive ambivalence of the sacred. 
In Girard's myth of the origin we are offered an account of the means whereby 
the primal community experience post-sacrificial serenity that is mediated by the 
scapegoat. Overwhelmed by the collective calm, the horde attributes a divine status to 
the scapegoat whom they bel;eve is the supreme source of social restoration. Girard 
writes: 
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The agitation and fear that preceded the selection of the scapegoat and the violence 
against him are followed, after his death, by a new mood of harmony and peace. To 
what, or, rather, to whom will the change be attributed? Obviously, to the all-
powerful cause that dominates the entire community: the scapegoat himself. Thus the 
scapegoat is credited with the reconci liation and the peace, after being credited with 
the earlier disruption. The absorption of all causality by the victim is so complete that 
he becomes a dynamic symbol of supreme benevolence as well as supreme 
malevolence, of social order as well as disorder. .. (l987:91) 
It is an error to say that the unanimous act of sacrificial violence against the scapegoat 
led to the birth of the collective ' s sense of communality. Rather, one should separate 
from each other the act of murder and it's mythologising. The original murder is 
distinguished from other primordial acts of violence through the act of mythologising 
this scapegoat's death as special or extraordinary in some sense because it 
"metamorphesises maleficent behaviour into beneficent behaviour" (1977 :258). 
Through the unanimous ritual slaughter of the scapegoat the undifferentiated chaos of 
the primal community is transfigured into a new social order. Writes Girard, 
Real or symbolic, sacrifice is primarily a collective action of the entire community 
which purifies itself of its own disorder through the unanimous immolation of a 
victim, but this can only happen at the paroxysm of the ritual crisis (Girard 1996: 11). 
The scapegoat rituals then are intended to buttress the disintegrating social order 
against the transgressions that the scapegoat (seems to) present, as the very purpose of 
ritual is "reconciliation and reordering through sacrifice" (Girard 1996:14). But what 
is the nature of this paroxysm? How are we to understand the collective' s convulsion 
at a critical moment; this sudden violent rupture of rage and relief experienced by the 
primal horde? In Girard 's words the paradox of ritual is that it represents "the genesis 
and regeneration as well as the degeneration of the cultural order through paroxystic 
disorder" (1996: 14). In other words, the scapegoat is pharmakon, both destroyer and 
restorer, at once responsible for the near destruction of the community as well as the 
collective's return to a stable and serene existence. In other words the immolation of 
the scapegoat allows for the purification of society by uniting its members into a 
harmonious whole. Myth, that is, the mythologising of the act of murder reconciles 
the seemingly irreconcilable co-existence of destruction and creation as embodied by 
the sacrificial victim in his dual capacity as destroyer and saviour. At the critical 
moment - at the crescendo of the ritual crisis - the scapegoat killing can either purify 
or contaminate the community. The latter is thus literally poised on a knife' s edge 
140 
between life and death. This intricate and extraordinary interface of order and 
disorder, violence and serenity is, according to Girard, the origin of culture. 
In complexity terminology we may say that there is a fractal dimension (at the 
edge of chaos) to the nexus between violence and identity, reflected at the micro level 
in the form of abjection and, at the macro level, in generative scapegoating. 
Specifically, the pharmakon is !he algorithm or conceptual hook by which we may 
understand the self-similarity in two forms of sacrificial violence: the abject 
constitutive of subjectivity and the scapegoat sacrifice constitutive of communality. 
At the micro and macro edge of chaos we find the dynamic interplay of order and 
disorder. This interplay is the locus of the subject and society's generation and the 
place of their potential obliteration. The origin of subjectivity then emerges in the 
difference between life and death, between a destructive act of matricide and a 
generative act of meaning-making. In self-similar terms we derive an understanding 
of the origin of human culture in the space between murder and myth, which as a 
reflection of the interplay between order and disorder negates any real distinction 
between the forces of life and death. We may therefore situate the originary formation 
of the subject and society in systemic terms at the edge of chaos; where order and 
disorder, life and death are intrinsically unified in ways that we cannot fully 
comprehend or calculate. At both ontological levels the generative engine is creative 
and destructive. Where Girard collapses the order-disorder interplay into violence, I 
believe that the force of culture is the interface between order and disorder, as an 
embodiment of the ambivalence of the sacred. In other words, destruction and 
creation are enmeshed in culture and subjectivity because they are interwoven at the 
origin of each. The concept that unifies them as self-similar phenomena is abject and 
scapegoat as pharmakon, by nature of which it is thus impossible to pronounce 
destruction more fundamental than regeneration or violence more fundamental than 
non-violence. By the same token it also signals a warning, namely that we should not 
seek to simply substitute peace or non-violence as default state. The response to 
culture must be order and disorder, both creative and destructive. This seems to 
suggest that if violence is the destructive aspect and if sacrifice is a violent response 
to this violent dimension of the sacred, that, given the generative dimension of the 
sacred, we should also be able to identify other, non-violent or generative cultural 
responses to the sacred. To make sense of the complexity of the order-disorder; 
creation-destruction phenomenon we must not seek out a new mythology of violence 
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but rather begin to conceive of the emergence of the subject and society in terms that 
are not exclusively destructive or associated with violence. Confronted with the 
reality of the most extreme forms of violence that may culminate in total annihilation, 
in seeking out non-violent alternatives we have to tum to similarly extreme, even 
miraculous, gestures. This chapter proposes forgiveness as one such extraordinary 
generative ~ultural response to the chaos that marks the founding moment of societies. 
5.3. Thinking beyond violence 
Forgiveness is, according to Kristeva, a timeless form of action: 
Forgiveness is ahistorical. It breaks the concatenation between causes and effects, 
crimes and punishments; it stays the time of actions. A strange place that opens up in 
a timelessness that is not one of the primitive unconscious, desiring and murderous, 
but its counterpart - its sublimation ... a loving harmony that is aware of its violence 
but accommodates them, elsewhere (1987:200; emphasis added). 
Whilst understanding forgiveness as a counterpart or alternative to violence, the aim 
is not to aspire to a non-violent default state as this would create an equally unrealistic 
and unworkable binary that is similarly guilty of misrepresenting human nature as its 
violent counterpart. This thesis suggests that in order to speculate about what a future 
would be like in which violence is not the default state, it is necessary to read order 
and disorder not in terms of binary opposition but in terms of process or interplay. For 
in so doing the historically constituted ends of violence, namely the rejuvenation of a 
community, can be achieved by means that include and go beyond violence. A good 
place to start is to look at instances, brief illuminatory moments, in which cycles of 
vengeance and hate have been broken with a specific gift of non-violence. From the 
previous chapter we have Kristeva's postulate that an imaginary association of the 
child with a loving ' imaginary father' supports a 'gift of love ' from the mother to her 
child as a means to include non-violence at the origins of SUbjectivity. Kristeva's 
suggestion of forgiveness as a third, non-binary response is echoed in Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu 's extremely influential belief that forgiveness has a central political 
role in acting as a third way between vengeance and forgetting in the creation of 
community (in Govier 2002:78). Vengeance has excessively cruel repercussions that 
plunge societies back into violent abyss of historical cycles of violence and counter-
violence that sacrificial rituals try to transcend. Commentators such as Ernest Renan 
have argued that the obliteration of memory is necessary to generate a new social 
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order, "the nation-building demands that history be forgotten in order for the past to 
be remade in the image of the present" (in Christie 2002:! 15). There is of course 
something sacrificial and violent about such active forgetting: it exorcises memory 
and by doing so replicates the violence it tries to forget. Given this chapter's aim to 
transcend such sacrificial suppressions and obliterations, I reject this view as I believe 
that the obliteration of memory contributes to a further dehumanisation of victims. On 
the contrary, I shall argue that the development of collective memory that draws on 
perspectives of both victims and perpetrators, offers the possibility of restoring 
humanity. With this comes the possibility of inscribing the history of the community 
with a new narrative, one that does not speak solely of hatred, animosity and revenge, 
and one that severs this generation's sense of selfhood from the sins of the past. For 
Tutu non-violence is thus a moral imperative. He writes, "The world is on the brink of 
disaster if we don't forgive, accept forgiveness and reconcile" (in Govier 2002:84). 
To begin an inquest into the transformative power of forgiveness and 
reconciliation in our contemporary culture, we need a more localised point of 
departure. I shall take South Africa' s extraordinary embrace of non-violence as this 
point precisely because it allows an emphasis on the transformative power that may 
be harnessed at level one. As Kristeva notes, the act of forgiving is "first the work of 
men" (1987:200) and it is in the extraordinary magnanimousness, lack of animosity 
and generosity of spirit of ordinary men and women that we are exposed to the 
creative dimension of the sacred. 
5.4. The spirit of ubuntu 
Whilst in prison, Mandela7 began negotiating the transition of the country 
from the autocratic regime of Apartheid to her first 'free and fair' elections that 
marked the birth of a democratic order. Given her excessively violent and oppressive 
legacy, the world turned its attention to South Africa expecting an eruption of 
vengeance and a deluge of blood. The situation, in the 1980's in particular, was one in 
which the ANC and the NP had become, what can best be described in Girardian 
terms as "doubles" or "enemy brothers", engaged in a deadly mimetic rivalry. As a 
result of the intensity of interaction between rivals, the differences between them are 
1 While speaking specifically of Mandela it is important to remember that his vision and his efforts 
where very much supported by olher equally exemplary leaders of the freedom struggle, who also 
endured extreme persecution and imprisonment These include figures such as Walter and Albertina 
Sisulu, Albert Lithuli, Govan Mbeki and Beyers 'NauM. 
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gradually eroded as they replicate each others desires, moves and murders - they 
become "matching images of violence" (Girard 1977:79). This is a universal tendency 
as Roy (2001:266) illustrates with her observation of the same in the bloody rivalry 
between the Hindus and the Muslims in India, "the more the two sides try and call 
attention to their religious differences by slaughtering each other, the less there is to 
distinguish them from one another. They worship at the same altar". Once the 
violence encapsulated in such rivalry is released, like the blood that is spilt, it seeps 
and spreads contagiously throughout the social order (Girard 1977:28) and will not 
disappear, setting the scene for never-ending vengeance and retaliatory attacks. Tutu 
understood this and was thus justifiably terrified of the spiral toward a bloody 
denouement, "I am frightened, dreadfully frightened, that we may soon reach the 
point of no return, when events will generate a momentum of their own ... " (in Bell 
2002:84). 
Mandela was determined that the liberators would not become the oppressors 
of those who had previously oppressed them. He therefore expressed a will to see 
South Africa transcend repetitive cycles of bloodletting and "escape the cycle of 
history in which the oppressed seek revenge against their oppressors, becoming 
themselves oppressors in tum" (in Govier 2002:71). In radical denial of expectation, 
'the people' of South Africa took to the polls in relative peace and through this 
collective gesture diverted the course of violence and what seemed to be a promise of 
civil war. This gesture has been widely explained with reference to the concept of 
ubuntu, an ancient philosophy which seeks "unity and reconciliation rather than 
revenge and punishment" (Bell 2002:89). The essence of ubuntu is captured in the 
Xhosa phrase" Umuntu ngumuntu ngabanye bantu" that is best translated as 'a person 
is a person through other persons ' (in Coetzee and Le Roux 1998:43). The humanity 
of one person is therefore relationally defined by the humanity of all. In this context, 
individuals are acutely aware of social obligations and the well-being of others as this 
exerts profound impact on the well-being of self. Because our humanity is 
inextricably intertwined and we exist through relations to other people, m 
dehumanising others, one dehumanises one's self. Tutu elaborates, "When we oppress 
others, we end up oppressing ourselves. All of our humanity is dependent on 
recognising the humanity in others" (2004:49-50). The emphasis is therefore on the 
complex, interdependent relationships between people and is therefore inherently 
incompatible with western ethnocentric cultural systems that exalt individuality over 
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communality. In African societies that share in the spirit of ubuntu the notion of 
individual autonomy is obsolete because/since the individual is viewed as an integral 
palt of society, whose identity is defined by role or status within the group and is 
expressed in terms of an ontological hierarchy in which primogeniture is the principle 
of differentiation. Such a culture is based upon an appreciation for the suffering of 
others, the fragility of the human condition and the virtue of solidarity in the face of 
this. John Mbiti summarises, "Whatever happens to the individual happens to the 
whole group, and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual. The 
individual can only say: "I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am" (in 
Graybill 2002: 33; see also Praeg 2000:267). The fabric of African communities is 
therefore weaved by prioritising the collective over the self. 
I argued in chapter two and the first Interlude that Western social contract 
theory assumes that the individual is conceptually prior to the social as best 
encapsulated in Descartes famous dictum cognito ergo sum: 'I think therefore I am'. 
Here in contrast the social is conceptually prior to the individual, or "I am because 
you are" (Coetzee and Le Roux 2002:43). In short, traditional African communities 
do not reflect a belief that privileges the autonomous self. 
That said, the Africanist logic of ubuntu is not unfamiliar in contemporary 
Western thinking and is manifest in an emerging universal humanistic culture. 
Vandersluis and Yeros (2000), for example, argue that a universal humanist order is 
emerging that acknowledges the inextricably linked humanity of all human beings. 
Set against this moral frame we are provided with a common moral referent, namely 
that of "human worth" that is applicable to all humans, or a particular "universalist 
ontology of the human" (ibid:6) that transcends categories of race, class, gender, 
nationality and so forth. On the basis of 'human worth' all humans are accorded the 
same moral status and thus there is a moral demand placed on each member "to 
respect the life, integrity, well-being and flourishing of others" (ibid: 10). Accorded 
the same rights and the same grounds for citizenship, all humans may ascend to a 
position within the human community (ibid:4). As further example, Rorty (1989) 
contends that social sol idarity is tied to moral obligation to others but that this sense 
of obligation is strongest in collectivities where the members are considered to be 
"one of us" and where "us" is constitutive of something "smaller and more local than 
the human race" (ibid: 191). He presses the need to extend the sense of 'we' to people 
who have previously been considered 'they': 
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thought of as the ability to see more and more traditional differences (of tribe, race, 
religion customs and the like) as unimportant when compared with similarities with 
respect to pain and humiliation - the ability to think of people who are wildly 
different from ourselves as included in the range of 'us' (ibid.). 
This resonates with Mandela's vision of the nation-building project that was informed 
by his express desire for the inclusion - the expansion of the South African sense of 
'we' - rather than the violent exclusion of minority groups. His acute appreciation of 
human worth as a basis for social solidarity saved the white population from what 
seemed an inevitably violent war against them. This is captured in the ANC's vision 
of an inclusive democracy, as first formally expressed in the Freedom Charter (1955) 
and now entrenched in the country's Constitution, which does not seek to generate a 
sense of national identity through the exclusion of any group and rather understands 
national unity as an accord between all South African citizens by expanding the South 
African sense of 'we' . 
As was elucidated in chapter one, the emergent human rights culture, of which 
Mandela's message undoubtedly forms a part, has severely problematised 
exclusionary logic by exposing the rights, plight and dignity of the scapegoat. 
Nanatives that exposed the humanity of victims undermined the founding sacrificial 
myths which constructed blacks as inherently sub-human and infinitely exploitable, 
even sacrificeable. Graybill (2002) argues that oppressors create narratives that 
validate subjugation of an individual or group. These allegations, if successfully 
mythologised, become truth. What a Truth Commission such as the TRC offers is an 
opportunity to deconstruct such myths, to problematise the veneer of 'truth' and thus 
ultimately overcome the 'nan-ative of the lie' (ibid:82). Increasingly cognisant of the 
central place accorded to sacrifice in the construction and sustenance of the old 
Republic of South Africa, as a nascent community, in pursuing the path of non-
violence, we have challenged it as the default state of our culture. In this process there 
has been a great deal (too great?) of utopian idealism of the future of South Africa as 
a non-violent community. In this move, there has been a reproduction of problematic 
modernist binaries as both options have effectively been derived and defined in tenns 
of violence. It seems counter-intuitive to assume that all the complexity of human 
culture (and indeed human nature) is captured in one or other of these poles, as 
different expressions of violence. Furthennore, in terms of binary logic if the 
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definition of violence as default is rendered unsatisfactory, it follows that we cannot 
make any real sense of non-violence as default state. 
5.5. Conditional and un-conditional forgiveness 
The question then is what kind of forgiveness can take us beyond the binaries 
that brought us the violence as default state and th~ concomitant impossibility of 
imagining a post-violence future? Two kinds of forgiveness are problematic and 
unsurprisingly, they exist as a binary: conditional and un-conditional forgiveness. 
Conditional forgiveness is best described as a process or calculus of exchange: 'if you 
the perpetrator confess, then you will be forgiven'. Thus the victim (individual, family 
or community) bestows forgiveness on condition that the perpetrator has confessed to 
a crime. Conditional forgiveness logically follows two options. Either, the perpetrator 
confesses and the victim grants forgiveness or the perpetrator refuses to confess and 
forgiveness is denied (Praeg 2000:270). In both instances the harmed individual must 
make the choice to forgive or not. This form of forgiveness is thus premised on a 
rugged individualism that forecloses the possibility of any real engagement between 
forgiver and forgiven that could stimulate a bona fide reconciliation between 
erstwhile enemies. 
Whilst dimensions of conditionalities are found in TRC discourse, the very 
logic of conditionality is problematised by the Africanist identity dictum that strongly 
influenced the way in which forgiveness was conceived in these hearings. As a 
member of a humanist community there is a need to act and think in ways that will 
ensure the harmony of society as a whole. As Tutu states, "Ubuntu says I am human 
only because you are human. You must do what you can to maintain this great 
harmony, which is perpetually undermined by resentment, anger, desire for revenge" 
(in Graybill 2002:33; emphasis added). The individual's sense of duty to the 
collective subsumes his or her right not to forgive. To harbour feelings of vengeance 
and animosity toward others is to threaten the very essence of what it means to be 
human. Members of the community are thus imbued with an ontological obligation, 
which is made even clearer in the following statement, "You can only be human in a 
human society, if you live with hate and revenge, you dehumanise not only yourself 
but your community. You must forgive to make your community whole" (in Christie 
2002: 143). As members of a humanist moral community in which it is only through 
their interaction with other members of the community and the society as a whole that 
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individuals garner their humanness , victims are obliged to forgive. Their humanity 
depends upon it as is illustrated if the African conception of identity is read in terms 
of human dignity, as the ''fulfilment of one's obligation to the group" thus linking 'the 
inner (moral) nature and worth of the human person and his or her proper relations 
within society" (in An Na-Im & Deng 1990:3; emphasis added). To this end, 
forgiveness and reconciliation se:m to be a precondition of ubuntu and by extension, 
an expression of the individual's self-worth. Therefore victims may experience a 
sense of guilt and inner impoverishment if they fail to embrace the perpetrators as this 
equates a rejection of traditional African values. In the cultural context of ubuntu, in 
which an individual (I) has an obligation to the other (we), the option ' that I do not 
forgive' seems a logical impossibility as the individual cannot risk not forgiving the 
perpetrators for fear that this may jeopardise one's personhood. As Praeg explains 
with a hypothetical scenario of a woman who seems obliged to forgive, "She will 
have to forgive them 'unconditionally' and embrace them regardless of whether or not 
they confess . .. She is because they all are" (ibid:270). Framed by an Africanist 
world view then conditional forgiveness is rendered impossible as it is premised on a 
different, individualist logic. 
This leads to the second form of forgiveness that is unconditionally granted. 
Mandela's extraordinary message was rooted in a belief that perpetrators were worthy 
of forgiveness as they were also, albeit in a very different sense, victims of the 
Apartheid system: 
The message of forgiveness was extended to all South African whites... This 
forgiveness was unilateral and unconditional grounded in Mandela's sensitivity to 
the volatility of hi s circumstances and respect for human beings as such (Govier 
2002:71). 
According to Derrida (2001), conditionality or the if-then configuration is deeply 
problematic precisely because it represents a form of economic exchange (ibid:34) 
that places an enormous debt on the perpetrator thus undermining the graciousness of 
the gift (Verdeja 2004:27). He believes forgiveness in its truest sense must be 
"unconditional, gracious, infinite" (Derrida 2001:34) and therefore free of any 
element of exchange. In rejecting conditionality, unilateral forgiveness is offered in 
the absence of remorse or apology on behalf of the perpetrators. Consequently, the 
relationship between forgiver and forgiven is asymmetrical and entails a 
unidirectional flow from forgiver to forgiven - the former assuming the moral high 
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ground, as magnanimous and gracious. Mandela's granting of 'unconditional' 
forgiveness, for example, established a 'moral supremacy' (Govier 2002) that led to a 
status differentiation between white and black, oppressor and oppressed. The ANC 
had the option of re-enacting the violent oppression of the NP regime, but in choosing 
not to , in choosing rather to forgive, they occupied the moral high ground. 
Suc~ a form of forgiveness makes no demands on the guilty party, who indeed 
may not view themselves in this light and therefore feel impotent, bitter and attacked. 
The act of forgiving certainly implies that a wrong was committed and many white 
South Africans were offended by the implication that they had done something 
wrong. This culminates in anger, frustration and hatred in response to 'wrongful 
accusations' and his or her branding as 'criminal' or 'immoral', even though they do 
not acknowledge they have acted wrongly and will therefore not accept forgiveness. 
In the absence of any ontological transformation, indebtedness to the forgiver may 
aggravate cycles of violence, in giving the oppressors (self-perceived) grounds for 
vengeance. Verdeja consequently warns that such a form of "forgiveness does not 
place any conditions on the recipient [and] a debt of resentment may develop" 
(2004:30) and such sentiments may well lead us once again the road of revenge. If we 
seek to remedy this by involving an admission of guilt that could minimise resentment 
and help to develop concern for the other, this creates a form of conditionality on 
unconditional forgiveness. This is one flaw in the unconditional model of forgiveness. 
Praeg elaborates a second flaw in writing, "If we cannot conceive of 
conditional forgiveness ... then we cannot in any meaningful sense of the word 
conceive of unconditional forgiveness. The latter, is after all, un-conditional" 
(2000:272). Conditional and un-conditional forms of forgiveness constitute a pair of 
binary oppositions, and as such they are conceptually bound - one is framed in terms 
of the other. As a binary opposite it is thus logical to assume that unconditional 
forgiveness would be underpinned by the same "individualist presuppositions 
characteristic of conditional forgiveness" (ibid:272). The individualist terms of 
conditional forgiveness become problematic in the context of an Africanist worldview 
in which an individual is relationally defined. The conditional form threatens to haml 
the other, for if forgiveness is not granted the other (perpetrator) is denied their 
humanity. Similarly, the unconditional form of forgiveness does not seem to display 
any real concern for the other (ibid:272). In forgiving unconditionally, the other is 
effectively excluded from the process of forgiveness and reconciliation. Whether or 
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not the other is repentant or resentful, humbled or hostile is beside the point and this 
forecloses the possibility of dialogue and the prospect that erstwhile enemies may 
come to a mutual understanding, which as I shall argue, serves as an important 
galvanising factor in the creation of a new moral community. This model, which 
centres on the self and is indifferent toward the other, is therefore also theoretically 
untenable in the formation of a post-colonial African community. 
The above forms of forgiveness are incapable of doing the post-sacrificial 
work that this chapter seeks, as they do not contain a sacred generative dimension. In 
fact, they present the danger of doing the reverse and aggravating cycles of vengeance 
- either by denying agency (unconditional forgiveness) or by calculating such agency 
as less impOltant than the national project of reconciliation. There are two further 
options to which I turn for hope that they may point the way to a post-sacrificial 
community: The African ethical imperative to forgive (Praeg 2000) and aporetic 
forgiveness (Derrida 200 I). 
5.6. The ethics of forgiveness 
At both the micro and macro level, discussions are arising around the ethical 
possibility of non-violent relations with others. Indeed it seems that an awareness of 
the imperative of an. ethic of nan.-violence is emerging systemically that is "concerned 
with humane, non-violative relationships between human beings" (Malan & Cilliers 
2004: 17). Such an ethical shift at both ontological levels radically transforms what is 
considered morally good and bad and how associated notions of duty, responsibility 
and obligation are understood. At the micro level, Kristeva has suggested an ethic of 
love between self and other that plays a vital function in the constitution of 
subjectivity. She suggests that we must learn to embrace the repressed within 
ourselves; the repressed being abject forces which recall the mother whose expulsion 
has been constructed as necessary for subjectivity (Kisteva 1982). In re-reading the 
relationship between self and (m)other Kristeva contends we may (must) learn to live 
with - and even love - others (ibid: 1987b). This idea of an intimate interdependence 
is embodied in the metonymic association of contiguity as suggested by lrigaray. In a 
similar vein, Gilligan (1983) postulated an the ethic of care, by placing an emphasis 
on the interdependence rather than individual atomism of human beings, which gives 
rise to associated notions of responsibility and moral obligation in the treatment of 
others. She does so by challenging the logic of justice, which emphasises the 
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autonomy of a person by focussing on care in relationships. Whereas "justice gives 
rise to an ethic of rights [ ... J care engenders an ethic of responsibility (in Malan & 
Cilliers 2004:5). The logic of justice is rooted in a Newtonian conception of 
autonomy, that as I've argued, led to a specific, violent relation with the Other that 
Gilligan attempts to undermine by opening a space for an ethics toward a 'non-
violative relationship with the Other'(in Malan & Cilliers 2004:2). The 
acknowledgement of holistic assumptions such as interdependence, interconnectivity 
and contiguity resonates in complexity discourse and 1 shall return to this in the latter 
part of this chapter, as it will allow us to make comprehensive sense of the emerging 
ethic of non-violence. For now, it allows us to emphasise the ethic of responsibility 
between 'I' and 'we'. 
The philosophy of ubuntu has a profound bearing on the way African 
communities conceive of forgiveness. In a cultural context where 'I am because you 
are' and an atrocity is committed, I need to confess to you and you need to forgive me 
because both our humanity depend upon it. This is the crux of the African ethical 
imperative to forgive and is based on precisely such a form of reciprocity between 
victim and victimiser as the processes of forgiveness makes moral demands on both 
parties - the T and the 'We', the individual and the collective. This allows common 
ground to be established between erstwhile enemies who share in the responsibility as 
they share in one another's humanness. Praeg (2000:268) writes that the ethical 
imperative "is neither conditional nor unconditional but rather a function of the 
communality captured in the dictum 'I am because we are"'. Not only is it essential to 
take responsibility for one's own actions but also to facilitate others in their attempts 
to make amends when they have erred. Each party must be gracious enough to accept 
the confession of their foe and also have the courage to confess if they have 
transgressed. 1 propose that in terms of African humanism, such an ethic of 
forgiveness provides a creative force of cultural renewal. 
This principle of reciprocity as embodied in the act of forgiveness is translated 
into political terms by the process of reconciliation. Therefore the transformative 
power of forgiveness in interpersonal relations and the reformative power of 
reconciliation at the level of the community require both confession and forgiveness 
as a precondition of selfhood if it is to provide a form of long term social catharsis. In 
summary, two important points underpin such an Africanist view. Firstly, it seeks out 
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a 'non-violative' relation between members of a communality - between self and 
other, I and we. And a second related point is that social solidarity is a result of the 
ethical imperative to confess and forgive - because our humanity depends upon it. 
Praeg (2000:275) writes, "There seems to be as much of an ethical imperative to 
forgive as there is an imperative to confess". It is the imperative of confession and 
forgi veness between 'I' and 'we ' that regenerates the social bond in dynamic non-
linear ways, which problematises the linear logic that prioritises the collective over 
the individual (as in the conditional form of forgiveness) or the individual over the 
collective (as with the un-conditional form) (ibid.). This idea of ethical reciprocity 
creates a form of forgiveness that is based upon recognition of not only the flaws of 
others but also of our own. In this cultural context, the will to reconcile exists as an 
imperative of our shared humanness; and, in the space between '1' and 'we' 
awareness emerges of the complexity of human relations (and the associated ethic of 
responsibility) that define us as members of a moral community. But how are we to 
conceive of this ethic of forgiveness in Western communities in which the Africanist 
identity dictum is not tenable? In developing a comprehensive understanding of the 
generative potential of forgiveness that is not context bound, it is necessary to 
generalise the logic of the ethic here described. I believe the possibility of so doing is 
presented in Derrida's aporetic form of forgiveness. 
5.7 Aporetic forgiveness 
In dealing with heinous crimes - or forms of horror as atrocious as those 
committed by the Apartheid regime or butchers as brutal as witnessed in the 
Rwandan, the Sudanese or the Nazi genocide, for example - it is not clear that these 
violations are forgivable. Such radical crimes against humanity, crimes that stand, 
quite literally, as the embodiment of evil , cannot (or should not?) be forgiven. In other 
words, in a community that has been so viciously stripped of its humanity, can the 
demands of our shared humanness suffice as an imperative for you to confess and for 
me to forgive? Indeed it seems to me that it is in such moments, so entirely devoid of 
ethics, that the imperative to forgive and confess is most vital. It is with respect to 
crimes that are so intrinsically unforgivable, that the imperative to forgive places its 
greatest demand between 'I' and 'we' . When faced \; ith crimes of this gravity, we are 
effectively required to experience an ethical relation that is impossible to experience, 
or as I shall argue, surrender to an absolute interdependence with the other. To do so 
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IS to expenence what Derrida terms an "aporia". In an exquisite response to 
lankelevitch's work 'L'Imprescriptible' in which he argues that there is no possibility 
of forgiving crimes against humanity, Derrida writes 
'Forgiveness died in the death camps' he [Jankelevitch] says. Yes. Unless it only 
becomes possible from the moment that it appears impossible. Its history would 
begin, on the contrary with the unforgi vable (2001:37). 
The distinction must then be made between criminal acts and radically evil 
transgressions, the likes of which filled Nazi death camps, churches in Kigali and NP 
detention centres. The former is punishable by law and relatively easy to forgive; the 
latter on the contrary is a horror so vile, unspeakable, and even unthinkable that it 
causes us to disbelieve humanism. It is a transgression that as Hannah Arendt 
summarises, goes beyond the 'realm of human affairs' (1989:241). Derrida's claim is 
that forgiveness begins in the face of such a radically evil crime against humanity that 
"remains on the horizon of the entire geopolitics of forgiveness" (2001:30). 
Accordingly, an act of true forgiveness can only occur in a realm that is beyond 
human comprehension; in a quasi-transcendental realm that is distant from human 
affairs; in the realm, that is, of the sacred. If the aporia-as-sacred mingles with 
community it loses its transcendental character and the result is the blurring of the 
distinction between pure and pseudo-forgiveness. 
Derrida' s extraordinary aporia of forgiveness consists in an understanding so 
fundamental that it can grasp its own impossibility: "forgiveness forgives only the 
unforgivable" (Derrida 2001 :32). In other words, the only act that can be forgiven - in 
any real sense of the faculty - is an act that is unforgivable. That is to say a true act of 
forgiveness must retain its "ontological connection to radical evil" (Verdeja 2004:25). 
With his aporia, Derrida is insisting that there is no crime or form of violence that is 
so extreme, so intrinsically impossible to forgive, that it cannot be matched by an 
equivalent from of forgiveness. In effect, there is no form of horror so great that it 
suspends an ethical obligation to another person. Such an absolute fo rgiveness occurs 
between self and other in the absence of a third party intervention (Derrida 2001:42) 
that would amount to amnesty, reparation, reconciliation or an end other than genuine 
forgiveness (ibid:Sl). Given the gravity of a radically evil crime, forgiveness that 
entails a non-violent embrace, rather than a retaliatory sacrifice, of the other is then an 
exceptional act in and of itself, as Derrida write: 
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Each time forgiveness is at the service of finality, be it noble and spiritual (atonement 
or redemption, reconci liation, salvation), each time that it aims to re-establish a 
normality (social, national, political, psychological) by a work of mourning, by some 
therapy or ecology of memory, then forgiveness is not pure - nor is its concept. 
Forgiveness is not, should not be, normal, normative, normalising. It should remain 
exceptional and extraordinary, in the face of the impossible: as if interrupted the 
course of historical temporality (ibid:32). 
Derrida is very clear that forgiveness must not become instrumentalised as a political 
or social tool but must remain limitless and extraordinary and "outside the world of 
mundane pardons and reconciliation" (Verdeja 2004:25). As such forgiveness must 
preclude any form of apology in order to retain its connection to ontological evil that 
is a necessity if it to keep its aporetic nature and thus its ability to transform and to 
heal. 
An aporia is counterintuitive, but necessarily so and we therefore cannot 
resolve it but what we can do is reconsider it. In this thesis I have already reassessed 
the Girardian modernist binary between order and disorder, violence and non-violence 
and have suggested that the sacred is structured not by the binary opposition between 
chaos and order, but in post-Newtonian terms by their generative interaction. We may 
thus say that forgiveness in its purest form is non-teleological, as Derrida supports, 
" In principle, there is no limit to forgiveness, no measure, no moderation, no ' to what 
point?'" (2001:27). It is not a linear progression to an end point (be it social unity, the 
end of violence, economic reparation and so forth) but rather an open and unending 
aporetic process. It is a dynamic interplay between violence (that is radically evil) and 
forgiveness (that is intrinsically impossible) as a manifestation of the sacred. I 
consequently believe that the aporetic power of forgiveness lies in a unity of 
generation and destruction. It is where an unthinkably destructive form of violence 
meets with the unthinkable thought that it may be forgiven . The two forces contradict 
and define one another - not as a binary that opposes, but as an interplay that 
enhances. It is not possible fully to represent exactly how this is possible as the aporia 
of forgiveness is a manifestation of the sacred and thus like the horror it seeks to 
transcend, it lies beyond human comprehension. But it is precisely because such 
"forgiveness is beyond understanding that it has the power to heal" (Praeg 2000:271). 
The apori:1 of forgiveness is considered to be a magical or miraculous healer in the 
sense that it required to be qua generative cultural response to the sacred. 
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In possessing both the power to heal and destroy, the aporia embodies the 
logic of the pharmakon. In the purest form of the faculty, forgiveness possesses the 
divine ability to transform chaos and conflict into order and peace. Girard claims that 
all primitive divinities have a double nature as they display both beneficent and 
maleficent behaviour (Girard 1977) and are thus perceived as supernatural beings, 
capable of absorbing both 'good' ~d 'bad' violence. Mandela is mythologised as one 
such contemporary "deity". Kader Asmal writes 
For many he has become a disembodied myth - a repository of hopes and fears. For 
millions he was the symbol of liberation from oppression, for a few he epitomised 
terror and destruction (2003:95). 
Although Mandela was not a surrogate victim, he effectively did the work that we 
thought only the sacrificial scapegoat could do in guiding the transition to a new 
political form. Historically, the transformation to a new social order has been 
mediated by "a supernatural being who sows violence to reap peace" (Girard 
1977:86). However Madiba offered a 'gratuitous gift of non-violence' and confronted 
the ontological connection to its radically violent past. He shunned violence to reap 
peace. To this end, the nature of Mandela's forgiveness is perplexing. As I argued 
before it is unconditional, but it appears here that it also contains a sacred generative 
dimension. Is it then aporetic? It is widely believed that South Africa' s transition is 
miraculous and that Mandela is a "saint", whose beneficent embrace of forgiveness 
allowed us to take the path to a new, democratic society instead of the (anticipated) 
path to civil war. Clearly resonating here is Derrida's quasi-miraculous definition of 
forgiveness as in forgiving radical evil, or 'forgiving the unforgivable'. Despite the 
extremity of the horror of Apartheid, it did not cause Mandela to suspend his belief in 
the humanness and interrelatedness of the people of South Africa. He fostered an 
ethical obligation to the oppressors in the face of radically evil crimes that they 
committed. I therefore believe that his forgiveness was not (only) unconditional 
forgiveness but (also partly) aporetic insofar as Mandela embraced a forgiveness so 
profound that it transcended the relation 'between 'I' and 'we' to ascend to the status 
of the sacred. 
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5.8. To harm and to heal 
In complexity terms, the aporia of forgiveness can be conceived as an attractor 
state that exists at the edge of chaos to which creative and destructive forces, at once 
complementary and contradictory, are drawn. The boundaries between attractors are 
not clear and there is often considerable complex overlap between them. Therefore I 
believe that ~here are other non-violent mediating forces that occupy the "same time-
space dimensions" (Milovanovic 1997:31) as forgiveness . Here, I propose dialogue 
and mourning as two further post-sacrificial galvanising forces that must be discussed 
to gain a holistic understanding of the community's generative experience. 
Debating, speaking, writing, and weeping are all forms of expression or outlets 
employed to channel a wide range of emotions including anger, aggression, pain, 
despair, depression, love, euphoria and compassion. According to Kristeva (1989) the 
violent birth of subjectivity demands the abjection of the mother that creates a 
profound melancholic depression in the subject who experiences an "impossible 
mourning" for the lost "maternal object". Such sentiments of sadness, grief and 
despair are born from the agonizing double-bind paradox that the subject feels the 
need to mourn the loss of the mother, yet such mourning is impossible as this 
maternal sacrifice is a biological and psychic necessity of the subject's birth (Tsu-
Chung Su 2005: 169) and subjectivity as such. Kristeva suggests that the cure for 
melancholia is the act of writing - to substitute the maternal melancholy for 
melancholy language, '''I have lost an essential object that happens to be, in the final 
analysis, my mother' is what the speaking subject seems to be saying. 'But no, I have 
found her again is signs, or rather since I consent to lose her I have not lost her. I can 
recover her in language'" (1989:43). Therefore Kristeva presents writing as a 
therapeutic way of curbing mourning. It gives meaning to the loss of the maternal 
object and it constitutes part of a creative healing process, as Kristeva explained in an 
interview 
Depression is at the threshold of creativity. When depression becomes creative, 
however it has been given a name and has therefore been overcome [ ... J. Depression 
becomes a secret force, perhaps even a modem form of sacredness (in Tsu-Chung Su 
2005: 182; emphasis added). 
Depression then is a melancholic response to the destructive aspect of the sacred. 
However we understand that destructive and creative forces are enmeshed in the lived 
experience of subjectivity because they are interwoven at the origin of each. In other 
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words, the response to subjectivity regeneration must be both creative and destructive. 
If abjection is the destructive dimension then there must be other catalysts that 
account for the creative aspect. Mourning is one such response. We have read the 
violence of abjection in terms of order-disorder interplay and thus we must interpret 
ritual mourning in such a frame. It serves a vital generative function in channelling 
melancholia and becomes "a blessed curse and source of creativity and insight" (Tsu-
Chung Su 2005: 186). As such, it is essential for human existence, as a constant source 
of inspiration and a perpetual promise of self-destruction. 
Given the organistic framework employed here, one in which the processes of 
individual and social identity formation display a self-similarity, the description of 
mourning and melancholia at an individual level provides a vocabulary that may help 
us understand the role of these emotions in the construction of a social or national 
identity. Durrant (2004: 10-11) observes such a connection and writes, "melancholic 
rituals may accrue a wider political significance and thus need to be re-interpreted as 
modes of collective mourning". This was precisely the task of the TRC - to facilitate 
the growth of a collective memory since remembering allows the opportunity to 
mourn and to mourn allows for the possibility of cultural re-birth. As Kader Asmal 
expresses, 
Without sustained remembrance and debate, it will be difficult to develop a new 
South African culture with its various strains intertwined in constructive friction, 
rather than in mere conflict and mutual strangulation. This talk of shared memory 
must not be misunderstood or mystified. It is not the creation of a post apartheid volk 
or a stifling homogenous nation; nor a new fatherland. Nor is it merely the equivalent 
of every individual's mental ability to retain facts and arguments at the front of her 
consciousness, such analogies are unhelpful. Rather shared memory, in the intended 
sense, is a process of historical accountability (in Rotberg and Thompson 2000:95; 
emphasis added). 
Dialogue and debate form another such creative process that provides for the 
possibility that the narratives of subjugation, oppression and sacrifice that were 
hidden in the previous cultural order may become public (Rotberg and Thompson 
2000:82), which in turn allows for the renunciation of such narratives, that nurtures 
the move toward an open and accountable society. The dialectic between individual 
and collective narratives facilitated the emergence of a 'dialogue truth' which 
Constitutional Court judge Albie Sachs summarised as follows: "Microscopic truth is 
factual and verifiable and can be documented and proved. Dialogue truth on the other 
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hand, is social truth, truth of expenence that is established through interaction, 
discussion and debate" (in ibid: 152). It was hoped that collective remembrance could 
create a bastion against the repetition of our horrendous past by channelling violent 
impulses through dialogue. Can we then begin to conceive of dialogue as another 
edge of chaos catalyst that compliments forgiveness? Alex Boraine's (in ibid.) 
suggestion that a humanist moral dialogical discourse as a basis for the new South 
Africa, whose national unity is forged not through retribution but rather 
reconciliation, would suggest so. The emphasis is clearly on reconciliation and 
rebuilding of broken relationships and it is a 'potent force to transformation and 
healing' (ibid: 157) in deeply wounded communities. 
This goes a long way in understanding Tutu 's urgmg of perpetrators 
(including political leaders) to apologize publicly (Graybill 2002:39) as this provides 
a platform from which to engage in public discussion. Successful reconciliatory acts, 
which rejuvenate a decayed moral order, require unanimity. Girard contends that the 
generative mechanism of violent culture is the 'unanimity-minus-one' principle - the 
entire community unified against the scapegoat. Such unanimous action requires 
visible public spectacle that can mobilise the masses. If we are to plausibly argue that 
forgiveness may do the political work traditionally done by violence, it too requires 
the force of unanimity. It must be able to galvanise or cohere the collective, pull them 
together "like a magnet" (Baillie 1995:121) in the same way that mimetically inspired 
violence does. It is therefore vital that victims voice their pain in a public arena and 
have their voices heard, for the purposes of individual and collective therapy. As 
Martha Minow elaborates, "to know one's tears are seen may grant a sense of 
acknowledgement that makes grief less lonely and terrifying" (Rotberg and 
Thompson 2000:83 ; emphasis added). One of the most powerful images to emerge 
from the TRC was Archbishop Tutu's emotional response to the testimony of 
Singqokwana Earnest Malgas (in ibid:247). Whilst a sobbing Malgas related his 
horrific tales of torture on Robben Island and the brutal police murder of his sons with 
acid, Tutu buried his head in his hands, and wept. For Martha Minow this moment 
"exemplified the complex and deep processes of acknowledging, bearing witness to, 
and mourning the atrocities committed under Apartheid. It also restored dignity to 
those whose very being had been so deeply violated" (ibid:247). The pubLc broadcast 
of the hearings on television and radio and in newspapers, allowed "the people" of 
South Africa to share in processes of dialogue that facilitate confession and 
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forgiveness. Such "a cathartic outpouring at a mass scale" (Christie 2002: 146) 
provided the opportunity to privately and publicly lament our legacy of hatred, 
violence and death, which ultimately allows us to construe the TRC process as an act 
of mourning by the South African community, in the regeneration of that very 
community. 
5.9. Ethics, complexity and community 
The essence of ubuntu as "delicate networks of interdependence" (Daye 
2004:161) succinctly captures complexity's focus on the interconnectivity and 
interdependence of entities within a complex system. Indeed, all complex systems 
"are defined not as atomistic and separate but as delineated through connection" 
(Malan and Cilliers 2004:5). By emphasising the interconnectivity of human beings in 
society as a complex system, it denotes a fundamental shift in thinking from the 
individual as atomised to interdependent. This highlights the complexity of the rich 
dynamic interaction and co-evolution between entities that occupy a shared 'fitness 
landscape' (Walby 2003). Within this ever-changing terrain, the identity of each 
system is no longer defined in abstracted terms of autonomy but relationally as a 
function of the interaction with others, and with this come a number of associated 
concepts such as respect, tolerance, responsibility and care (Malan & Cilliers 2004). 
The link between ubuntu and complexity is clear to see, as in both there is no such 
thing as the isolated self, however it is on this point that complexity departs from 
ubulltu. If the logic of ubuntu is taken to its furthest extreme we arrive at an 
understanding that, "Interdependence is necessary for persons to exercise, develop 
and fulfil their potential to be both individuals and a community. Gnly by means of 
absolute dependence on God and neighbour ... can true human identity be discovered" 
(in Daye 2004: 161 ; emphasis added). Complexity on the contrary argues it is 
necessary to occupy the middle ground between absolute dependence as purported by 
such a Christianised ubuntu view and the absolute independence of Western 
modernism. Conceiving the individual (qua complex system) as a hoi on provides a 
clear model from which we arrive at a post-Newtonian understanding of self-identity 
as a dynamic function of autonomy from, but also dependence upon others. A shift to 
complexity enlarges, perhaps even universalises, tht. logic of ubuntu by not merely 
casting the 'self as other' ('1' purely in terms of 'we') but rather by providing a model 
of self-identity that accommodates both dependence and independence. Only in 
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acknowledging the complexity generated from the interplay between. tenns (between 
'I' and 'we') can we begin to articulate a holistic reading of the processes and ethics 
involved in constructing a post-sacrificial community. 
By post-sacrificial I am suggesting that identity formation is structured by the 
generative interaction between chaos and order, dependence (dissipation) and 
autonomy (autopoesis) and not by binary opposition. The distinguishing f~ature of 
this chapter's catalysts toward a post -sacrificial communality is that they unify the 
destructive and creative aspects of the sacred and in so doing they generate a new 
form of community that is not necessarily forged in violence. In other words, by 
situating a number of creative catalysts in unity with the destructive aspect of the 
sacred at the edge of chaos, we begin to understand that a new cultural and moral 
community does not emerge (only) sacrificially by virtue of the exclusion of the Other 
but (also) as a function of the way complex dynamical or open systems self-organise-
as an interplay of creation and destruction; order and disorder; 'I' and 'we' . 
Gilligan proposed that such a moral transformation could be created and 
sustained through "a dialectical tension between justice and care" (in Malan & 
Cilliers 2004:8). She acknowledges that an ethic of care is not sufficient in and of 
itself and justice requires the force of law to uphold it - care cannot enforce justice 
and justice without care is stripped of morality (in ibid: 17). It is therefore the dynamic 
interplay between justice (as violence) and care (as non-violence) that create a broad 
ethic of responsibility at the edge of chaos. This is the space that the TRC occupied. It 
was not intended as a substitute for criminal justice (Rotberg and Thompson 
2000: 149). The 'justice of law' still existed but the overarching emphasis was on 
restorative rather than retributive justice, which is not such much about punishment as 
it is about "restoring victims, restoring offenders and restoring communities" (Bell 
2002:90). Unlike amnesties that blanket or suppress truths, a truth commission seeks 
to establish a common narrative of a shared past necessarily engaging a personal truth 
and a social truth (ibid.) - to allow both the 'I' and 'we', victim and perpetrator(s) to 
tell their stories. Consequently, how forgiveness becomes intelligible "results from the 
interaction between the victim' s conception of forgiveness and its broader societal 
and ethical understandings" (Verdeja 2004:35). In complexity terms, it is this open 
dynamic and continuous interaclion of complex systems with their environments (the 
engagement between 'I' and 'we') that allows them to generate and regenerate 
themselves by self-organising to changing circumstances and changing meanings. 
160 
This resonates in the method of the TRC as it encouraged dialogue, reciprocity and 
feedback, with the aspiration that parties could share their versions of past events and, 
with time, come to share responsibility for those very events. 
This chapter sought to engage with the complex relationship between 
confession, forgiveness and social reconciliation with the prospect of rejuvenating the 
social order. The potent force of forgiveness as a non-v~olent catalyst seems to present 
itself in the construction of subjectivities and collectivities. It is a systemic testament 
to the creative aspect of the sacred. The point is not to say that forgiveness has the 
same telos as violence (Verdeja 2004:39) in the regeneration of society - as this is 
once again in the realm of binary thought in proposing that either violence or non-
violence can save society from itself - but rather that the dynamic interplay of 
destructive and creative forces that presents a macro reflection of a systemic 
phenomenon already observed at the level of subjectivities. Whether forgiveness is 
ultimately sustainable as a force of social generation and regeneration or not, we 
cannot say. But what we can say is these forces did the political work that for Girard 
has historically been the domain of violence. We therefore have the originary 
experience of a community that metamorphosed from violent disorder into a new 
inclusive social order by integrating an ethic of forgiveness (and including associated 
values of interdependence, care and co-operation) rather than falling uncritically and 
instinctually back onto violence. 
S.10. Conclusion 
From the Newtonian worldview, the identity of the self and the social, its 
autonomy and/or sovereignty, is necessarily achieved sacrificially through processes 
of violent exclusion, and any belief in the transformative power of co-operation, 
interdependence and forgiveness has historically been dismissed as "naive" and 
idealistic. Working from within this modernist paradigm, Girard postulated violence 
as the single modus to community (re)generation as the autonomy of the social order 
was a function of the sacrificial expulsion of disorder, enacted through the scapegoat 
mechanism. Apartheid, by its very definition as 'apartness', was premised upon such 
an ethic of violent (material and ideational) exclusion. In its function as sacrificial 
galvanist, violence embodies the duality of the pharmakon, as Thorton describes in 
the context of South Africa "the endemic conflict that characterised South African 
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history ... is the source of both the stability and disintegration" (in Christie 2002: 108; 
emphasis added). 
In refuting this rigid violence-identity nexus, I have argued that the violent 
world of Western modernity, represented by individualism and statism, seems to be 
on the wane. Alternative ways of conceiving both individual and collective identities 
are being articulated and the fac! that the analyses of post-sacrificial subject and 
community formations are being engaged at the same time, suggests something more 
fundamental than mere coincidence. I believe that this is a further reflection of a total 
shift, a shift of the magnitude that signalled the shift away from a medieval 
organismic world towards a Newtonian mechanistic world. We currently find 
ourselves living the transition to a post-Newtonian world, which has called into 
question many of the key assumptions that have historically constructed violence as 
the default state of human existence. In such a world, defined by the profound 
interconnectedness and interdependence of individuals and collectives, we may situate 
the generators of culture at the edge of chaos where we find the unity of order and 
chaos, which challenges the historical emphasis on autonomy and separation, 
violently assured. 
Furthermore, at the edge of chaos we find a fractal dimension, which allows us 
to speak of the (re) construction of individual and collective identities in holistic 
terms. At the micro level of subjectivity, Kristeva's subject embodies the destructive 
capacity of murder (matricide) with the generative capacity of love. Self-similarly at 
the macro level, society follows the same pattern of interaction, precariously balanced 
between stabilising and destabilising forces in dynamic interplay, which defines its 
identity. All galvanists that contribute to the creation of community display this 
ambiguity associated with the pharmakon and in this chapter I have sought to 
understand how collectivities engage post-sacrificial mechanisms of identity 
formation such as forgiveness , dialogue and mourning and how these catalysts 
contribute to the construction of a post-sacrificial communality. I framed my specific 
discussion of the transitory experience of South Africa with the philosophy of ubuntu 
that resonates better with a pre-modern organistic and now again, post-modern 
complexity world-view; and which presented us with the ethical imperative between 
victim and victimiser to confess-and-forgive because the humanity of both depends 
upon it. Whilst this ethic is important as it emphasises co-responsibility (rather than 
obligation) and the interdependence of human beings (rather than autonomy), it is not 
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an adequate solution to the quandary of post-sacrificial identity formation as it is not 
applicable in Western communities. However the logic of the Africanist ethic can be 
universalised if Derrida's aporia is read in terms of complexity as the generative 
interplay between the destructive aspect (qua radical evil) and creative aspect (qua 
extraordinary forgiveness) of the sacred. Derrida argues that we are unable to 
experience su_ch an aporia, as it requires an (impossibly) absolute embrace of the 
other. He contends that if we would experience that we are absolutely interdependent 
on (an) other and submit to a definition of humanness in terms of interdependence, 
then we would understand that no extremity of violence could cause us to renounce an 
ethical obligation to forgive the other as a condition of self. To do so is impossible; 
however it is this very impossibility that becomes the horizon to which we must aspire 
if we are to invoke forgiveness as a catalyst in the generation of a post-sacrificial 
community. 
In its creative capacity forgiveness allows for the therapeutic healing of a 
badly traumatised social order, as Govier (2002:80) supports that forgiveness acted as 
a catalyst for the repair of a badly fractured human relation. Indeed the very origin of 
the word in Greek is linked to concepts of purification, catharsis and spiritual renewal 
(Asmal et al 1997:48). In creating a national solidarity; in bringing about a social 
reconciliation; or in bringing to a close viscous cycles of reciprocal violence and 
revenge, forgiveness effectively does all those things that Girard says only violence 
can do. This testifies to the fact that forgiveness shares a basic structural similarity 
with sacrifice (Verdeja 2004:39). However I am not postulating either forgiveness or 
violence as the primary (default) modus that creates community. Neither am I 
suggesting that either expelling or embracing the Other can re-enact the social bond, 
and I am certainly not looking to replace violence with non-violence as this would 
entail reproducing problematic Newtonian binaries. Rather, using post-Newtonian 
discourse, I believe we are able to reassess the way in which individual and collective 
identities are formed - not in terms of battle between creative and destructive 
impulses but as a generative interplay of these contradictory forces. Indeed it is the 
very mark of a post-sacrificial gaJvanist that it unifies the destructive and generative 
aspects of the sacred and does so in a way that creates community. The fact that we 
find ourselves in the domain of the sacred illuminates the belief that South Africa's 
transition from one political system to another was miraculously mediated by 
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forgiveness, as a creative aspect of sacred. It is an impossible aporetic unity between 
pure evil and pure forgiveness tbat is a revelation of transcendence. 
Ultimately, I believe to discuss the possibility of such alternative creative 
mechanisms of collective rejuvenation; to acknowledge that in the past violence was 
detrimental to tbe social order and deformed social bonds and to create awareness 
about myths that enabled the modes of sacrificial violence is a constructive move. It 
speaks to the winds of change. It speaks to the possibility of responding to sacrificial 
violence, not witb vengeance or forgetfulness, but in post-sacrificial ways . And, in a 
time fraught with unleashed violence, to engage even with the possibility of an 
alternative future is in itself a positive, creative response to our excessively violent 
and inhumane past. 
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Conclusion 
Toward a Post-sacrificial Future 
In a speech entitled "I See the Promised Land" delivered in 1968, Martin 
Luther King, Jr. famously stated that "The question is no longer between violence and 
non-violence; it is between non-violence and non-existence". In reading Modernist 
accounts of the origin of culture (Girard) and the birth of the subject (Lacan, Kristeva) 
we have gained a clear understanding of the former distinction. The identity or 
autonomy of an entity is defined sacrificially and violence employed in such 
processes has been posited as a historical and conceptual inevitability. As a result in 
the contemporary world violence is set as the default-state and non-violence as an 
alternative is not defined in a positive sense but in the derogatory terms of binary 
opposition as what it is not, namely violence. In recent times a gamut of forces (most 
notably post-Newtonianism, post-feminism, post-colonialism and the emerging 
human rights culture) have begun rigorously contesting the notion of violence as the 
default-state. As a result, the legitimacy of sacrifice as the primary modus to an 
autonomous selfhood has been radically called into question and it urges us to 
acknowledge that whilst violence has historically played a central role in defining who 
we are as individuals and as a collective; violence need not dictate what we may 
become. Nonetheless the impulse to violence has been historically ingrained at all 
levels of existence, and so exposure to the sacrificial logic that (re) generates culture 
led to an escalation. in victims as communities attempt with increasing vehemence 
and apocalyptic futility to assert and sustain their autonomy sacrificially. Girard 
argues that this 'sacrificial crisis' leaves us staring down the barrel of a desperate 
ultimatum between renunciation of violence or annihilation by violence; between 
'non-violence' and 'non-existence' . 
The grisly reality of this choice is evident in the experiences of African post-
colonial states that are incapable of inventing their sovereignty sacrificially yet seem 
unwilling (or unable?) of detaching from the logic of ancient sacrificial rituals. 
Consequently, the employ of violence in a bid to assert autonomy is as futile as it has 
become ubiquitous. Commenting on the observed correspondence between the 
disintegration of culture and the desperation of violence in this context, Arjun 
Appadurai writes: 
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Wherever the testimony is sufficiently graphic ... it becomes clear that even the worst 
act of degradation - involving faeces, urine, body parts, beheading, impaling, gutting, 
sawing, raping, burning, hanging and suffocating - have macabre forms of cultural 
design (in Broch-Due 2005:24). 
The current crisis of violence and identity formation is not a problem of individuals, 
or communities, or states. It is a systemic problem. Broch-Due (2005 :6) writes "the 
quest for identity and belonging in post-colonial Africa is fought out at every level of 
social existence". To this end, a fragmented ModernistlNewtonian methodology is 
wholly inadequate in grappling with nature of the crisis and the possibility of 
transcending it. Indeed, I believe that the crux of the crisis is encapsulated in the 
paradigmatic shift away from such Newtonian thought toward a post-Newtonian 
worldview, which refutes the fearsome obsession with order and autonomy violently 
assured, as it does the unyielding binary between violence and non-violence that has 
forced us to confront the possibility of non-existence. 
In seeking to challenge the assumption of violence-as-default, I translated the 
comprehensive sacrificial nature of collective identity and subjectivity into a 
complexity-based model that allowed me to make three crucial conceptual moves 
toward a comprehensive understanding of post-sacrificial identities that occupy an 
important place in a post-Newtonian world. 
6.1. From autonomy to interdependence 
Throughout this thesis I argued that modernist accounts of self and collective 
identity are unified by the shared root metaphor of autonomy that is pursued violently. 
This assumption is exemplified by 17th century contract theory that obeyed a 
Newtonian ontology and thus viewed entities in atomistic terms as manifest in a 
concern with the nature and behaviour of autonomous individuals and sovereign 
states. In addition, the invention of 'masculinised' human nature and the 'manly' state 
was premised upon the sacrificial exclusion of the feminine. The change from 
ModernistlNewtonian to post-Newtonian thought has challenged the assumptions that 
supported the Hobbesian myth of autonomy/sovereignty sacrificially achieved. Whilst 
acknowledging that autonomy is a critical concept in the analysis of the identity-as-
violence phenomenon, I believe that the notion of Newtonian autonomy that 
underpinned both the Hobbesian view of human nature and the extrapolated Realist 
view of state that we are dealt with in our illustration of systemic nature of the 
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identity-violence nexus is and always has been illusory. In truth, neither atoms nor 
men nor states are naturally autonomous and it is in attempts to invent this mythical 
autonomy that we find recourse to violence. When the myth fails we witness the 
violent (sacrificial) expunging of an identified enemy-other with a view to reinventing 
an autonomous selfhood. 
From a post-Newtonian perspective, it becomes possible to disengage [rom the 
violence of inventing and sustaining the autonomy of individuals and states, by 
debunking the epistemology that makes systemic violence both necessary and 
possible. On this view, the world is no longer understood as a reducible bite-machine 
but one holistic, interdependent and indivisible, dynamic whole whose parts are 
interrelated (Capra 1982:66). Within such a system, entities are not understood in 
isolation but rather in terms of interconnections, as Bohr explains "Isolated material 
particles are abstractions, their properties being definable and observable only through 
their interaction with other systems" (in ibid:69). This understood it becomes possible 
to argue that the emergence of the subject and society are not associated exclusively 
with violence and that individual/collective identities and their formation may be 
articulated outside or beyond a concern with their 'autonomy'. This also entails an 
ontological shift as it compels us to engage with the most profound question of how 
we understand "entities" (be it a cell, an individual or a state) in taking as a point of 
departure not autonomy but interdependence. In other words, if the root assumption of 
complexity is relational then violence can/will no longer be invoked to sustain the 
myth of autonomy. 
6.2. From analogy to self-similarity 
In order to comprehensively challenge the assumption of sacrificial exclusion 
that lies at the base of subjectivity and the way communities conceive of their 
identity, I argued for the systemic nature of sacrificial violence. Theorists like 
Hobbes, Kant and Spinoza provided a quasi-hypothesis that the nexus between 
violence and identity resonates at the level of man and state, however the nature of the 
relation was not accounted for in a methodologically adequate manner. Using the new 
emerging organismic paradigm of complexity I re-represented Hobbesian "just so" 
analogies as self-similarities. In Jnderstanding society as a complex dynamical self-
organising system, we can expect such a system to display the characteristics of other 
such living organisms, notably a self-similar or analogical relation between the parts 
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and the whole. More specifically, I used the notion of the fractal implicit in this 
ontology to account for the assumed "analogy" between micro and macro, which 
allowed me to speak of the relationship between subjectivity violence and collectivity 
violence in terms of their organic self-similarity. With the benefit of such a unified 
systemic model of identity formation, it is possible to argue that the individual, the 
society and the state are linked or are generated by the _same algorithm that accounts 
for the patterns whereby self-identity is sacrificially created and sustained. In other 
words, by casting individual and social explanations of identity formation in the 
holistic mould of society, it becomes possible to account for the violence-identity 
nexus ontologicall y at all levels. 
Beyond this, in contemporary culture, a generative redefinition of the modern 
individual and the modern state in the masculine terms of autonomy/sovereignty 
sacrificially achieved is increasingly impossible. Given the organistic framework 
employed here, one in which the processes of individual and social identity formation 
display a self-similarity, it facilitates an ontological move away from the violence of 
traditional metaphysics toward a post-sacrificial epistemology valid for both 
collective identities and subjectivity. Whilst conceding that violence is an extremely 
fundamental aspect of cultural formation, it is not the only aspect and this realisation 
has compelled me to seek out alternative means to coalesce the collective and 
stabilizing the subject beyond murderous violence. 
6.3. From binary to interplay 
How then are we to conceive of post-sacrificial generators of identity? The 
key is to situate the identity of the self and society qua complex systems at the edge of 
chaos that is described as "a ferociously active frontier that has been found to exist 
between stability and incomprehensible disorder" (Hawkins 1996:8). In stark contrast 
to Newtonian thought, order and disorder are not rigid binary rivals but rather two 
faces of the same dynamic phenomenon (Baker 1993). From here, it allows us to 
construe the system's capacity for consistency or change as a function of the order-
disorder exchange. At the micro level, Ire-read Kristeva to cast the guest for self-
identity as a constant conflictual dialectical interplay between the symbolic (as order) 
and the semiotic (as disorder) that accounts for change (in Tsu-Chung Su 2005: 184). 
Rather than necessitating the sacrificial abjection of the maternal semiotic, 
subjectivity is understood in terms of the pharmakon as an ambiguous reconciliation 
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of forces of destruction and creation that causes the subject to move fluidly between 
the semiotic and the symbolic in the regeneration of their identity. We thus arrive at a 
post-Newtonian understanding of subjectivity that "no longer resorts to violence ... to 
maintain its sense of coherence" (Chapman and Rutherford in Gamble 2001:57) but 
rather finds coherence in acknowledging the dynamic and unpredictable interchange 
of order and disorder. 
In the case of communities, Girard contends that the sacred is all that has been 
sacrificed in order for culture to be born and must be sacrificed for any subsequent 
cultural renaissance. As Woodward (1997:30) supports "The sacred, that which is set 
apart, is defined and marked out as different in relation to the profane, to which the 
sacred is in opposition and from which it is entirely excluded". Where Girard 
collapses the order-disorder interplay into violence, or the sacred as the force of 
disorder that threatens the order of culture, through the lens of complexity, Ire-cast 
his modernist binary relation of violence and the sacred in post-Newtonian terms to 
argue that the force of culture is the interface between order and disorder. The sanctity 
of the social order is not achieved simply by the expUlsion of disorder through the 
sacrificial mechanism, but rather that violence exists as the sacred in the sense of 
being a unified destructive/generative force. As Beardsworth (2000:141) writes , "the 
scapegoat shift ambivalently between a 'victim' whose attributes are those of 
monstrosity and dereliction and a 'saviour' whose attributes are those of divinity, 
fertility and/or resurrection". The scapegoat is pharmakon - both destroyer and 
restorer - and the embodiment of the ambiguous potential that may be harvested in 
the order-disorder interplay. 
The logic of the pharmakon provides the conceptual hinge needed to articulate 
the self-similarity in two forms of post-sacrificial identity formation. The aim is not to 
create non-violence as an idealised default state that usurps the hegemonic position of 
violence, but rather to create a frame in which neither violence nor a non-violent 
alternative is pronounced more fundamental. Undoubtedly, violence is integral to 
human culture and the human condition (Broch-Due 2005: 17), but what this thesis has 
offered is a clearer understanding of the complex and intricate ways that violent and 
non-violent; destructive and creative forces are structured not by the binary 
opposition, but by their generative interaction at the origin of the subject and society. 
This dynamic interplay allows a system to maintain or transform its identity through 
the power of the attractors that operate at the edge of chaos, which exists as a function 
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of the continuous and self-organised oscillation between chaos and order. The holistic 
model developed here can account for the regeneration or decay of a complex system 
in a holistic, systemic way and thus allows us to say that subjectivity is not simply a 
reduplicated maternal sacrifice and the future of community is not inevitably defined 
by its violent past. 
6.4. Forging a post-sacrificial path 
In final synopsis, the complex system's methodology as mapped out in this 
thesis, has offered new ways of looking at the age-old violence-identity nexus, by 
engaging identity formation as a hybrid phenomenon or a fusion of the natural and 
social sciences. The ability to do so testifies to the magnitude of total shift currently 
being engaged from Newtonian to post-Newtonian worldview that has fundamentally 
altered the way we think of chaos, order and interdependence and has thus had 
profound consequence for the way we conceive of individual and collective identity 
construction. By situating my study in the context of this paradigm shift I have 
employed an alternative epistemology that takes as its point of departure identity 
defined in relational terms as interdependent rather than autonomous. Thus instead of 
pursuing a new mythology of violence (by reading non-violence in sacrificial terms), I 
have begun to conceive of the emergence of the subject and society in terms that are 
not exclusively destructive and associated with violence. This conclusion led me to 
speculate about possible creative forces of individual and cultural renewal, which 
entailed opening up a post-sacrificial space to integrate values such as forgiveness, 
co-operation, interdependence and care that pose a profound and creative response to 
violence, or the destructive aspect of the sacred. I believe that Derrida's aporetic form 
of forgiveness is one such generative cultural response to the violence of the sacred, 
which is extraordinary as it only responds to the most radical and sinister of evils . An 
aporia by definition is something beyond human comprehension, as Lucy (2004: 1) 
explains, "an aporia takes the form of something that cannot be explained within 
standard rules of logic". It is precisely in the aporetic nature of forgiveness - as an 
unthinkable response to an unthinkable evil - that it may inspire the possibility of 
change (in Reynolds and Roffe 2004:32). Pure forgiveness thus exists in unity with 
extreme violence - with its own impossibility - and in generating this unity of 
creation and destruction, an aporia generates the miraculous and mysterious 
transformative power of the pharrnakon. To this end, Derrida's aporetic forgiveness is 
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a bona fide post-sacrificial galvanist as it embodies the intimate unity of destructive 
forces and creative responses to the sacred. 
By situating the originary formation of the subject and society III systemic 
terms at the edge of chaos, I have read the violence/forgiveness interface as a 
representation of the destructive/generative aspect of the sacred. This post-Newtonian 
reading has cleared the conceptual space that would suggest there might yet be hope 
for a future that does not embrace violence as default-state. As testament to this very 
possibility, the post-1994 South Africa offered a non-violent quasi-aporetic response 
to the wreckages of a violent past. In theorising this extraordinary renunciation of 
vengeance and violence in a world, which as we have seen, has historically defined 
itself in these very terms, this thesis offers one step in the ' long walk' to a post-
sacrificial future. 
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